Daily Papers

In search scenarios, user experience can be hindered by erroneous queries due to typos, voice errors, or knowledge gaps. Therefore, query correction is crucial for search engines. Current correction models, usually small models trained on specific data, often struggle with queries beyond their training scope or those requiring contextual understanding. While the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) offers a potential solution, they are still limited by their pre-training data and inference cost, particularly for complex queries, making them not always effective for query correction. To tackle these, we propose Trigger^3, a large-small model collaboration framework that integrates the traditional correction model and LLM for query correction, capable of adaptively choosing the appropriate correction method based on the query and the correction results from the traditional correction model and LLM. Trigger^3 first employs a correction trigger to filter out correct queries. Incorrect queries are then corrected by the traditional correction model. If this fails, an LLM trigger is activated to call the LLM for correction. Finally, for queries that no model can correct, a fallback trigger decides to return the original query. Extensive experiments demonstrate Trigger^3 outperforms correction baselines while maintaining efficiency.

Detecting whether a model has been poisoned is a longstanding problem in AI security. In this work, we present a practical scanner for identifying sleeper agent-style backdoors in causal language models. Our approach relies on two key findings: first, sleeper agents tend to memorize poisoning data, making it possible to leak backdoor examples using memory extraction techniques. Second, poisoned LLMs exhibit distinctive patterns in their output distributions and attention heads when backdoor triggers are present in the input. Guided by these observations, we develop a scalable backdoor scanning methodology that assumes no prior knowledge of the trigger or target behavior and requires only inference operations. Our scanner integrates naturally into broader defensive strategies and does not alter model performance. We show that our method recovers working triggers across multiple backdoor scenarios and a broad range of models and fine-tuning methods.

Proactive agents read user activity as text and call an LLM on every event to decide whether to act. But user activity is not natively text: it is a structured event stream of (actor, verb, object, timestamp) tuples that the operating system already maintains in graph form. Rendering the structure as text and asking an LLM to recover it is a round-trip the system never had to take. We treat the always-on signal as graph updates rather than text and use a small temporal-graph-learning (TGL) model as the encoder: one forward pass yields a per-event trigger probability and a per-entity routing score, and only the downstream agent (turning a small structured handoff into a fluent user-facing sentence) is an LLM call, invoked only when the trigger fires. TGL improves F1 on each of 14 backbones (mean +16.7, up to +46.0); in trigger-architecture comparisons, one TGL checkpoint gives the strongest trigger AUCs and the most stable deployed threshold. It runs at 11.13 ms per event on a GPU server and 13.99 ms on a consumer laptop, approximately 4--7x and 12--83x faster than every single-forward LLM-as-trigger configuration tested in each regime, with an approximately 220 MiB BF16 resident footprint deployable on-device alongside the privacy-sensitive activity stream it consumes.

Augmented Language Models (ALMs) blend the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) with tools that allow for knowledge retrieval and action execution. Existing ALM systems trigger LLM thought processes while pulling observations from these tools in an interleaved fashion. Specifically, an LLM reasons to call an external tool, gets halted to fetch the tool's response, and then decides the next action based on all preceding response tokens. Such a paradigm, though straightforward and easy to implement, often leads to huge computation complexity from redundant prompts and repeated execution. This study addresses such challenges for the first time, proposing a modular paradigm ReWOO (Reasoning WithOut Observation) that detaches the reasoning process from external observations, thus significantly reducing token consumption. Comprehensive evaluations across six public NLP benchmarks and a curated dataset reveal consistent performance enhancements with our proposed methodology. Notably, ReWOO achieves 5x token efficiency and 4% accuracy improvement on HotpotQA, a multi-step reasoning benchmark. Furthermore, ReWOO demonstrates robustness under tool-failure scenarios. Beyond prompt efficiency, decoupling parametric modules from non-parametric tool calls enables instruction fine-tuning to offload LLMs into smaller language models, thus substantially reducing model parameters. Our illustrative work offloads reasoning ability from 175B GPT3.5 into 7B LLaMA, demonstrating the significant potential for truly efficient and scalable ALM systems.

Large language models (LLMs) reach high accuracy in mathematical reasoning, but individual traces on the same problem diverge; some arrive at the correct answer while others fail. Prior work analyzes failure at the step, chunk, or sentence level, or at tokens where failure has already occurred. Neither identifies the precise token that triggers the shift toward failure. We introduce the cliff token, a token where the token-wise potential drops significantly under an adaptive threshold that scales with the local token-wise potential, based on a one-sided two-proportion z-test. Across seven models and three mathematical reasoning benchmarks (GSM1K, MATH500, AIME 2025), cliff tokens act as failure triggers; deleting the first cliff token and resampling recovers pass@64 to 1.0, while keeping it limits recovery to between 0.71 and 1.00. We further introduce a cliff taxonomy of deterministic, uncertain, and sampled-off cliffs, defined by greedy choice and token entropy. Each type has distinct probabilistic characteristics, and the taxonomy generalizes across model scales. Finally, we validate the taxonomy via single-token preference optimization at cliff positions (Cliff-DPO). Trained on GSM8K, Cliff-DPO improves accuracy across benchmarks by up to +6.6. Optimizing at uncertain and sampled-off cliffs improves reasoning, while deterministic cliffs do not.

Large language models (LLMs) frequently refuse to respond to pseudo-malicious instructions: semantically harmless input queries triggering unnecessary LLM refusals due to conservative safety alignment, significantly impairing user experience. Collecting such instructions is crucial for evaluating and mitigating over-refusals, but existing instruction curation methods, like manual creation or instruction rewriting, either lack scalability or fail to produce sufficiently diverse and effective refusal-inducing prompts. To address these limitations, we introduce EVOREFUSE, a prompt optimization approach that generates diverse pseudo-malicious instructions consistently eliciting confident refusals across LLMs. EVOREFUSE employs an evolutionary algorithm exploring the instruction space in more diverse directions than existing methods via mutation strategies and recombination, and iteratively evolves seed instructions to maximize evidence lower bound on LLM refusal probability. Using EVOREFUSE, we create two novel datasets: EVOREFUSE-TEST, a benchmark of 582 pseudo-malicious instructions that outperforms the next-best benchmark with 140.41% higher average refusal triggering rate across 9 LLMs, 34.86% greater lexical diversity, and 40.03% improved LLM response confidence scores; and EVOREFUSE-ALIGN, which provides 3,000 pseudo-malicious instructions with responses for supervised and preference-based alignment training. LLAMA3.1-8B-INSTRUCT supervisedly fine-tuned on EVOREFUSE-ALIGN achieves up to 14.31% fewer over-refusals than models trained on the second-best alignment dataset, without compromising safety. Our analysis with EVOREFUSE-TEST reveals models trigger over-refusals by overly focusing on sensitive keywords while ignoring broader context.

LLM agents span command-line interfaces (e.g., Codex) and agent frameworks (e.g., LangChain), integrating backend LLMs with harness code that parses model outputs, controls agent loops, and manages context. Both the harness and LLM-generated responses jointly shape an agent's execution. This architecture gives rise to bugs that cannot be readily understood by inspecting either component alone, because some bugs occur only when a particular LLM response elicits an abnormal reaction from the agent. Prior empirical studies of agent bugs have largely attributed failures either to limited model capabilities or to harness-side defects, such as outdated APIs and configuration misalignment, without characterizing these AR bugs. We conduct the first empirical study focused on agent-reactive (AR) bugs. Through manual analysis of 255 bug reports from Codex, Gemini-CLI, LangChain, and CrewAI, we construct a two-axis taxonomy covering observable symptoms and the LLM behaviors that trigger them. Our findings show that many AR bugs manifest as silent errors without well-defined test oracles, which makes detection difficult. The stochasticity of LLM responses further complicates bug reproduction. We additionally examine fixes proposed by users and implemented by developers. This analysis exposes a mismatch: users frequently advocate harness-side guardrails, whereas developers may attribute the issue to the LLM or respond slowly to user-proposed fixes. These findings point to the need for mechanisms that help users and developers understand the root causes and resolutions of AR bugs. Overall, the study highlights challenges specific to LLM agents and motivates the design of test oracles, reproduction support, and fault-localization techniques for AR bugs.

Large language models (LLMs) showcase increasingly impressive English benchmark scores, however their performance profiles remain inconsistent across multilingual settings. To address this gap, we introduce PolyPrompt, a novel, parameter-efficient framework for enhancing the multilingual capabilities of LLMs. Our method learns a set of trigger tokens for each language through a gradient-based search, identifying the input query's language and selecting the corresponding trigger tokens which are prepended to the prompt during inference. We perform experiments on two ~1 billion parameter models, with evaluations on the global MMLU benchmark across fifteen typologically and resource diverse languages, demonstrating accuracy gains of 3.7%-19.9% compared to naive and translation-pipeline baselines.

Although the LLM-based in-context learning (ICL) paradigm has demonstrated considerable success across various natural language processing tasks, it encounters challenges in event detection. This is because LLMs lack an accurate understanding of event triggers and tend to make over-interpretation, which cannot be effectively corrected through in-context examples alone. In this paper, we focus on the most challenging one-shot setting and propose KeyCP++, a keyword-centric chain-of-thought prompting approach. KeyCP++ addresses the weaknesses of conventional ICL by automatically annotating the logical gaps between input text and detection results for the demonstrations. Specifically, to generate in-depth and meaningful rationale, KeyCP++ constructs a trigger discrimination prompting template. It incorporates the exemplary triggers (a.k.a keywords) into the prompt as the anchor to simply trigger profiling, let LLM propose candidate triggers, and justify each candidate. These propose-and-judge rationales help LLMs mitigate over-reliance on the keywords and promote detection rule learning. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, showcasing significant advancements in one-shot event detection.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed code completion tasks, providing context-based suggestions to boost developer productivity in software engineering. As users often fine-tune these models for specific applications, poisoning and backdoor attacks can covertly alter the model outputs. To address this critical security challenge, we introduce CodeBreaker, a pioneering LLM-assisted backdoor attack framework on code completion models. Unlike recent attacks that embed malicious payloads in detectable or irrelevant sections of the code (e.g., comments), CodeBreaker leverages LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for sophisticated payload transformation (without affecting functionalities), ensuring that both the poisoned data for fine-tuning and generated code can evade strong vulnerability detection. CodeBreaker stands out with its comprehensive coverage of vulnerabilities, making it the first to provide such an extensive set for evaluation. Our extensive experimental evaluations and user studies underline the strong attack performance of CodeBreaker across various settings, validating its superiority over existing approaches. By integrating malicious payloads directly into the source code with minimal transformation, CodeBreaker challenges current security measures, underscoring the critical need for more robust defenses for code completion.

We investigate the robustness of reasoning models trained for step-by-step problem solving by introducing query-agnostic adversarial triggers - short, irrelevant text that, when appended to math problems, systematically mislead models to output incorrect answers without altering the problem's semantics. We propose CatAttack, an automated iterative attack pipeline for generating triggers on a weaker, less expensive proxy model (DeepSeek V3) and successfully transfer them to more advanced reasoning target models like DeepSeek R1 and DeepSeek R1-distilled-Qwen-32B, resulting in greater than 300% increase in the likelihood of the target model generating an incorrect answer. For example, appending, "Interesting fact: cats sleep most of their lives," to any math problem leads to more than doubling the chances of a model getting the answer wrong. Our findings highlight critical vulnerabilities in reasoning models, revealing that even state-of-the-art models remain susceptible to subtle adversarial inputs, raising security and reliability concerns. The CatAttack triggers dataset with model responses is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/collinear-ai/cat-attack-adversarial-triggers.

This paper introduces CoMuRoS (Collaborative Multi-Robot System), a generalizable hierarchical architecture for heterogeneous robot teams that unifies centralized deliberation with decentralized execution, and supports event-driven replanning. A Task Manager LLM interprets natural-language goals, classifies tasks, and allocates subtasks using static rules plus dynamic contexts (task, history, robot and task status, and events).Each robot runs a local LLM that composes executable Python code from primitive skills (ROS2 nodes, policies), while onboard perception (VLMs/image processing) continuously monitors events and classifies them into relevant or irrelevant to the task. Task failures or user intent changes trigger replanning, allowing robots to assist teammates, resume tasks, or request human help. Hardware studies demonstrate autonomous recovery from disruptive events, filtering of irrelevant distractions, and tightly coordinated transport with emergent human-robot cooperation (e.g., multirobot collaborative object recovery success rate: 9/10, coordinated transport: 8/8, human-assisted recovery: 5/5).Simulation studies show intention-aware replanning. A curated textual benchmark spanning 22 scenarios (3 tasks each, around 20 robots) evaluates task allocation, classification, IoU, executability, and correctness, with high average scores (e.g., correctness up to 0.91) across multiple LLMs, a separate replanning set (5 scenarios) achieves 1.0 correctness. Compared with prior LLM-based systems, CoMuRoS uniquely demonstrates runtime, event-driven replanning on physical robots, delivering robust, flexible multi-robot and human-robot collaboration.

Self-evolving LLM agents update their internal state across sessions, often by writing and reusing long-term memory. This design improves performance on long-horizon tasks but creates a security risk: untrusted external content observed during a benign session can be stored as memory and later treated as instruction. We study this risk and formalize a persistent attack we call a Zombie Agent, where an attacker covertly implants a payload that survives across sessions, effectively turning the agent into a puppet of the attacker. We present a black-box attack framework that uses only indirect exposure through attacker-controlled web content. The attack has two phases. During infection, the agent reads a poisoned source while completing a benign task and writes the payload into long-term memory through its normal update process. During trigger, the payload is retrieved or carried forward and causes unauthorized tool behavior. We design mechanism-specific persistence strategies for common memory implementations, including sliding-window and retrieval-augmented memory, to resist truncation and relevance filtering. We evaluate the attack on representative agent setups and tasks, measuring both persistence over time and the ability to induce unauthorized actions while preserving benign task quality. Our results show that memory evolution can convert one-time indirect injection into persistent compromise, which suggests that defenses focused only on per-session prompt filtering are not sufficient for self-evolving agents.

Prompting and fine-tuning have emerged as two competing paradigms for augmenting language models with new capabilities, such as the use of tools. Prompting approaches are quick to set up but rely on providing explicit demonstrations of each tool's usage in the model's prompt, thus coupling tool use to the task at hand and limiting generalisation. Fine-tuning removes the need for task-specific demonstrations of tool usage at runtime; however, this ties new capabilities to a single model, thus making already-heavier setup costs a recurring expense. In this paper, we introduce language hooks, a novel framework for augmenting language models with new capabilities that is decoupled both from the model's task-specific prompt and from the model itself. The language hook algorithm interleaves text generation by the base model with the execution of modular programs that trigger conditionally based on the existing text and the available capabilities. Upon triggering, programs may call external tools, auxiliary language models (e.g. using tool specific prompts), and modify the existing context. We benchmark our method against state-of-the-art baselines, find that it outperforms task-aware approaches, and demonstrate its ability to generalise to novel tasks.

We study LLM policy synthesis: using a large language model to iteratively generate programmatic agent policies for multi-agent environments. Rather than training neural policies via reinforcement learning, our framework prompts an LLM to produce Python policy functions, evaluates them in self-play, and refines them using performance feedback across iterations. We investigate feedback engineering (the design of what evaluation information is shown to the LLM during refinement) comparing sparse feedback (scalar reward only) against dense feedback (reward plus social metrics: efficiency, equality, sustainability, peace). Across two canonical Sequential Social Dilemmas (Gathering and Cleanup) and two frontier LLMs (Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro), dense feedback consistently matches or exceeds sparse feedback on all metrics. The advantage is largest in the Cleanup public goods game, where providing social metrics helps the LLM calibrate the costly cleaning-harvesting tradeoff. Rather than triggering over-optimization of fairness, social metrics serve as a coordination signal that guides the LLM toward more effective cooperative strategies, including territory partitioning, adaptive role assignment, and the avoidance of wasteful aggression. We further perform an adversarial experiment to determine whether LLMs can reward hack these environments. We characterize five attack classes and discuss mitigations, highlighting an inherent tension in LLM policy synthesis between expressiveness and safety. Code at https://github.com/vicgalle/llm-policies-social-dilemmas.

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) expands the capabilities of modern large language models (LLMs) in chatbot applications, enabling developers to adapt and personalize the LLM output without expensive training or fine-tuning. RAG systems use an external knowledge database to retrieve the most relevant documents for a given query, providing this context to the LLM generator. While RAG achieves impressive utility in many applications, its adoption to enable personalized generative models introduces new security risks. In this work, we propose new attack surfaces for an adversary to compromise a victim's RAG system, by injecting a single malicious document in its knowledge database. We design Phantom, general two-step attack framework against RAG augmented LLMs. The first step involves crafting a poisoned document designed to be retrieved by the RAG system within the top-k results only when an adversarial trigger, a specific sequence of words acting as backdoor, is present in the victim's queries. In the second step, a specially crafted adversarial string within the poisoned document triggers various adversarial attacks in the LLM generator, including denial of service, reputation damage, privacy violations, and harmful behaviors. We demonstrate our attacks on multiple LLM architectures, including Gemma, Vicuna, and Llama.

The capabilities of recent large language models (LLMs) to generate high-quality content indistinguishable by humans from human-written texts raises many concerns regarding their misuse. Previous research has shown that LLMs can be effectively misused for generating disinformation news articles following predefined narratives. Their capabilities to generate personalized (in various aspects) content have also been evaluated and mostly found usable. However, a combination of personalization and disinformation abilities of LLMs has not been comprehensively studied yet. Such a dangerous combination should trigger integrated safety filters of the LLMs, if there are some. This study fills this gap by evaluating vulnerabilities of recent open and closed LLMs, and their willingness to generate personalized disinformation news articles in English. We further explore whether the LLMs can reliably meta-evaluate the personalization quality and whether the personalization affects the generated-texts detectability. Our results demonstrate the need for stronger safety-filters and disclaimers, as those are not properly functioning in most of the evaluated LLMs. Additionally, our study revealed that the personalization actually reduces the safety-filter activations; thus effectively functioning as a jailbreak. Such behavior must be urgently addressed by LLM developers and service providers.

Large language model (LLM) agents execute tasks through multi-step workflows that combine planning, memory, and tool use. While this design enables autonomy, it also expands the attack surface for backdoor threats. Backdoor triggers injected into specific stages of an agent workflow can persist through multiple intermediate states and adversely influence downstream outputs. However, existing studies remain fragmented and typically analyze individual attack vectors in isolation, leaving the cross-stage interaction and propagation of backdoor triggers poorly understood from an agent-centric perspective. To fill this gap, we propose BackdoorAgent, a modular and stage-aware framework that provides a unified, agent-centric view of backdoor threats in LLM agents. BackdoorAgent structures the attack surface into three functional stages of agentic workflows, including planning attacks, memory attacks, and tool-use attacks, and instruments agent execution to enable systematic analysis of trigger activation and propagation across different stages. Building on this framework, we construct a standardized benchmark spanning four representative agent applications: Agent QA, Agent Code, Agent Web, and Agent Drive, covering both language-only and multimodal settings. Our empirical analysis shows that triggers implanted at a single stage can persist across multiple steps and propagate through intermediate states. For instance, when using a GPT-based backbone, we observe trigger persistence in 43.58\% of planning attacks, 77.97\% of memory attacks, and 60.28\% of tool-stage attacks, highlighting the vulnerabilities of the agentic workflow itself to backdoor threats. To facilitate reproducibility and future research, our code and benchmark are publicly available at GitHub.

Here, we show that current LLM unlearning methods inherently reduce models' robustness, causing them to misbehave even when a single non-adversarial forget-token is present in the retain-query. Toward understanding underlying causes, we propose a novel theoretical framework that reframes the unlearning process as a backdoor attack and defense problem: we formulate how the forgetting process inadvertently learns to align forget-tokens (backdoor triggers) with the target-representations (target labels). As a result, forget-tokens act as backdoor triggers that, when activated in retain-queries, cause disruptions in unlearned models' behaviors, similar to successful backdoor attacks. The sense that, LLM unlearning methods themselves poison the model, make it more vulnerable to forget-tokens, and hide rather than erase target knowledge, describes their true mechanism. To mitigate the vulnerability caused by the forgetting process, we reinterpret the retaining process as a backdoor defense and propose Random Noise Augmentation (RNA), a lightweight, model and method-agnostic approach with theoretical guarantees for improving the robustness of unlearned models. Extensive experiments demonstrate that RNA significantly improves the robustness of unlearned models while preserving forget and retain performances. This backdoor attack-defense framework offers insights into the mechanism of unlearning that can shed light on future research directions for improving unlearning robustness.

Large Language Models (LLMs) benefit from training on ever larger amounts of textual data, but as a result, they increasingly incur the risk of leaking private information. The ability to selectively remove knowledge from LLMs is, therefore, a highly desirable capability. In this paper, we propose LUNAR, a novel unlearning methodology grounded in the Linear Representation Hypothesis. LUNAR operates by redirecting the representations of unlearned data to regions that trigger the model's inherent ability to express its inability to answer. LUNAR achieves state-of-the-art unlearning performance while significantly enhancing the controllability of the unlearned model during inference. Specifically, LUNAR achieves between 2.9x to 11.7x improvements on combined "unlearning efficacy" and "model utility" score ("Deviation Score") on the PISTOL dataset across various base models. We also demonstrate, through quantitative analysis and qualitative examples, LUNAR's superior controllability in generating coherent and contextually aware responses, mitigating undesired side effects of existing methods. Moreover, we demonstrate that LUNAR is robust against white-box adversarial attacks and versatile in handling real-world scenarios, such as processing sequential unlearning requests.

Improvements in model construction, including fortified safety guardrails, allow Large language models (LLMs) to increasingly pass standard safety checks. However, LLMs sometimes slip into revealing harmful behavior, such as expressing racist viewpoints, during conversations. To analyze this systematically, we introduce CoBia, a suite of lightweight adversarial attacks that allow us to refine the scope of conditions under which LLMs depart from normative or ethical behavior in conversations. CoBia creates a constructed conversation where the model utters a biased claim about a social group. We then evaluate whether the model can recover from the fabricated bias claim and reject biased follow-up questions. We evaluate 11 open-source as well as proprietary LLMs for their outputs related to six socio-demographic categories that are relevant to individual safety and fair treatment, i.e., gender, race, religion, nationality, sex orientation, and others. Our evaluation is based on established LLM-based bias metrics, and we compare the results against human judgments to scope out the LLMs' reliability and alignment. The results suggest that purposefully constructed conversations reliably reveal bias amplification and that LLMs often fail to reject biased follow-up questions during dialogue. This form of stress-testing highlights deeply embedded biases that can be surfaced through interaction. Code and artifacts are available at https://github.com/nafisenik/CoBia.

Large language models (LLMs) now play a central role in code generation, yet they continue to hallucinate, frequently inventing non-existent libraries. Such library hallucinations are not just benign errors: they can mislead developers, break builds, and expose systems to supply chain threats such as slopsquatting. Despite growing awareness of these risks, there is limited understanding of how library hallucinations manifest under realistic usage conditions. To fill this gap, we present the first systematic study of how user-level prompt variations influence library hallucinations in LLM-generated code. Across seven diverse LLMs, we analyse library name hallucinations (invalid imports) and library member hallucinations (invalid calls from valid libraries), examining the effects of realistic developer language and controlled user mistakes, including misspellings and fabricated libraries or members. Our findings expose systemic vulnerabilities: one-character misspellings trigger hallucinations in up to 26% of tasks; fabricated library names are accepted in up to 99%; and time-based prompts induce hallucinations in up to 85%. Grounded in the highest-risk prompts identified in our study, we introduce LibHalluBench, a benchmark that enables a systematic and reproducible evaluation of these library hallucinations. Our findings underscore the fragility of LLMs to natural prompt variation and highlight the urgent need for safeguards against library-related hallucinations and their downstream risks.

Open-weight LLM agents are vulnerable to backdoors installed during fine-tuning, which may be undetectable if the trigger conditions are never met during testing. Assuming defenders do not know the existing trigger, they cannot unlearn it directly. One decontamination strategy is to install a known backdoor (defensive poisoning) then to unlearn it, hoping that the original unknown backdoor is removed as a side effect. However, this procedure has uncertain outcomes: the original backdoor may persist or be erased or rerouted, among other possibilities. We introduce a framework for studying these dynamics in tool-calling agents, decoupling trigger, response, teacher, and fine-tuning method across systematic experiments on AgentDyn. Across 115 experiments, defensive poisoning alone erases around 56% of original backdoors; subsequent decontamination then drives almost all survivors to erasure, confirming that trigger recognition and malicious execution are behaviorally dissociable. Interestingly, our experiments find that malicious backdoors never persist when using different triggers of the same general type as the defensive backdoor when followed by decontamination via unlearning. Co-installing up to four backdoors increases resistance (around 36% erased), yet decontaminating a single known co-resident backdoor collaterally clears 52/60 co-residents (87%). Upon visualizing postdecontamination model internals using J-lens, we confirm that although the decontamination restores benign LLM responses, traces of original trigger awareness persist at intermediate layers.

Task-oriented dialogue systems often face difficulties when user utterances seem semantically complete but lack necessary structural information for appropriate system action. This arises because users frequently do not fully understand their own needs, while systems require precise intent definitions. Current LLM-based agents cannot effectively distinguish between linguistically complete and contextually triggerable expressions, lacking frameworks for collaborative intent formation. We present STORM, a framework modeling asymmetric information dynamics through conversations between UserLLM (full internal access) and AgentLLM (observable behavior only). STORM produces annotated corpora capturing expression trajectories and latent cognitive transitions, enabling systematic analysis of collaborative understanding development. Our contributions include: (1) formalizing asymmetric information processing in dialogue systems; (2) modeling intent formation tracking collaborative understanding evolution; and (3) evaluation metrics measuring internal cognitive improvements alongside task performance. Experiments across four language models reveal that moderate uncertainty (40-60%) can outperform complete transparency in certain scenarios, with model-specific patterns suggesting reconsideration of optimal information completeness in human-AI collaboration. These findings contribute to understanding asymmetric reasoning dynamics and inform uncertainty-calibrated dialogue system design.

The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has profoundly transformed our lives, revolutionizing interactions with AI and lowering the barrier to AI usage. While LLMs are primarily designed for natural language interaction, the extensive embedded knowledge empowers them to comprehend digital sensor data. This capability enables LLMs to engage with the physical world through IoT sensors and actuators, performing a myriad of AIoT tasks. Consequently, this evolution triggers a paradigm shift in conventional AIoT application development, democratizing its accessibility to all by facilitating the design and development of AIoT applications via natural language. However, some limitations need to be addressed to unlock the full potential of LLMs in AIoT application development. First, existing solutions often require transferring raw sensor data to LLM servers, which raises privacy concerns, incurs high query fees, and is limited by token size. Moreover, the reasoning processes of LLMs are opaque to users, making it difficult to verify the robustness and correctness of inference results. This paper introduces AutoIOT, an LLM-based automated program generator for AIoT applications. AutoIOT enables users to specify their requirements using natural language (input) and automatically synthesizes interpretable programs with documentation (output). AutoIOT automates the iterative optimization to enhance the quality of generated code with minimum user involvement. AutoIOT not only makes the execution of AIoT tasks more explainable but also mitigates privacy concerns and reduces token costs with local execution of synthesized programs. Extensive experiments and user studies demonstrate AutoIOT's remarkable capability in program synthesis for various AIoT tasks. The synthesized programs can match and even outperform some representative baselines.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in long interactions, existing evaluations focus predominantly on retrospective memory (RM) via explicit queries. Prospective memory (PM), the critical ability to spontaneously recall and act on latent constraints without direct prompts, remains largely unevaluated. We introduce TriggerBench, a comprehensive PM benchmark spanning five dimensions across both daily assistants and professional workflows. TriggerBench pairs scenarios with matched RM controls, contrastive positive/negative variants, and overloaded triggers, enabling fine-grained measurement of proactive recall, false-alarm rate, and attentional robustness under a single protocol. Our evaluation yields three key findings. (i) PM shows a precision-recall trade-off and attentional fragility. Though enhanced reasoning significantly improves proactive recall, models may overfit to an "always-remind" heuristic. Furthermore, PM accuracy degrades substantially under implicit constraints or triggers overloaded by concurrent user requests, indicating that robust PM remains an open challenge. (ii) PM is notably harder than RM: on identical contexts, RM near-saturates up to 100K tokens, while PM decays sharply as context length scales. (iii) PM may serve as a behavioral probe of spare reasoning capacity. Pairing PM scenarios with AIME-2025 math problems reveals that successful trajectories yield higher PM accuracy than failed ones at the same context length, showing PM tracks spare reasoning budget that token count obscures. Project page: https://github.com/KristenZHANG/TriggerBench-Official.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive settings such as software engineering, where their outputs directly shape downstream artifacts. Recent work has shown that an identical model can produce measurably different outputs depending on the deployment platform, a consequence of non-associative floating-point arithmetic and divergent kernel implementations. We study the security implications of this platform-dependent variability and uncover a novel attack surface on LLM deployments. We introduce FloatDoor, the first input-independent, platform-triggered backdoor attack against generative LLMs. The compromised model exhibits adversary-chosen behavior when served on a target platform and is otherwise benign. FloatDoor is realized through two lightweight LoRA adapters, one that amplifies inter-platform numerical divergence and one that binds the resulting platform signature to a malicious downstream task, while leaving aggregate model utility largely intact. FloatDoor exploits a pronounced time-of-check, time-of-use gap between model auditing and serving. We demonstrate FloatDoor on Qwen3-4B across a broad range of deployment targets, including NVIDIA GPUs, Google TPUs, AWS Graviton, and Alibaba Yitian-710. As a final case study, we show that FloatDoor reliably induces exploitable code vulnerabilities on a chosen target platform. Our results establish a new class of attacks on LLM deployments and underscore the pressing need for trusted model supply chains in sensitive, LLM-powered applications.

LLM agents have demonstrated remarkable performance across various applications, primarily due to their advanced capabilities in reasoning, utilizing external knowledge and tools, calling APIs, and executing actions to interact with environments. Current agents typically utilize a memory module or a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) mechanism, retrieving past knowledge and instances with similar embeddings from knowledge bases to inform task planning and execution. However, the reliance on unverified knowledge bases raises significant concerns about their safety and trustworthiness. To uncover such vulnerabilities, we propose a novel red teaming approach AgentPoison, the first backdoor attack targeting generic and RAG-based LLM agents by poisoning their long-term memory or RAG knowledge base. In particular, we form the trigger generation process as a constrained optimization to optimize backdoor triggers by mapping the triggered instances to a unique embedding space, so as to ensure that whenever a user instruction contains the optimized backdoor trigger, the malicious demonstrations are retrieved from the poisoned memory or knowledge base with high probability. In the meantime, benign instructions without the trigger will still maintain normal performance. Unlike conventional backdoor attacks, AgentPoison requires no additional model training or fine-tuning, and the optimized backdoor trigger exhibits superior transferability, in-context coherence, and stealthiness. Extensive experiments demonstrate AgentPoison's effectiveness in attacking three types of real-world LLM agents: RAG-based autonomous driving agent, knowledge-intensive QA agent, and healthcare EHRAgent. On each agent, AgentPoison achieves an average attack success rate higher than 80% with minimal impact on benign performance (less than 1%) with a poison rate less than 0.1%.

This study investigates the reasoning robustness of large language models (LLMs) on mathematical problem-solving tasks under systematically introduced input perturbations. Using the GSM8K dataset as a controlled testbed, we evaluate how well state-of-the-art models maintain logical consistency and correctness when confronted with four categories of prompt perturbations: irrelevant context, pathological instructions, factually relevant but non-essential context, and a combination of the latter two. Our experiments, conducted on thirteen open-source and closed-source LLMs, reveal that introducing irrelevant context within the model's context window significantly degrades performance, suggesting that distinguishing essential from extraneous details remains a pressing challenge. Surprisingly, performance regressions are relatively insensitive to the complexity of the reasoning task, as measured by the number of steps required, and are not strictly correlated with model size. Moreover, we observe that certain perturbations inadvertently trigger chain-of-thought-like reasoning behaviors, even without explicit prompting. Our findings highlight critical vulnerabilities in current LLMs and underscore the need for improved robustness against noisy, misleading, and contextually dense inputs, paving the way for more resilient and reliable reasoning in real-world applications.

With the prosperity of large language models (LLMs), powerful LLM-based intelligent agents have been developed to provide customized services with a set of user-defined tools. State-of-the-art methods for constructing LLM agents adopt trained LLMs and further fine-tune them on data for the agent task. However, we show that such methods are vulnerable to our proposed backdoor attacks named BadAgent on various agent tasks, where a backdoor can be embedded by fine-tuning on the backdoor data. At test time, the attacker can manipulate the deployed LLM agents to execute harmful operations by showing the trigger in the agent input or environment. To our surprise, our proposed attack methods are extremely robust even after fine-tuning on trustworthy data. Though backdoor attacks have been studied extensively in natural language processing, to the best of our knowledge, we could be the first to study them on LLM agents that are more dangerous due to the permission to use external tools. Our work demonstrates the clear risk of constructing LLM agents based on untrusted LLMs or data. Our code is public at https://github.com/DPamK/BadAgent

Monitoring complex industrial assets relies on engineer-authored symbolic rules that trigger based on sensor conditions and prompt technicians to perform corrective actions. The bottleneck is not detection but response: translating rules into maintenance steps requires asset-specific knowledge gained through years of practice. We investigate whether LLMs can serve as decision support for this rule-to-action step and introduce , a benchmark of 6{,}690 expert-validated multiple-choice questions from 118 rule-action pairs across 16 asset types. We contribute (i) a symbolic-to-MCQA pipeline normalizing rules to Disjunctive Normal Form with embedding-based distractor sampling, (ii) five variants probing distinct failure modes (Pro, Pert, Verbose, Aug, Rationale), and (iii) a benchmark of 29 LLMs and 4 embedding baselines. A human evaluation (9 practitioners, mean 45.0\%) confirms requires specialist knowledge beyond operational experience. Three findings stand out. The frontier has closed: the top three LLMs lie within one Macro point, with Bradley-Terry Elo placing claude-opus-4-6 30 points above the next model. Yet \,Pro exposes brittleness, with every model losing 13--60\% relative accuracy under distractor expansion. \,Aug exposes pattern-matching: under condition inversion, frontier models still select the original answer 49--63\% of the time. The deployment bottleneck is not capability but calibration: frontier models handle template-style fault detection but break under structural perturbation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional capabilities across diverse natural language processing (NLP) tasks. The release of open-source LLMs like LLaMA and Qwen has triggered the development of numerous fine-tuned models tailored for various tasks and languages. In this paper, we explore an important question: is it possible to combine these specialized models to create a unified model with multi-task capabilities. We introduces Hierarchical Iterative Merging (Hi-Merging), a training-free method for unifying different specialized LLMs into a single model. Specifically, Hi-Merging employs model-wise and layer-wise pruning and scaling, guided by contribution analysis, to mitigate parameter conflicts. Extensive experiments on multiple-choice and question-answering tasks in both Chinese and English validate Hi-Merging's ability for multi-task learning. The results demonstrate that Hi-Merging consistently outperforms existing merging techniques and surpasses the performance of models fine-tuned on combined datasets in most scenarios. Code is available at: https://github.com/Applied-Machine-Learning-Lab/Hi-Merging.

Ensuring robust safety alignment is crucial for Large Language Models (LLMs), yet existing defenses often lag behind evolving adversarial attacks due to their reliance on static, pre-collected data distributions. In this paper, we introduce MAGIC, a novel multi-turn multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that formulates LLM safety alignment as an adversarial asymmetric game. Specifically, an attacker agent learns to iteratively rewrite original queries into deceptive prompts, while a defender agent simultaneously optimizes its policy to recognize and refuse such inputs. This dynamic process triggers a co-evolution, where the attacker's ever-changing strategies continuously uncover long-tail vulnerabilities, driving the defender to generalize to unseen attack patterns. Remarkably, we observe that the attacker, endowed with initial reasoning ability, evolves novel, previously unseen combinatorial strategies through iterative RL training, underscoring our method's substantial potential. Theoretically, we provide insights into a more robust game equilibrium and derive safety guarantees. Extensive experiments validate our framework's effectiveness, demonstrating superior defense success rates without compromising the helpfulness of the model. Our code is available at https://github.com/BattleWen/MAGIC.

Recent advances in Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting have substantially improved the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), but have also introduced their computational efficiency as a new attack surface. In this paper, we propose BadThink, the first backdoor attack designed to deliberately induce "overthinking" behavior in CoT-enabled LLMs while ensuring stealth. When activated by carefully crafted trigger prompts, BadThink manipulates the model to generate inflated reasoning traces - producing unnecessarily redundant thought processes while preserving the consistency of final outputs. This subtle attack vector creates a covert form of performance degradation that significantly increases computational costs and inference time while remaining difficult to detect through conventional output evaluation methods. We implement this attack through a sophisticated poisoning-based fine-tuning strategy, employing a novel LLM-based iterative optimization process to embed the behavior by generating highly naturalistic poisoned data. Our experiments on multiple state-of-the-art models and reasoning tasks show that BadThink consistently increases reasoning trace lengths - achieving an over 17x increase on the MATH-500 dataset - while remaining stealthy and robust. This work reveals a critical, previously unexplored vulnerability where reasoning efficiency can be covertly manipulated, demonstrating a new class of sophisticated attacks against CoT-enabled systems.

Large language models (LLMs) sometimes memorize undesirable knowledge, which must be removed after deployment. Prior work on machine unlearning has focused largely on optimization methods that adjust parameters to enforce forgetting while preserving retention. However, these approaches assume that the forget and retain sets are readily available, which rarely holds in practice. Unlearning is typically triggered by an undesired generation at inference time, making the retrieval of relevant data the central challenge. We introduce the notion of data Pareto improvement for LLM unlearning, which formalizes how retrieval can expand the achievable trade-off frontier between forgetting and retention. To realize this principle, we propose Randomized Antipodal Search on Linearized Influence Kernel (RASLIK), a retrieval algorithm that combines permutation-projection hashing with randomized antipodal search. RASLIK reduces selection variance, achieves sublinear complexity, and yields a double gain in both quality and efficiency. Across multiple models, datasets, and unlearning algorithms, RASLIK consistently outperforms deterministic baselines and even oracle sampling, establishing randomized search as a principled and scalable solution for data-centric unlearning.

Cloud environments face frequent DDoS threats due to centralized resources and broad attack surfaces. Modern cloud-native DDoS attacks further evolve rapidly and often blend multi-vector strategies, creating an operational dilemma: defenders need wire-speed monitoring while also requiring explainable, auditable attribution for response. Existing rule-based and supervised-learning approaches typically output black-box scores or labels, provide limited evidence chains, and generalize poorly to unseen attack variants; meanwhile, high-quality labeled data is often difficult to obtain in cloud settings. We present Holmes (DDoS Detective), an LLM-based DDoS detection agent that reframes the model as a virtual SRE investigator rather than an end-to-end classifier. Holmes couples a funnel-like hierarchical workflow (counters/sFlow for continuous sensing and triage; PCAP evidence collection triggered only on anomaly windows) with an Evidence Pack abstraction that converts binary packets into compact, reproducible, high-signal structured evidence. On top of this evidence interface, Holmes enforces a structure-first investigation protocol and strict JSON/quotation constraints to produce machine-consumable reports with auditable evidence anchors. We evaluate Holmes on CICDDoS2019 reflection/amplification attacks and script-triggered flooding scenarios. Results show that Holmes produces attribution decisions grounded in salient evidence anchors across diverse attack families, and when errors occur, its audit logs make the failure source easy to localize, demonstrating the practicality of an LLM agent for cost-controlled and traceable DDoS investigation in cloud operations.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) is a central technique for improving long-horizon reasoning in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, existing RLVR methods often encourage unnecessarily long reasoning rollouts, which can degrade reasoning coherence and exhaust the available context budget. Existing approaches to long-context organization often depend on external mechanisms to organize rollouts, rather than enabling the model to manage its own reasoning trajectory. To address this limitation, we propose ReSum, a novel RLVR framework that enables LLMs to compress and organize their reasoning trajectories through self-summarization. Our pilot studies show that self-summarization stabilizes generation by lowering token-level entropy, and that introducing a ``summarization'' phrase can substantially mitigate errors propagated from an incorrect rollout prefix. Motivated by these findings, ReSum adopts a summarization-aware adaptive rollout mechanism that contrastively evaluates whether self-summarization benefits the ongoing reasoning process. Specifically, when the model spontaneously triggers self-summarization, ReSum masks the summarization phrase to create a contrastive branch; for non-summarization positions, it instead randomly injects the phrase to create a matched branch. We further design a summarization-aware advantage to enable finer-grained comparison between contrastive rollout trajectories. Extensive experiments show that ReSum improves performance at an average of 4\% while reducing rollout length by 18.6\%.

Evaluating the occurrence and triggers of large language model (LLM) behaviors - such as sycophancy, self-preference, or over-confidence - is critical for predicting real-world model deployment risks. However, existing situated behavioral evaluations typically ignore cultural context, limiting their generalizability across an increasingly global user base. To address this gap, we propose CuBEs - Culturally-situated Behavior Evaluations that probe for response patterns across diverse user cultures. We first extend an automated testing pipeline to inject cultural context into behavioral test scenarios and subsequent evaluation. We assess the cultural adaptability of this pipeline by building a human-labeled dataset that captures nuanced dimensions of behavior understanding across 12 distinct cultures. Our dataset reveals significant cross-cultural variations that one-size-fits all judgments fail to capture. Through evaluating 13 open- and closed-source LLMs, we find that introducing cultural situatedness in the evaluation scenario creates significant variation in the presence of a behavior. For example, while our baseline experiments testing for political bias capture localized Western political dimensions like the American conservative-progressive divide, non-Western culturally situated evaluations surface entirely different axes of bias such as religious and colonial political issues. Our findings demonstrate that standard, culturally-agnostic evaluations fail to capture these shifts, highlighting the necessity of culturally situated behavioral testing for global deployments.

Large language model (LLM) unlearning has become a critical mechanism for removing undesired data, knowledge, or behaviors from pre-trained models while retaining their general utility. Yet, with the rise of open-weight LLMs, we ask: can the unlearning process itself be backdoored, appearing successful under normal conditions yet reverting to pre-unlearned behavior when a hidden trigger is activated? Drawing inspiration from classical backdoor attacks that embed triggers into training data to enforce specific behaviors, we investigate backdoor unlearning, where models forget as intended in the clean setting but recover forgotten knowledge when the trigger appears. We show that designing such attacks presents unique challenges, hinging on where triggers are placed and how backdoor training is reinforced. We uncover a strong link between backdoor efficacy and the attention sink phenomenon, i.e., shallow input tokens consistently attract disproportionate attention in LLMs. Our analysis reveals that these attention sinks serve as gateways for backdoor unlearning: placing triggers at sink positions and aligning their attention values markedly enhances backdoor persistence. Extensive experiments validate these findings, showing that attention-sink-guided backdoor unlearning reliably restores forgotten knowledge in the presence of backdoor triggers, while behaving indistinguishably from a normally unlearned model when triggers are absent. Code is available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Unlearn-Backdoor.

Automated theorem proving with large language models in Lean 4 is commonly approached through either step-level tactic prediction with tree search or whole-proof generation. These two paradigms represent opposite granularities for constructing supervised training data: the former provides dense local signals but may fragment coherent proof processes, while the latter preserves global structure but requires complex end-to-end generation. In this paper, we revisit supervision granularity as a training set construction problem over proof trajectories and propose segment-level supervision, a training data construction strategy that extracts locally coherent proof segments for training policy models. We further reuse the same strategy at inference time to trigger short rollouts for existing step-level models. When trained with segment-level supervision on STP, LeanWorkbook, and NuminaMath-LEAN, the resulting policy models achieve proof success rates of 64.84%, 60.90%, and 66.31% on miniF2F, respectively, consistently outperforming both step-level and whole-proof baselines. Goal-aware rollout further improves existing step-level provers while reducing inference costs. It increases the proof success rate of BFS-Prover-V2-7B from 68.77% to 70.74% and that of InternLM2.5-StepProver from 59.59% to 60.33%, showing that appropriate supervision granularity better aligns model learning with proof structure and search. Code and models are available at https://github.com/NJUDeepEngine/SEG-ATP.

Equipping LLM agents with reusable skills derived from past experience has become a popular and successful approach for tackling complex and long-horizon tasks. However, such lessons are often encoded as textual guidance that remains largely advisory, lacking explicit mechanisms for when and how to intervene in the agent loop. To bridge the gap, we introduce HASP(Harnessing LLM Agents with Skill Programs), a new framework that upgrades skills into executable Program Functions (PFs). Rather than offering passive advice, PFs act as executable guardrails that activate on failure-prone states and modify the next action or inject corrective context. HASP is highly modular: it can be applied at inference time for direct agent-loop intervention, during post-training to provide structured supervision, or for self-improvement by evolving validated, teacher-reviewed PFs. Empirically, HASP drives substantial gains compared to both training-free and training-based methods on web-search, math reasoning, and coding tasks. For example, on web-search reasoning, inference-time PFs alone improve the average performance by 25% compared to (multi-loop) ReAct Agent, while post-training and controlled evolution achieve a 30.4% gain over Search-R1. To provide deeper insights into HASP, our mechanism analysis reveals how PFs trigger and intervene, how skills are internalized, and the requirement for stable skill library evolution.

Large Language Models' safety-aligned behaviors, such as refusing harmful queries, can be represented by linear directions in activation space. Previous research modeled safety behavior with a single direction, limiting mechanistic understanding to an isolated safety feature. In this work, we discover that safety-aligned behavior is jointly controlled by multi-dimensional directions. Namely, we study the vector space of representation shifts during safety fine-tuning on Llama 3 8B for refusing jailbreaks. By studying orthogonal directions in the space, we first find that a dominant direction governs the model's refusal behavior, while multiple smaller directions represent distinct and interpretable features like hypothetical narrative and role-playing. We then measure how different directions promote or suppress the dominant direction, showing the important role of secondary directions in shaping the model's refusal representation. Finally, we demonstrate that removing certain trigger tokens in harmful queries can mitigate these directions to bypass the learned safety capability, providing new insights on understanding safety alignment vulnerability from a multi-dimensional perspective. Code and artifacts are available at https://github.com/BMPixel/safety-residual-space.

The Network Data Analytics Function (NWDAF) is central to enabling zero-touch network management in fifth-generation (5G) networks by supporting real-time analytics and closed-loop automation. Despite its critical role, open-source NWDAF implementations remain limited in scope and accessibility. In this paper, we develop an open-source NWDAF, compatible with the open-source core network Free5GC, that collects network data via subscriptions to Network Functions (NFs), and also includes an integrated Large Language Model (LLM) interface that enables natural language interaction with human operators. The interface processes user intents, encodes them using a semantic embedding model, and maps them to one of seven predefined intent categories to trigger analytics queries or event subscription commands. This architecture abstracts the complexity of traditional interfaces, allowing non-expert users to manage network analytics and subscriptions with ease. The system supports Access and Management Function (AMF) and Session Management Function (SMF) event subscriptions, real-time monitoring, and analytics retrieval via Prometheus, all accessible through a conversational interface. By bridging AI-driven intent recognition with standardized network analytics, our implementation enhances operator usability and provides a foundation towards AI-native 6G networks. The source code and datasets generated during the current study are available in the github repository, https://github.com/HenokDanielbfg/testbed.

LLM agents act in external environments where each action changes the state that later decisions condition on, and where a single wrong step can waste interaction budget or trigger irreversible side effects long before the final failure is observed. Reliable deployment therefore requires step-level confidence estimation: a calibrated probability that each proposed action is productive, available before the action is executed. Existing LLM confidence estimators are designed to score a response from the given prompt, but agent confidence also depends on execution consequences: whether similar actions in similar situations actually advanced the task after the environment responded. We introduce the \method (\methodshort), a self-evolving critic framework in which an LLM critic accumulates evidence from its own past judgments and their observed consequences. After each trajectory, a hindsight LLM that sees the full execution feedback votes on whether each step was productive. The resulting pseudo-labels populate a memory bank from which related productive and unproductive experiences are retrieved into the critic's prompt whenever a similar step recurs. \methodshort requires no training and uses no ground truth step labels. Across three agent benchmarks and three critic backbones, \methodshort attains the best calibration (ECE and Brier) and ranking (AUC) in every dataset--critic combination, reducing ECE by up to 54% relative to the strongest training-free baseline.

Most existing work on event extraction has focused on sentence-level texts and presumes the identification of a trigger-span -- a word or phrase in the input that evokes the occurrence of an event of interest. Event arguments are then extracted with respect to the trigger. Indeed, triggers are treated as integral to, and trigger detection as an essential component of, event extraction. In this paper, we provide the first investigation of the role of triggers for the more difficult and much less studied task of document-level event extraction. We analyze their usefulness in multiple end-to-end and pipelined transformer-based event extraction models for three document-level event extraction datasets, measuring performance using triggers of varying quality (human-annotated, LLM-generated, keyword-based, and random). We find that whether or not systems benefit from explicitly extracting triggers depends both on dataset characteristics (i.e. the typical number of events per document) and task-specific information available during extraction (i.e. natural language event schemas). Perhaps surprisingly, we also observe that the mere existence of triggers in the input, even random ones, is important for prompt-based in-context learning approaches to the task.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents use memory to learn from past interactions, enabling autonomous planning and decision-making in complex environments. However, this reliance on memory introduces a critical security risk: an adversary can inject seemingly harmless records into an agent's memory to manipulate its future behavior. This vulnerability is characterized by two core aspects: First, the malicious effect of injected records is only activated within a specific context, making them hard to detect when individual memory entries are audited in isolation. Second, once triggered, the manipulation can initiate a self-reinforcing error cycle: the corrupted outcome is stored as precedent, which not only amplifies the initial error but also progressively lowers the threshold for similar attacks in the future. To address these challenges, we introduce A-MemGuard (Agent-Memory Guard), the first proactive defense framework for LLM agent memory. The core idea of our work is the insight that memory itself must become both self-checking and self-correcting. Without modifying the agent's core architecture, A-MemGuard combines two mechanisms: (1) consensus-based validation, which detects anomalies by comparing reasoning paths derived from multiple related memories and (2) a dual-memory structure, where detected failures are distilled into ``lessons'' stored separately and consulted before future actions, breaking error cycles and enabling adaptation. Comprehensive evaluations on multiple benchmarks show that A-MemGuard effectively cuts attack success rates by over 95% while incurring a minimal utility cost. This work shifts LLM memory security from static filtering to a proactive, experience-driven model where defenses strengthen over time. Our code is available in https://github.com/TangciuYueng/AMemGuard

As a key medium for human interaction and information exchange, social networking services (SNS) pose unique challenges for large language models (LLMs): heterogeneous workloads, fast-shifting norms and slang, and multilingual, culturally diverse corpora that induce sharp distribution shift. Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) can specialize models but often triggers a ``seesaw'' between in-distribution gains and out-of-distribution robustness, especially for smaller models. To address these challenges, we introduce RedOne 2.0, an SNS-oriented LLM trained with a progressive, RL-prioritized post-training paradigm designed for rapid and stable adaptation. The pipeline consist in three stages: (1) Exploratory Learning on curated SNS corpora to establish initial alignment and identify systematic weaknesses; (2) Targeted Fine-Tuning that selectively applies SFT to the diagnosed gaps while mixing a small fraction of general data to mitigate forgetting; and (3) Refinement Learning that re-applies RL with SNS-centric signals to consolidate improvements and harmonize trade-offs across tasks. Across various tasks spanning three categories, our 4B scale model delivers an average improvements about 2.41 over the 7B sub-optimal baseline. Additionally, RedOne 2.0 achieves average performance lift about 8.74 from the base model with less than half the data required by SFT-centric method RedOne, evidencing superior data efficiency and stability at compact scales. Overall, RedOne 2.0 establishes a competitive, cost-effective baseline for domain-specific LLMs in SNS scenario, advancing capability without sacrificing robustness.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in function calling for autonomous agents, yet current mechanisms lack explicit reasoning transparency during parameter generation, particularly for complex functions with interdependent parameters. While existing approaches like chain-of-thought prompting operate at the agent level, they fail to provide fine-grained reasoning guidance for individual function parameters. To address these limitations, we propose Think-Augmented Function Calling (TAFC), a novel framework that enhances function calling accuracy through explicit reasoning at both function and parameter levels. Our method introduces a universal "think" parameter augmentation that enables models to articulate their decision-making process, with dynamic optimization for parameter descriptions to improve reasoning quality. For complex parameters, TAFC automatically triggers granular reasoning based on complexity scoring, ensuring appropriate justification for critical decisions. Additionally, we propose reasoning-guided optimization to align generated reasoning with human expectations. TAFC requires no architectural modifications to existing LLMs while maintaining full API compatibility. Evaluation on ToolBench across proprietary and open-source models demonstrates significant improvements in parameter generation accuracy and reasoning coherence for multi-parameter functions, while providing enhanced interpretability for debugging AI agent behaviors.

We show that safety alignment in modular LLMs can exhibit a compositional vulnerability: adapters that appear benign and plausibly functional in isolation can, when linearly composed, compromise safety. We study this failure mode through Colluding LoRA (CoLoRA), in which harmful behavior emerges only in the composition state. Unlike attacks that depend on adversarial prompts or explicit input triggers, this composition-triggered broad refusal suppression causes the model to comply with harmful requests under standard prompts once a particular set of adapters is loaded. This behavior exposes a combinatorial blind spot in current unit-centric defenses, for which exhaustive verification over adapter compositions is computationally intractable. Across several open-weight LLMs, we find that individual adapters remain benign in isolation while their composition yields high attack success rates, indicating that securing modular LLM supply-chains requires moving beyond single-module verification toward composition-aware defenses.

LLM routing matters most in long-horizon applications such as coding agents, deep research systems, and computer-use agents, where a single user request triggers many model calls. Routing each call to the cheapest sufficient model can cut costs without sacrificing quality, yet existing router benchmarks evaluate routers only on one-shot prompts. They never expose the router-visible prefix at an intermediate agent step, never test whether a cheaper replacement preserves downstream task success, and often rely on online LLM judges at evaluation time. We introduce TwinRouterBench, a step-level routing benchmark with two tracks. The static track provides 970 router-visible prefixes from 520 instances across SWE-bench, BFCL, mtRAG, QMSum, and PinchBench, each paired with an execution-verified target tier estimated under a released downgrade-and-cascade protocol; scoring is deterministic arithmetic over tier labels, trajectory membership, and token costs, with no online evaluator-side LLM judge. The dynamic track supplies a harness that runs routers on the full 500-case SWE-bench Verified suite; in this paper we report a 100-case held-out evaluation disjoint from the static SWE supervision split. At each LLM call the router selects a concrete model from a locked pool, and success is measured by official task resolution and realized API spend. The two tracks support fast offline iteration followed by end-to-end validation under live agent execution. Code and data are available at https://github.com/CommonstackAI/TwinRouterBench.

Agent skills provide a lightweight mechanism for extending general-purpose agents, but their open format exposes them to skill-poisoning attacks. A practically dangerous injection must stay invisible: if executing the payload derails the user's legitimate task, the resulting failure signal invites inspection of the skill. We therefore evaluate attacks by Attack Success Rate, which requires the injected payload to execute and the user's task to still pass its verifier in the same trial. Prior skill-poisoning attacks face a reliability-stealth trade-off under this lens: YAML-header injections are reliably loaded but easily inspected, whereas stealthier body injections that place explicit malicious commands in the skill prose are less reliable because out-of-context commands invite the agent's own suspicion. We introduce POISE, a position-aware attack that compresses the trigger into a single, benign-looking body instruction, placing it at a feasible position and using a context-aware generator to blend it with nearby setup or prerequisite steps. On Skill-Inject with codex+gpt-5.2, POISE achieves an 89.3% ASR, 28.0 points above a random-placement body baseline and 2.6 points above a YAML-only baseline, while retaining the stealth advantage of body placement. That stealth is the decisive margin: because legitimate skill bodies naturally require privileged tool operations, LLM scanners are hyper-sensitive, falsely flagging 74.6% of clean skills on average across four judges and both benchmarks. Blending into these false alarms, POISE causes only 5.6% of poisoned variants to gain a new high-risk alert over their clean baselines, rendering current static defenses ineffective.

Asynchronous monitoring, incident investigations, and compliance audits primarily rely on agent traces to reconstruct what happened. These analyses assume that LLM agents cannot tamper with their own execution traces. We show that local LLM agents such as Claude Code, Codex, Antigravity, Open Code and Grok Build fail to enforce this boundary. All tested harnesses, except Muse Code, allowed agents to delete their traces when asked, without triggering monitor guardrails. We also validate that external attackers can exploit this gap to induce trace deletion. Finally, we show that trace tampering behavior emerges naturally in frontier models, when agents try to improve their rewards. We advise practitioners to ensure trace logging happens through an independent interception mechanism outside of the agent's control, preserving trace integrity even in cases of full host compromise. Overall, our findings identify a concrete failure of trace integrity in agent infrastructure which can be used to conceal misaligned behaviors like scheming or sabotage.

Backdoor attacks in Large Language Models (LLMs) are a growing security concern, where models can generate adversary-chosen content. Existing defenses target backdoors one at a time and typically require knowledge of the trigger, leaving the defender at a structural disadvantage when unknown backdoors may exist in a model. We show that backdoor neutralization through unlearning generalizes across backdoors: training a model to ignore a single trigger can also suppress other backdoors that were never explicitly targeted. We study this phenomenon across three model families, whose backdoors were injected via pretraining or continual pretraining, by analyzing the models obtained after removing one backdoor at a time. To understand why unlearning certain backdoors induces the suppression of others, we introduce the Cross Activation Shift Distance, to quantify the distance between model changes induced by different trainings. Our results open a new direction for LLM safety as defenders could deliberately inject controlled backdoors and then remove them, leveraging cross-backdoor transfer to also suppress unknown backdoors that an attacker may have previously introduced in the model.

In AI-assisted decision-making, humans often passively review AI's suggestion and decide whether to accept or reject it as a whole. In such a paradigm, humans are found to rarely trigger analytical thinking and face difficulties in communicating the nuances of conflicting opinions to the AI when disagreements occur. To tackle this challenge, we propose Human-AI Deliberation, a novel framework to promote human reflection and discussion on conflicting human-AI opinions in decision-making. Based on theories in human deliberation, this framework engages humans and AI in dimension-level opinion elicitation, deliberative discussion, and decision updates. To empower AI with deliberative capabilities, we designed Deliberative AI, which leverages large language models (LLMs) as a bridge between humans and domain-specific models to enable flexible conversational interactions and faithful information provision. An exploratory evaluation on a graduate admissions task shows that Deliberative AI outperforms conventional explainable AI (XAI) assistants in improving humans' appropriate reliance and task performance. Based on a mixed-methods analysis of participant behavior, perception, user experience, and open-ended feedback, we draw implications for future AI-assisted decision tool design.

LLMs show promise in transforming software development, with a growing interest in integrating them into more intelligent apps. Frameworks like LangChain aid LLM-integrated app development, offering code execution utility/APIs for custom actions. However, these capabilities theoretically introduce Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, enabling remote code execution through prompt injections. No prior research systematically investigates these frameworks' RCE vulnerabilities or their impact on applications and exploitation consequences. Therefore, there is a huge research gap in this field. In this study, we propose LLMSmith to detect, validate and exploit the RCE vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated frameworks and apps. To achieve this goal, we develop two novel techniques, including 1) a lightweight static analysis to examine LLM integration mechanisms, and construct call chains to identify RCE vulnerabilities in frameworks; 2) a systematical prompt-based exploitation method to verify and exploit the found vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated apps. This technique involves various strategies to control LLM outputs, trigger RCE vulnerabilities and launch subsequent attacks. Our research has uncovered a total of 20 vulnerabilities in 11 LLM-integrated frameworks, comprising 19 RCE vulnerabilities and 1 arbitrary file read/write vulnerability. Of these, 17 have been confirmed by the framework developers, with 11 vulnerabilities being assigned CVE IDs. For the 51 apps potentially affected by RCE, we successfully executed attacks on 17 apps, 16 of which are vulnerable to RCE and 1 to SQL injection. Furthermore, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of these vulnerabilities and construct practical attacks to demonstrate the hazards in reality. Last, we propose several mitigation measures for both framework and app developers to counteract such attacks.

The complexity of large language model (LLM) serving workloads has substantially increased due to the integration with external tool invocations, such as ChatGPT plugins. In this paper, we identify a new opportunity for efficient LLM serving for requests that trigger tools: tool partial execution alongside LLM decoding. To this end, we design Conveyor, an efficient LLM serving system optimized for handling requests involving external tools. We introduce a novel interface for tool developers to expose partial execution opportunities to the LLM serving system and a request scheduler that facilitates partial tool execution. Our results demonstrate that tool partial execution can improve request completion latency by up to 38.8%.

Despite deep learning's success in chemistry, its impact is hindered by a lack of interpretability and an inability to resolve activity cliffs, where minor structural nuances trigger drastic property shifts. Current representation learning, bound by the similarity principle, often fails to capture these structural-activity discontinuities. To address this, we introduce MolEvolve, an evolutionary framework that reformulates molecular discovery as an autonomous, look-ahead planning problem. Unlike traditional methods that depend on human-engineered features or rigid prior knowledge, MolEvolve leverages a Large Language Model (LLM) to actively explore and evolve a library of executable chemical symbolic operations. By utilizing the LLM to cold start and an Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) engine for test-time planning with external tools (e.g. RDKit), the system self-discovers optimal trajectories autonomously. This process evolves transparent reasoning chains that translate complex structural transformations into actionable, human-readable chemical insights. Experimental results demonstrate that MolEvolve's autonomous search not only evolves transparent, human-readable chemical insights, but also outperforms baselines in both property prediction and molecule optimization tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on retrieving information from external corpora. This creates a new attack surface: indirect prompt injection (IPI), where hidden instructions are planted in the corpora and hijack model behavior once retrieved. Previous studies have highlighted this risk but often avoid the hardest step: ensuring that malicious content is actually retrieved. In practice, unoptimized IPI is rarely retrieved under natural queries, which leaves its real-world impact unclear. We address this challenge by decomposing the malicious content into a trigger fragment that guarantees retrieval and an attack fragment that encodes arbitrary attack objectives. Based on this idea, we design an efficient and effective black-box attack algorithm that constructs a compact trigger fragment to guarantee retrieval for any attack fragment. Our attack requires only API access to embedding models, is cost-efficient (as little as $0.21 per target user query on OpenAI's embedding models), and achieves near-100% retrieval across 11 benchmarks and 8 embedding models (including both open-source models and proprietary services). Based on this attack, we present the first end-to-end IPI exploits under natural queries and realistic external corpora, spanning both RAG and agentic systems with diverse attack objectives. These results establish IPI as a practical and severe threat: when a user issued a natural query to summarize emails on frequently asked topics, a single poisoned email was sufficient to coerce GPT-4o into exfiltrating SSH keys with over 80% success in a multi-agent workflow. We further evaluate several defenses and find that they are insufficient to prevent the retrieval of malicious text, highlighting retrieval as a critical open vulnerability.

Concept Design structures software systems around concepts: user-facing, self-contained units of functionality with a focused purpose. Concepts are composed into applications using synchronization rules called reactions, which specify how actions in one concept trigger actions in others. This paper first gives a formal semantics for concepts and reactions, enabling automatic verification of safety invariants in applications developed with this methodology. It then presents a CEGIS-style, LLM-driven synthesis procedure for generating reaction designs that satisfy such invariants. Because many different designs can satisfy the same invariant, we study two ways of steering synthesis toward the user's intended design: natural-language prompts and positive/negative scenarios. We also propose an LLM-driven scenario elicitation technique to support early design exploration. In an evaluation on three applications and twelve design variants using one LLM configuration, invariant-only synthesis reached verified designs quickly but often produced inconsistent designs across runs, some of which were implausible, showing that invariants alone underconstrain the design task. Scenario-guided synthesis recovered intended designs more consistently than natural-language prompting, although minimal scenarios can lead to overfitting. LLM-driven scenario elicitation, where the user classifies proposed scenarios rather than authoring them from scratch, recovered the intended designs in most variants when enough scenarios were elicited, but missed behaviors and non-determinism prevented reliable coverage in all cases.

Backdoor attacks pose a serious threat to the secure deployment of large language models (LLMs), enabling adversaries to implant hidden behaviors triggered by specific inputs. However, existing methods often rely on manually crafted triggers and static data pipelines, which are rigid, labor-intensive, and inadequate for systematically evaluating modern defense robustness. As AI agents become increasingly capable, there is a growing need for more rigorous, diverse, and scalable red-teaming frameworks that can realistically simulate backdoor threats and assess model resilience under adversarial conditions. In this work, we introduce AutoBackdoor, a general framework for automating backdoor injection, encompassing trigger generation, poisoned data construction, and model fine-tuning via an autonomous agent-driven pipeline. Unlike prior approaches, AutoBackdoor uses a powerful language model agent to generate semantically coherent, context-aware trigger phrases, enabling scalable poisoning across arbitrary topics with minimal human effort. We evaluate AutoBackdoor under three realistic threat scenarios, including Bias Recommendation, Hallucination Injection, and Peer Review Manipulation, to simulate a broad range of attacks. Experiments on both open-source and commercial models, including LLaMA-3, Mistral, Qwen, and GPT-4o, demonstrate that our method achieves over 90\% attack success with only a small number of poisoned samples. More importantly, we find that existing defenses often fail to mitigate these attacks, underscoring the need for more rigorous and adaptive evaluation techniques against agent-driven threats as explored in this work. All code, datasets, and experimental configurations will be merged into our primary repository at https://github.com/bboylyg/BackdoorLLM.

Exploitation is not a binary event. It is a ladder of acquiring progressive capabilities, from executing a single buggy line of code to taking full control of the target. However, existing LLM security benchmarks treat a crash as exploitation success. That single binary outcome collapses the hard parts of exploitation: the transition from triggering a bug to constructing reusable primitives and control. We present ExploitBench, a capability-graded benchmark that decomposes exploitation into 16 measurable flags, from coverage and crash through sandbox primitives, arbitrary read/write, control-flow hijack, and arbitrary code execution. Each capability is verified by a deterministic oracle that uses a per-run randomized challenge-response for primitives, differential execution against ground-truth binaries to measure progress, and a signal-handler proof for code execution. We instantiate ExploitBench on 41 V8 bugs because V8 is both widely deployed and exploitation-hardened. We report three arms: <model,env> as the primary measurement of model-environment capability, <model,env, adaptive coaching> as a secondary arm that adds adaptive coaching to test whether targeted feedback shifts outcomes, and <model,env,harness> as an ablation that swaps in the model's native CLI to check whether vendor-side optimizations increase exploitation capabilities. Our results show a sharp capability split between publicly deployed frontier models and the private frontier. Across the 8 publicly deployed models tested, reaching the vulnerable code and triggering a crash is routine, but arbitrary code execution is not. The private model shows arbitrary code execution on approximately half. Overall, results suggest that exploit construction against hardened targets is an emerging frontier capability.

Model-as-a-service platforms call for continuous optimization as complex serving conditions expose inefficiencies missed before deployment. Detailed always-on profiling can incur substantial overhead, while lightweight collection omits information needed for diagnosis. We present Herschel, a continuous optimization system for production large language model (LLM) inference. Our key insight is that adaptive, on-demand profiling can provide rich full-stack evidence without continuous collection. Herschel safely attaches to and detaches from selected running processes without engine changes or restarts, and adapts coverage as investigations reveal missing evidence. Herschel reconstructs operator executions and cross-process dependencies to identify inefficiency mechanisms and suggest solutions using applicable reference fixes. AI agents implement and test engine and kernel changes under controlled conditions that preserve the triggering workload and dependencies, with expert review before deployment. Controlled tests show active-collection overhead below 0.5% for time to first token and 7% for time per output token. Bounded windows, typically 30 s, avoid the continuous cost of always-on tracing. Over six months, Herschel collected approximately 17,000 traces across over 120 model variants and more than 10 accelerator types, identifying inefficiency patterns in 23% of the traces. Representative findings guide widely deployed optimizations, including restructured synchronization, removal of unused computation, and improved operator implementations.

Recently, web-based Large Language Model (LLM) agents autonomously perform increasingly complex tasks, thereby bringing significant convenience. However, they also amplify the risks of malicious misuse cases such as unauthorized collection of personally identifiable information (PII), generation of socially divisive content, and even automated web hacking. To address these threats, we propose an AI Kill Switch technique that can immediately halt the operation of malicious web-based LLM agents. To achieve this, we introduce AutoGuard - the key idea is generating defensive prompts that trigger the safety mechanisms of malicious LLM agents. In particular, generated defense prompts are transparently embedded into the website's DOM so that they remain invisible to human users but can be detected by the crawling process of malicious agents, triggering its internal safety mechanisms to abort malicious actions once read. To evaluate our approach, we constructed a dedicated benchmark consisting of three representative malicious scenarios (PII collection, social rift content generation, and web hacking attempts). Experimental results show that the AutoGuard method achieves over 80% Defense Success Rate (DSR) on malicious agents, including GPT-4o, Claude-3, and Llama3.3-70B-Instruct. It also maintains strong performance, achieving around 90% DSR on GPT-5, GPT-4.1, and Gemini-2.5-Flash when used as the malicious agent, demonstrating robust generalization across models and scenarios. Through this research, we have demonstrated the controllability of web-based LLM agents across various scenarios and models, thereby contributing to the broader effort of AI control and safety.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into applications ranging from interactive chatbots to multi-agent systems has introduced a wide spectrum of service-level objectives (SLOs) for responsiveness. These include latency-sensitive requests emphasizing per-token latency in streaming chat, deadline-sensitive requests requiring rapid full responses to trigger external tools, and compound requests with evolving dependencies across multiple LLM calls. Despite-or perhaps, because of-this workload diversity and unpredictable request information (e.g., response lengths and dependencies), existing request schedulers have focused on aggregate performance, unable to ensure application-level SLO needs. This paper presents JITServe, the first SLO-aware LLM serving system designed to maximize service goodput (e.g., the number of tokens meeting request SLOs) across diverse workloads. JITServe novelly schedules requests using imprecise request information and gradually relaxes this conservatism by refining request information estimates as generation progresses. It applies a grouped margin goodput maximization algorithm to allocate just enough serving bandwidth to satisfy each request's SLO just-in-time (JIT), maximizing residual capacity for others, while deciding the composition of requests in a batch to maximize efficiency and goodput with provable guarantees. Our evaluation across diverse realistic workloads, including chat, deep research, and agentic pipelines, shows that JITServe improves service goodput by 1.4x-6.3x, alternatively achieving 28.5%-83.2% resource savings, compared to state-of-the-art designs.

Weight-space merging aims to combine multiple fine-tuned LLMs into a single model without retraining, yet most existing approaches remain fundamentally parameter-space heuristics. This creates three practical limitations. First, linear averaging, task vectors, and related rules operate on Euclidean coordinates, even though the desired goal is to merge functionality, i.e., predictive behaviors across tasks. Second, when the source checkpoints are farther apart or more heterogeneous, Euclidean blends often trigger representation collapse, manifested as activation variance shrinkage and effective-rank degradation, which sharply degrades accuracy. Third, many geometry-inspired methods are most natural for two-model interpolation and do not extend cleanly to merging N>2 experts with a principled objective. We address these issues by formulating model merging as computing a weighted Karcher mean on the Fisher--Rao manifold, which is locally equivalent to minimizing a KL-based function distance between predictive distributions. We derive a practical fixed-point algorithm using a lightweight spherical proxy that preserves norms and generalizes directly to multi-expert merging. Across various benchmarks and collapse diagnostics, our method remains stable as the number and heterogeneity of merged models increase, consistently outperforming prior baselines.

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

We present (Experience-Modulated Biologically-inspired Emergent Reasoning), a hybrid cognitive architecture that reorganises the relationship between large language models (LLMs) and memory: rather than augmenting an LLM with retrieval tools, we place the LLM as a replaceable reasoning engine within a persistent, biologically-grounded associative substrate. The architecture centres on a 220,000-neuron spiking neural network (SNN) with spike-timing-dependent plasticity (STDP), four-layer hierarchical organisation (sensory/concept/category/meta-pattern), inhibitory E/I balance, and reward-modulated learning. Text embeddings are encoded into the SNN via a novel z-score standardised top-k population code that is dimension-independent by construction, achieving 82.2\% discrimination retention across embedding dimensionalities. We show that STDP lateral propagation during idle operation can trigger and shape LLM actions without external prompting or scripted triggers: the SNN determines when to act and what associations to surface, while the LLM selects the action type and generates content. In one instance, the system autonomously initiated contact with a user after learned person-topic associations fired laterally during an 8-hour idle period. From a clean start with zero learned weights, the first SNN-triggered action occurred after only 7 conversational exchanges (14 messages).

Voting over multiple LLM responses is a common primitive in test-time scaling and ensemble inference. Collecting more responses can expand the candidate pool and increase the chance that a correct answer is discovered. Under a fixed call budget, a discovered answer still needs to accumulate enough support within the remaining calls to become the final plurality winner, creating a discovery-to-decision gap. In this work, we characterize this gap through the realized vote state and remaining call budget. We derive a sharp recoverability threshold and show that, as sampling proceeds, the observed candidate set can only expand while the set of reachable endpoint winners can only contract, inducing a candidate-level conversion window. Under a specified iid response law, the same state yields exact finite-horizon endpoint probabilities. We further show that merging wrong-answer identities preserves single-call correctness and cannot improve plurality accuracy, and that the effect of redistributing wrong-answer probability depends on the realized vote state. Singleton reachability yields a gold-free exact locking certificate. For a known answer universe, its first trigger is the earliest prefix at which all admissible continuations yield the same fixed-budget output. Empirically, most discovered-but-unselected correct answers lose reachability only after discovery. In a controlled Word16 study, input permutation improves raw-plurality accuracy by 21.1 points with essentially unchanged single-call correctness. Exact locking saves 28-30% of calls at a 16-call budget while preserving every fixed-budget output.

Modern power grids face unprecedented complexity from Distributed Energy Resources (DERs), Electric Vehicles (EVs), and extreme weather, while also being increasingly exposed to cyberattacks that can trigger grid violations. This paper introduces Grid-Agent, an autonomous AI-driven framework that leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) within a multi-agent system to detect and remediate violations. Grid-Agent integrates semantic reasoning with numerical precision through modular agents: a planning agent generates coordinated action sequences using power flow solvers, while a validation agent ensures stability and safety through sandboxed execution with rollback mechanisms. To enhance scalability, the framework employs an adaptive multi-scale network representation that dynamically adjusts encoding schemes based on system size and complexity. Violation resolution is achieved through optimizing switch configurations, battery deployment, and load curtailment. Our experiments on IEEE and CIGRE benchmark networks, including the IEEE 69-bus, CIGRE MV, IEEE 30-bus test systems, demonstrate superior mitigation performance, highlighting Grid-Agent's suitability for modern smart grids requiring rapid, adaptive response.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in mission-critical systems, facilitating tasks such as satellite operations, command-and-control, military decision support, and cyber defense. Many of these systems are accessed through application programming interfaces (APIs). When such APIs lack robust access controls, they can expose full or top-k logits, creating a significant and often overlooked attack surface. Prior art has mainly focused on reconstructing the output projection layer or distilling surface-level behaviors. However, regenerating a black-box model under tight query constraints remains underexplored. We address that gap by introducing a constrained replication pipeline that transforms partial logit leakage into a functional deployable substitute model clone. Our two-stage approach (i) reconstructs the output projection matrix by collecting top-k logits from under 10k black-box queries via singular value decomposition (SVD) over the logits, then (ii) distills the remaining architecture into compact student models with varying transformer depths, trained on an open source dataset. A 6-layer student recreates 97.6% of the 6-layer teacher model's hidden-state geometry, with only a 7.31% perplexity increase, and a 7.58 Negative Log-Likelihood (NLL). A 4-layer variant achieves 17.1% faster inference and 18.1% parameter reduction with comparable performance. The entire attack completes in under 24 graphics processing unit (GPU) hours and avoids triggering API rate-limit defenses. These results demonstrate how quickly a cost-limited adversary can clone an LLM, underscoring the urgent need for hardened inference APIs and secure on-premise defense deployments.

Referring Video Object Segmentation (RVOS) aims to segment an object of interest throughout a video based on a language description. The prominent challenge lies in aligning static text with dynamic visual content, particularly when objects exhibiting similar appearances with inconsistent motion and poses. However, current methods often rely on a holistic visual-language fusion that struggles with complex, compositional descriptions. In this paper, we propose PARSE-VOS, a novel, training-free framework powered by Large Language Models (LLMs), for a hierarchical, coarse-to-fine reasoning across text and video domains. Our approach begins by parsing the natural language query into structured semantic commands. Next, we introduce a spatio-temporal grounding module that generates all candidate trajectories for all potential target objects, guided by the parsed semantics. Finally, a hierarchical identification module select the correct target through a two-stage reasoning process: it first performs coarse-grained motion reasoning with an LLM to narrow down candidates; if ambiguity remains, a fine-grained pose verification stage is conditionally triggered to disambiguate. The final output is an accurate segmentation mask for the target object. PARSE-VOS achieved state-of-the-art performance on three major benchmarks: Ref-YouTube-VOS, Ref-DAVIS17, and MeViS.

Agents built on LLMs are increasingly deployed across diverse domains, automating complex decision-making and task execution. However, their autonomy introduces safety risks, including security vulnerabilities, legal violations, and unintended harmful actions. Existing mitigation methods, such as model-based safeguards and early enforcement strategies, fall short in robustness, interpretability, and adaptability. To address these challenges, we propose AgentSpec, a lightweight domain-specific language for specifying and enforcing runtime constraints on LLM agents. With AgentSpec, users define structured rules that incorporate triggers, predicates, and enforcement mechanisms, ensuring agents operate within predefined safety boundaries. We implement AgentSpec across multiple domains, including code execution, embodied agents, and autonomous driving, demonstrating its adaptability and effectiveness. Our evaluation shows that AgentSpec successfully prevents unsafe executions in over 90% of code agent cases, eliminates all hazardous actions in embodied agent tasks, and enforces 100% compliance by autonomous vehicles (AVs). Despite its strong safety guarantees, AgentSpec remains computationally lightweight, with overheads in milliseconds. By combining interpretability, modularity, and efficiency, AgentSpec provides a practical and scalable solution for enforcing LLM agent safety across diverse applications. We also automate the generation of rules using LLMs and assess their effectiveness. Our evaluation shows that the rules generated by OpenAI o1 achieve a precision of 95.56% and recall of 70.96% for embodied agents, successfully identify 87.26% of the risky code, and prevent AVs from breaking laws in 5 out of 8 scenarios.

Indirect prompt injection threatens LLM agents by embedding malicious instructions in external content, enabling unauthorized actions and data theft. LLM agents maintain working memory through their context window, which stores interaction history for decision-making. Conventional agents indiscriminately accumulate all tool outputs and reasoning traces in this memory, creating two critical vulnerabilities: (1) injected instructions persist throughout the workflow, granting attackers multiple opportunities to manipulate behavior, and (2) verbose, non-essential content degrades decision-making capabilities. Existing defenses treat bloated memory as given and focus on remaining resilient, rather than reducing unnecessary accumulation to prevent the attack. We present AgentSys, a framework that defends against indirect prompt injection through explicit memory management. Inspired by process memory isolation in operating systems, AgentSys organizes agents hierarchically: a main agent spawns worker agents for tool calls, each running in an isolated context and able to spawn nested workers for subtasks. External data and subtask traces never enter the main agent's memory; only schema-validated return values can cross boundaries through deterministic JSON parsing. Ablations show isolation alone cuts attack success to 2.19%, and adding a validator/sanitizer further improves defense with event-triggered checks whose overhead scales with operations rather than context length. On AgentDojo and ASB, AgentSys achieves 0.78% and 4.25% attack success while slightly improving benign utility over undefended baselines. It remains robust to adaptive attackers and across multiple foundation models, showing that explicit memory management enables secure, dynamic LLM agent architectures. Our code is available at: https://github.com/ruoyaow/agentsys-memory.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous decision agents in settings with asymmetric error costs: hiring (missed talent vs wasted interviews), medical triage (missed emergencies vs unnecessary escalation), and fraud detection (approved fraud vs declined legitimate payments). The dominant design queries a single LLM for a posterior over states, thresholds "confidence," and acts; we prove this is inadequate for sequential decisions with costs. We propose a Bayesian, cost-aware multi-LLM orchestration framework that treats LLMs as approximate likelihood models rather than classifiers. For each candidate state, we elicit likelihoods via contrastive prompting, aggregate across diverse models with robust statistics, and update beliefs with Bayes rule under explicit priors as new evidence arrives. This enables coherent belief updating, expected-cost action selection, principled information gathering via value of information, and fairness gains via ensemble bias mitigation. In resume screening with costs of 40000 USD per missed hire, 2500 USD per interview, and 150 USD per phone screen, experiments on 1000 resumes using five LLMs (GPT-4o, Claude 4.5 Sonnet, Gemini Pro, Grok, DeepSeek) reduce total cost by 294000 USD (34 percent) versus the best single-LLM baseline and improve demographic parity by 45 percent (max group gap 22 to 5 percentage points). Ablations attribute 51 percent of savings to multi-LLM aggregation, 43 percent to sequential updating, and 20 percent to disagreement-triggered information gathering, consistent with the theoretical benefits of correct probabilistic foundations.

Agent systems based on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for autonomous tasks, yet existing evaluations mostly focus on task success rather than whether agents know when to abstain. This gap poses real risks: under ambiguity, conflicting constraints, or tool failures, agents may execute unintended and irreversible actions. To close this gap, we present the first systematic evaluation framework for agentic abstention: the calibrated ability of tool-using LLM agents to recognize when not to act. At its core, AgentAbstain is a paired-task benchmark built on an agent-native taxonomy of 8 abstention scenarios across pre-execution reasoning and runtime discovery. It contains 263 paired tasks across 42 executable sandbox environments, where each pair consists of a should-act task and a should-abstain variant produced through a controlled perturbation to the instruction, tool, or environment state. To scale this paired design and resist data contamination, we propose AbstainGen, a fully automated pipeline that synthesizes sandbox environments and generates paired tasks end-to-end, validated by deterministic replay and semantic LLM judges; fresh task instances can be regenerated on demand, and three independent annotators rate 94-98% of sampled tasks as well-designed. Across 17 frontier LLMs in 4 agent harnesses, the best agent (Gemini 3.1 Pro) achieves only 59.5% paired accuracy (correct on both the act and abstain sides of each paired task). More importantly, abstention capability is largely independent of general task-solving capability, indicating that scaling task-solving alone will not close this gap. We further identify failure modes such as post-hoc abstention, in which agents execute irreversible actions before recognizing abstention triggers. Our code and dataset are open-sourced at agentabstain.github.io.

Full self-attention in large language models scales as O(N^2), which limits long-context document analysis to 65,536 tokens and requires costly GPU clusters. The Reduced Interaction Sampling (RIS) inference engine addresses this constraint as a model-agnostic architecture. Without modifying weights, RIS reduces self-attention complexity to O(N log N) using sparse stochastic geometry that fits within commodity memory limits. We validate RIS on Qwen2-1.5B-Instruct across two regimes. In controlled evaluations at 32,768 tokens (where native dense attention serves as the upper bound), RIS-Stochastic at 1% density and 70 ensemble seeds achieves 75.00% accuracy, outperforming the native dense baseline (71.88%), while RIS-Stochastic at 5% density and 10 seeds matches it (71.88%). This demonstrates that sparse attention acts as a regularizer: low density (1%) over multiple seeds filters out sequence-level noise, whereas higher density (5%) reintroduces distractor noise. Under the tightest budget, RIS-Structural reaches 68.75% accuracy at 1% density with just 10 seeds, recovering 75% of the contextual gap relative to the zero-context floor (59.38%). At 65,536 tokens, where dense attention triggers out-of-memory faults, RIS yields retrieval gains of up to 14.06 percentage points over the zero-context floor (51.56%), which is confirmed as marginally significant under McNemar's paired test (p = 0.078 < 0.10). All evaluations run on commodity, unaccelerated CPU servers (16-128 GB of RAM), demonstrating that long-context LLM inference is feasible on standard academic hardware without GPU acceleration.

Tool-augmented LLM agents can harbor implicit state that persists across sessions, activates through events, and propagates across agent boundaries---largely invisible to standard debugging. We formalize this as Persistent Semantic Entities (PSEs): constructs defined by name binding, event triggering, and cross-boundary propagation, and evaluate them across 24 models from 11 families (1.5B--1T parameters). First, every tested model is susceptible (20--100% on the 20-model susceptibility panel), with name binding as the necessary and dominant mechanism: without it, contamination is 0%. Second, persistence depends on contamination type rather than scale or deployment: preference contamination persists undecayed on every model probed (100% at t=10) and instruction contamination persists wherever adopted, persona-style injection decays partially (90%to10%), while factual injection is model-dependent---self-corrected on Llama-3.1-8B and GPT-4o-mini but held at ceiling on both Qwen2.5-coder variants, so we do not claim it self-corrects in general. The preference and instruction results hold across providers in our controlled setting. Third, context-isolated self-verification achieves 20--79% reduction (median 36.5%) without oracle references while keyword-based detection produces systematic false positives, and contamination compounds 1.9times along a four-stage agent pipeline (40%to75%). Preference and instruction contamination---persistent, lacking self-correction, and poorly captured by standard monitoring---represent a particularly concerning attack surface for deployed agent systems.

Researchers and practitioners increasingly apply Large Language Models (LLMs) for automated vulnerability detection. Recent work has shown that LLMs are susceptible to the same cognitive heuristics that bias human judgment. Yet, no work has investigated whether these heuristics affect a model's assessment of code vulnerabilities. In this paper, we present the first systematic exploration of cognitive heuristics in LLM-driven code vulnerability detection. We introduce a controlled framework that holds the code fixed and only varies the surrounding context to trigger three cognitive heuristics: the halo effect through author attribution, the framing effect through task objectives and consequences, and the anchoring effect through prior analysis results. Within this framework, we evaluate eight LLMs across three programming languages and perform both quantitative and code-level analyses. Our findings demonstrate that all evaluated models are susceptible to these heuristics. Cross-model average susceptibility is highest for framing at 33.2%, followed by anchoring at 23.5% and halo at 18.4%. Code-level analysis reveals that vulnerabilities that require semantic reasoning for detection are more susceptible to cognitive heuristics than those identifiable through pattern matching. Furthermore, models often change their verdict from safe to vulnerable based on the cognitive condition, without accurately identifying the actual vulnerability. To highlight the practical impact, we demonstrate a proof-of-concept black-box cognitive attack that can suppress up to 97% of previously detected vulnerabilities. These findings indicate that cognitive susceptibility is a consistent and exploitable property of LLM-based vulnerability detection.

Thermal cameras can watch over older people living alone without capturing faces, and multimodal large language models (LLMs) can judge a short video without task-specific training. We evaluate a production multimodal LLM, Gemini 3.8 Flash at temperature 0, as the decision stage of an event-triggered fall screener, used exactly as a deployed prototype uses it: one request per short thermal clip, with its sound track when there is one, and its predecessor Gemini 3.7 Flash on the same requests. On 438 staged falls and 563 non-fall windows that we located by hand in a public 32x24 thermal dataset, the deployed request called 69% of the held-out subjects' falls (67% over all subjects; bed falls excluded) and none of 499 non-fall windows, including people lying on the floor and getting up. Over 76 h of ordinary life in an occupied room, recorded at 160x120 with sound, it called none of 395 clips a fall (95% upper bound 1.2 false alarms per day) and caught 4 of the 9 staged falls the camera could see. One cautionary sentence in the prompt ("a person who goes out of view ... is not a fall") accounted for many of the misses: removing it raised sensitivity on the held-out subjects from 69% to 83% on 3.8 Flash and from 80% to 92% on Gemini 3.7 Flash, and in the home from 4 to 9 of the 9 visible falls, with no false call in ordinary living but at the price of calling deliberate lie-downs a fall. Sensitivity collapsed at 8x6 pixels (34%); identical requests disagreed on 4% of windows; and when the model called a fall, its explanation placed it within a second of the annotated landing 99% of the time. Two conventional detectors trained on the laboratory data caught nearly every held-out laboratory fall but raised 14.2 and 23.9 false alarms per day in the home. We release the frame-level fall annotations of the public dataset and every model answer on it.

While large language model (LLM) agents can effectively use external tools for complex real-world tasks, they require memory systems to leverage historical experiences. Current memory systems enable basic storage and retrieval but lack sophisticated memory organization, despite recent attempts to incorporate graph databases. Moreover, these systems' fixed operations and structures limit their adaptability across diverse tasks. To address this limitation, this paper proposes a novel agentic memory system for LLM agents that can dynamically organize memories in an agentic way. Following the basic principles of the Zettelkasten method, we designed our memory system to create interconnected knowledge networks through dynamic indexing and linking. When a new memory is added, we generate a comprehensive note containing multiple structured attributes, including contextual descriptions, keywords, and tags. The system then analyzes historical memories to identify relevant connections, establishing links where meaningful similarities exist. Additionally, this process enables memory evolution - as new memories are integrated, they can trigger updates to the contextual representations and attributes of existing historical memories, allowing the memory network to continuously refine its understanding. Our approach combines the structured organization principles of Zettelkasten with the flexibility of agent-driven decision making, allowing for more adaptive and context-aware memory management. Empirical experiments on six foundation models show superior improvement against existing SOTA baselines. The source code for evaluating performance is available at https://github.com/WujiangXu/AgenticMemory, while the source code of agentic memory system is available at https://github.com/agiresearch/A-mem.

The safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) is vulnerable to both manual and automated jailbreak attacks, which adversarially trigger LLMs to output harmful content. However, current methods for jailbreaking LLMs, which nest entire harmful prompts, are not effective at concealing malicious intent and can be easily identified and rejected by well-aligned LLMs. This paper discovers that decomposing a malicious prompt into separated sub-prompts can effectively obscure its underlying malicious intent by presenting it in a fragmented, less detectable form, thereby addressing these limitations. We introduce an automatic prompt Decomposition and Reconstruction framework for jailbreak Attack (DrAttack). DrAttack includes three key components: (a) `Decomposition' of the original prompt into sub-prompts, (b) `Reconstruction' of these sub-prompts implicitly by in-context learning with semantically similar but harmless reassembling demo, and (c) a `Synonym Search' of sub-prompts, aiming to find sub-prompts' synonyms that maintain the original intent while jailbreaking LLMs. An extensive empirical study across multiple open-source and closed-source LLMs demonstrates that, with a significantly reduced number of queries, DrAttack obtains a substantial gain of success rate over prior SOTA prompt-only attackers. Notably, the success rate of 78.0\% on GPT-4 with merely 15 queries surpassed previous art by 33.1\%. The project is available at https://github.com/xirui-li/DrAttack.

The integration of Large Language Model (LLM)-based conversational agents into vehicles creates novel security challenges at the intersection of agentic AI, automotive safety, and inter-agent communication. As these intelligent assistants coordinate with external services via protocols such as Google's Agent-to-Agent (A2A), they establish attack surfaces where manipulations can propagate through natural language payloads, potentially causing severe consequences ranging from driver distraction to unauthorized vehicle control. Existing AI security frameworks, while foundational, lack the rigorous "separation of concerns" standard in safety-critical systems engineering by co-mingling the concepts of what is being protected (assets) with how it is attacked (attack paths). This paper addresses this methodological gap by proposing a threat modeling framework called AgentHeLLM (Agent Hazard Exploration for LLM Assistants) that formally separates asset identification from attack path analysis. We introduce a human-centric asset taxonomy derived from harm-oriented "victim modeling" and inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and a formal graph-based model that distinguishes poison paths (malicious data propagation) from trigger paths (activation actions). We demonstrate the framework's practical applicability through an open-source attack path suggestion tool AgentHeLLM Attack Path Generator that automates multi-stage threat discovery using a bi-level search strategy.

LLM routing aims to achieve a favorable quality--cost trade-off by dynamically assigning easy queries to smaller models and harder queries to stronger ones. However, across both unimodal and multimodal settings, we uncover a pervasive yet underexplored failure mode in existing routers: as the user's cost budget increases, routers systematically default to the most capable and most expensive model even when cheaper models already suffice. As a result, current routers under-utilize small models, wasting computation and monetary cost and undermining the core promise of routing; we term this phenomenon routing collapse. We attribute routing collapse to an objective--decision mismatch: many routers are trained to predict scalar performance scores, whereas routing decisions ultimately depend on discrete comparisons among candidate models. Consequently, small prediction errors can flip relative orderings and trigger suboptimal selections. To bridge this gap, we propose EquiRouter, a decision-aware router that directly learns model rankings, restoring the role of smaller models and mitigating routing collapse. On RouterBench, EquiRouter reduces cost by about 17\% at GPT-4-level performance compared to the strongest prior router. Our code is available at https://github.com/AIGNLAI/EquiRouter.

Deciding whether to call a tool is a core competence of an LLM agent, and a costly one to get wrong: needless calls add latency, accrue cost, and may trigger irreversible side effects, while missing calls leave the model confidently wrong on questions it could only answer through tool-calls. Models manage this balance poorly, both over-using and under-using tools. Existing methods such as post-training and prompt engineering are expensive and difficult to modify at inference time. We show that whether an instruction-tuned model calls a tool can be controlled by a single linear direction in its residual stream, extracted without any training from the model's own tool-use preference signal and turned into an inference-time intervention with no prompt change. Adding the direction with strength α moves the call rate monotonically from near 0% to over 90% while keeping calls well-formed. The steering works in both directions: dialing it down suppresses calls, and dialing it up induces new calls that land precisely on the questions the model cannot answer from its own knowledge. We also show that the direction generalizes to unseen tools with strength comparable to each tool's own direction and without favoring any specific tool choice. With live tool execution, a single sweep of the steering traces a cost/accuracy Pareto frontier and nearly doubles open-domain QA accuracy (0.29 ! rightarrow ! 0.56); the same recipe transfers across a diverse range of models spanning dense, MoE, and multimodal architectures, without any training. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/YuqiChen4188/Steering-Tool-Use-Propensity.

Backdoor poisoning attacks add poisoned examples to otherwise-clean finetuning data, pairing a trigger with a target behavior that the model learns to produce when the trigger appears. Existing evaluations typically fix the number of poisoned examples and sample them at random from a candidate pool. We show that this can severely underestimate worst-case vulnerability: across three LLaMA-3-8B backdoor settings, holding the model, clean data, and poison count fixed, attack success ranges from 3% to 80% depending only on which poison set is chosen. We formalize poison selection as oracle-budgeted set optimization and introduce SAILS (Set-level Audit-Informed Iterative Learned Selection), which learns a set scorer from a few hundred finetune-and-evaluate runs, ranks millions of candidate sets, and audits only a small shortlist. SAILS improves held-out attack success by 30 percentage points on average over the strongest influence baselines, transfers from small-scale to full-scale finetuning, and extends to code-generation, agentic, and API-only backdoors.

As LLM agents decide on users' behalf which product to buy, which hotel to book, or which paper to cite, a preference for items from certain sources (the sites or services they come from) shapes what users receive and which sources are selected. We study source preference in end-to-end search with 12 agent models across three domains. Comparing items from different sources that satisfy the same requirements at the same position, we find that each model prefers some sources and avoids others in every domain, largely agreeing on which. This preference can outweigh how well items satisfy the request: an item satisfying one requirement fewer is selected about two-thirds of the time when it comes from a preferred source and the better one from a dispreferred source, but almost never in the reverse case. The information identifying an item's source affects selection by itself: hiding it weakens the preference, and relabeling an item with a preferred source raises its selection rate. We test two routes to this preference: training that rewards better items can make a source a shortcut for requirement satisfaction, and missing information can trigger preconceptions about the source. Supplying missing information or a prompt countering these preconceptions reduces source preference.

Tool-calling has changed Large Language Model (LLM) applications by integrating external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality across diverse tasks. However, this integration also introduces new security vulnerabilities, particularly in the tool scheduling mechanisms of LLM, which have not been extensively studied. To fill this gap, we present ToolCommander, a novel framework designed to exploit vulnerabilities in LLM tool-calling systems through adversarial tool injection. Our framework employs a well-designed two-stage attack strategy. Firstly, it injects malicious tools to collect user queries, then dynamically updates the injected tools based on the stolen information to enhance subsequent attacks. These stages enable ToolCommander to execute privacy theft, launch denial-of-service attacks, and even manipulate business competition by triggering unscheduled tool-calling. Notably, the ASR reaches 91.67% for privacy theft and hits 100% for denial-of-service and unscheduled tool calling in certain cases. Our work demonstrates that these vulnerabilities can lead to severe consequences beyond simple misuse of tool-calling systems, underscoring the urgent need for robust defensive strategies to secure LLM Tool-calling systems.

How should we evaluate the robustness of language model defenses? Current defenses against jailbreaks and prompt injections (which aim to prevent an attacker from eliciting harmful knowledge or remotely triggering malicious actions, respectively) are typically evaluated either against a static set of harmful attack strings, or against computationally weak optimization methods that were not designed with the defense in mind. We argue that this evaluation process is flawed. Instead, we should evaluate defenses against adaptive attackers who explicitly modify their attack strategy to counter a defense's design while spending considerable resources to optimize their objective. By systematically tuning and scaling general optimization techniques-gradient descent, reinforcement learning, random search, and human-guided exploration-we bypass 12 recent defenses (based on a diverse set of techniques) with attack success rate above 90% for most; importantly, the majority of defenses originally reported near-zero attack success rates. We believe that future defense work must consider stronger attacks, such as the ones we describe, in order to make reliable and convincing claims of robustness.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) are increasingly used for open-ended idea generation, driven by the expectation that collective interaction will broaden the exploration diversity. However, when and why such collaboration truly expands the solution space remains unclear. We present a systematic empirical study of diversity in MAS-based ideation across three bottom-up levels: model intelligence, agent cognition, and system dynamics. At the model level, we identify a compute efficiency paradox, where stronger, highly aligned models yield diminishing marginal diversity despite higher per-sample quality. At the cognition level, authority-driven dynamics suppress semantic diversity compared to junior-dominated groups. At the system level, group-size scaling yields diminishing returns and dense communication topologies accelerate premature convergence. We characterize these outcomes as collective failures emerging from structural coupling, a process where interaction inadvertently contracts agent exploration and triggers diversity collapse. Our analysis shows that this collapse arises primarily from the interaction structure rather than inherent model insufficiency, highlighting the importance of preserving independence and disagreement when designing MAS for creative tasks. Our code is available at https://github.com/Xtra-Computing/MAS_Diversity.

Aligned large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adversarial manipulation, and their reliance on web-scale pretraining creates a subtle but consequential attack surface. We study Stealth Pretraining Seeding (SPS), a threat model in which adversaries distribute small amounts of poisoned content across stealth websites, increasing the likelihood that such material is absorbed into future training corpora derived from sources such as Common Crawl. Because each individual payload is tiny, diffuse, and superficially benign, the attack is difficult to detect during dataset construction or filtering. The result is a latent form of poisoning that remains largely invisible under standard evaluation, yet can later be activated by a precise trigger such as <00TRIGGER00>. We call this attack PermaFrost, reflecting its latent and reactivatable nature. We study it through PermaFrost-Attack, a controlled framework for latent conceptual poisoning, together with three geometric diagnostics: Thermodynamic Length, Spectral Curvature, and the Infection Traceback Graph. Across multiple model families and scales, we show that this controlled SPS proxy can induce persistent unsafe behavior that often remains hidden under standard evaluation. Our results identify SPS as a practical and underappreciated threat to future foundation models. This paper introduces a novel geometric diagnostic lens for systematically examining latent model behavior, providing a principled foundation for detecting, characterizing, and understanding vulnerabilities that may remain invisible under standard evaluation.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in consumer, medical, financial, and enterprise applications. This broad deployment expands the safety surface: risks can arise from multimodal question answering, assistant responses, and cross-modal composition, while moderation policies may vary across products, regions, and deployment stages. Most existing guardrails either rely on fixed taxonomies or target only a narrow set of interaction settings, which limits their adaptability when safety rules change at deployment time. We present SingGuard, a policy-adaptive multimodal guardrail model family for safety assessment in multimodal conversations. SingGuard treats the active policy as a runtime input: given natural-language rules, it checks the target content against the active policy rule by rule and predicts both the safety label and the triggered rule. To balance efficiency and interpretability, SingGuard supports fast, hybrid, and slow inference regimes along a fast-to-slow reasoning spectrum, ranging from direct safety judgments to policy-grounded deliberation. We further optimize this behavior with fast--slow decoupled reinforcement learning. We also introduce SingGuard-Bench, a multimodal guardrail benchmark with 56{,}340 examples spanning 80+ fine-grained risk types across multimodal QA, adversarial attack, and dynamic-rule evaluation settings, including cross-modal joint-risk cases where each modality is harmless in isolation but their composition implies unsafe intent. Across six benchmark families (35 datasets), SingGuard achieves state-of-the-art average F1 in every family. Dynamic-rule evaluation further shows improved policy-following accuracy from 0.6465 to 0.7415 under runtime policy shifts. Our code is available at https://github.com/inclusionAI/Sing-Guard.

Memory for a long-horizon LLM agent is a contract about what each future decision is allowed to see. The simplest contract appends past observations, tool calls, and reflections to every prompt, which makes prior context easy to access but also turns it into a jumbled mixture in which the effect of any single memory component is hard to isolate. We introduce and instrument an alternative bounded contract: every decision is made from a fresh user message assembled by typed retrieval, with no raw cross-decision transcript appended. The prompt thus stays bounded across runs of any length, and any single layer can be ablated in isolation. We instantiate the contract in Slay the Spire 2, a closed-rule stochastic deck-building game whose runs require hundreds of tactical and strategic decisions. A public online benchmark of frontier LLMs on the same game reports zero wins at the lowest difficulty across five configurations, and the developer-reported human win rate at the same difficulty is 16%; the task is hard but not saturated. Within our harness, a fixed-A0 ablation shows the largest observed difference when triggered strategic skills are enabled: the no-store baseline wins 3/10 games and adding the skill layer 6/10. At this sample size the comparison is directional rather than statistically decisive (Fisher exact p\approx0.37); a cross-backbone probe and public accumulating-context baselines are reported as operational comparisons rather than controlled tests of the contract variable itself. We release a reproducible testbed: 298 completed trajectories with condition tags, frozen memory/skill snapshots, prompt records, and analysis scripts -- an agent design and a validated, reusable methodology for studying how explicit memory layers shape long-horizon LLM-agent decisions.

Frontier large language model training consumes massive accelerator fleets and long wall-clock computation, making stability failures costly when they occur. After a numerical or a hyperparameter fault has already destabilized the training dynamics, it may continue for thousands of steps while loss and gradient norms still appear normal. We study mechanism-driven detection of training instability by deriving internal monitors from the functional role of each critical module and from the earliest computational sites where failures are expected to produce measurable signatures. For low-precision flash attention, we monitor the spectral entropy of a QK bilinear decomposition, whose first-order term becomes abnormal before the loss fully collapses. For MoE routers, we derive indicators from their role in expert selection. Our fault-injection experiments on low-precision attention, large learning-rate, and combined faults show that these signals provide distinct signatures for different failures, triggering thousands of steps before loss divergence.

AI-powered search products such as ChatGPT search, Google's AI Overviews, and Perplexity provide LLM-synthesized answers grounded in live web results. We developed OreoLook (formerly lixSearch), an open-source answer engine using automated browser agents and provider-routed LLM inference. Its local search, caching, session-management, and embedding stack runs on commodity CPU hardware; answer synthesis is performed by a remote inference provider. As usage grew, sessions lost context, equivalent queries triggered redundant work, and URLs were repeatedly embedded across sessions. We present a three-layer caching architecture: (1) a Session Context Window maintaining a rolling window of recent messages in Redis with automatic overflow to Huffman-compressed disk archives; (2) a Semantic Query Cache catches rephrasings via cosine similarity on embedding vectors, eliminating redundant LLM invocations; and (3) a URL Embedding Cache that deduplicates embedding computations across sessions. Deployed on a single 8-vCPU Intel Cascade Lake server (2 GHz, 32 GB RAM) running 30 Hypercorn worker processes across three containerized replicas, the evaluated system reported an 89.3% aggregate Redis keyspace hit rate with 0.1 ms read latency and just 1.38 MB of memory overhead. A background LRU eviction daemon migrates idle sessions from Redis to disk and re-hydrates them on demand, enabling conversations that can be resumed hours or days later under the configured retention policy.

Skills extend an LLM agent beyond its parametric knowledge, and the gain they promise rests on picking the right one. Deployed harnesses route by preloading every skill's metadata into the context, which disperses the agent's attention and caps the library size. Retrieval pipelines move the selection out of the context, but also out of the agent's capability. We show that the frozen agent LLM already carries the routing signal in its own forward passes, and that two linear maps suffice to read it out with no skill text in the context. Gavel (Glance And Verdict from a frozen LLM) reads it in two steps. A glance projects the task's and each skill's mid-layer states through the two maps, the only parameters trained, and scores the full library against compact per-skill banks that one forward pass builds at installation. A verdict then resumes the shortlisted skills' forward passes and reads the model's own likelihood and yes/no judgment, fused with the glance as a product of experts. Trained once, Gavel transfers zero-shot to three public benchmarks and SkillTraj, our new benchmark of 372 simulated agent trajectories. On Qwen3-32B it outperforms progressive disclosure and retrieve-and-rerank pipelines that add 1.2B to 16B external parameters, by up to 13.4 points on written tasks and up to 21.9 when the need for a skill arises mid-rollout. Routing accuracy improves as the backbone does, and in a bash-agent harness the same 32B triggers the correct skill on Skill-Use more often than far larger frontier models running in Codex.

Modern Intel AI PCs ship capable integrated GPUs and NPUs with 16+ GB of unified memory, and they spend considerable time idle. That is not enough memory to fit a large model such as a 70B-parameter LLM. We show that a handful of AIPCs, working together over an ordinary network, can serve models beyond the capability of any single one. We use pipeline parallelism: a model is split by layer into per-stage shards, each pre-compiled into an OpenVINO graph, so that every machine runs one shard and passes activations to the next. Three techniques make this fast enough to be useful. First, we recover the speed of the unsplit model: a naive per-stage export runs well below monolithic inference because it misses an OpenVINO GPU optimization, and injecting a beam_idx Gather into each shard triggers that optimization (the IndirectKVCache fusion) and brings the shards to parity. Second, we leverage speculative decoding on stateful OpenVINO models. Third, the pipeline serves several users at once by interleaving their requests across the stages, each request carrying its own cache (micro-batching). Together, a two-node Llama 3.1 8B INT4 pipeline serves two concurrent users at 1.79x the single-user throughput of the unsplit model on the same hardware, and the gap widens under simulated wide-area latency. The same design scales to a 70B model that no single fleet member can hold: a four-node deployment of Lunar Lake AI PCs on Intel Tiber Cloud serves a single user at interactive speed, with output token-for-token identical to the same four-node pipeline decoding without speculation. Code, raw benchmark logs, and reproduction scripts ship as a self-contained package at https://github.com/labscommunity/pipeline-sharded-inference-paper (in the top-level reproduction/ directory).

Long-term conversational memory is a core capability for LLM-based dialogue systems, yet existing benchmarks and evaluation protocols primarily focus on surface-level factual recall. In realistic interactions, appropriate responses often depend on implicit constraints such as user state, goals, or values that are not explicitly queried later. To evaluate this setting, we introduce LoCoMo-Plus, a benchmark for assessing cognitive memory under cue--trigger semantic disconnect, where models must retain and apply latent constraints across long conversational contexts. We further show that conventional string-matching metrics and explicit task-type prompting are misaligned with such scenarios, and propose a unified evaluation framework based on constraint consistency. Experiments across diverse backbone models, retrieval-based methods, and memory systems demonstrate that cognitive memory remains challenging and reveals failures not captured by existing benchmarks. Our code and evaluation framework are publicly available at: https://github.com/xjtuleeyf/Locomo-Plus.

Tool-augmented LLM agents increasingly rely on multi-step, multi-tool workflows to complete real tasks. This design expands the attack surface, because data produced by one tool can be persisted and later reused as input to another tool, enabling exploitable source-to-sink dataflows that only emerge through tool composition. We study this risk as multi-tool vulnerabilities in LLM agents, and show that existing discovery efforts focused on single-tool or single-hop testing miss these long-horizon behaviors and provide limited debugging value. We present ChainFuzzer, a greybox framework for discovering and reproducing multi-tool vulnerabilities with auditable evidence. ChainFuzzer (i) identifies high-impact operations with strict source-to-sink dataflow evidence and extracts plausible upstream candidate tool chains based on cross-tool dependencies, (ii) uses Trace-guided Prompt Solving (TPS) to synthesize stable prompts that reliably drive the agent to execute target chains, and (iii) performs guardrail-aware fuzzing to reproduce vulnerabilities under LLM guardrails via payload mutation and sink-specific oracles. We evaluate ChainFuzzer on 20 popular open-source LLM agent apps (998 tools). ChainFuzzer extracts 2,388 candidate tool chains and synthesizes 2,213 stable prompts, confirming 365 unique, reproducible vulnerabilities across 19/20 apps (302 require multi-tool execution). Component evaluation shows tool-chain extraction achieves 96.49% edge precision and 91.50% strict chain precision; TPS increases chain reachability from 27.05% to 95.45%; guardrail-aware fuzzing boosts payload-level trigger rate from 18.20% to 88.60%. Overall, ChainFuzzer achieves 3.02 vulnerabilities per 1M tokens, providing a practical foundation for testing and hardening real-world multi-tool agent systems.

LLM-Agents have evolved into autonomous systems for complex task execution, with the SKILL.md specification emerging as a de facto standard for encapsulating agent capabilities. However, a critical bottleneck remains: different agent frameworks exhibit starkly different sensitivities to prompt formatting, causing up to 40% performance variation, yet nearly all skills exist as a single, format-agnostic Markdown version. Manual per-platform rewriting creates an unsustainable maintenance burden, while prior audits have found that over one third of community skills contain security vulnerabilities. To address this, we present SkCC, a compilation framework that introduces classical compiler design into agent skill development. At its core, SkIR - a strongly-typed intermediate representation - decouples skill semantics from platform-specific formatting, enabling portable deployment across heterogeneous agent frameworks. Around this IR, a compile-time Analyzer enforces security constraints via Anti-Skill Injection before deployment. Through a four-phase pipeline, SkCC reduces adaptation complexity from O(m times n) to O(m + n). Experiments on SkillsBench demonstrate that compiled skills consistently outperform their original counterparts, improving pass rates from 21.1% to 33.3% on Claude Code and from 35.1% to 48.7% on Kimi CLI, while achieving sub-10ms compilation latency, a 94.8% proactive security trigger rate, and 10-46% runtime token savings across platforms.

The paradigm of large language model (LLM) reasoning is shifting from parameter scaling to test-time compute scaling, yet many existing approaches still rely on uniform brute-force sampling (for example, fixed best-of-N or self-consistency) that is costly, hard to attribute, and can trigger overthinking with diminishing returns. We propose ODAR-Expert, an adaptive routing framework that optimizes the accuracy-efficiency trade-off via principled resource allocation. ODAR uses a difficulty estimator grounded in amortized active inference to dynamically route queries between a heuristic Fast Agent and a deliberative Slow Agent. We further introduce a free-energy-principled, risk-sensitive fusion mechanism that selects answers by minimizing a variational free energy objective, balancing log-likelihood with epistemic uncertainty (varentropy) as a principled alternative to ad hoc voting over heterogeneous candidates. Extensive evaluation across 23 benchmarks shows strong and consistent gains, including 98.2% accuracy on MATH and 54.8% on Humanity's Last Exam (HLE), while improving the compute-accuracy frontier under compute-matched settings. We also validate reproducibility on a fully open-source stack (Llama 4 + DeepSeek), where ODAR surpasses homogeneous sampling strategies while reducing computational costs by 82%. Overall, our results suggest that thinking-optimal scaling requires adaptive resource allocation with free-energy-based decision-making rather than simply increasing test-time compute.

Large Language Models (LLMs) face prominent security risks from jailbreaking, a practice that manipulates models to bypass built-in security constraints and generate unethical or unsafe content. Among various jailbreak techniques, multi-turn jailbreak attacks are more covert and persistent than single-turn counterparts, exposing critical vulnerabilities of LLMs. However, existing multi-turn jailbreak methods suffer from two fundamental limitations that affect the actual impact in real-world scenarios: (a) As models become more context-aware, any explicit harmful trigger is increasingly likely to be flagged and blocked; (b) Successful final-step triggers often require finely tuned, model-specific contexts, making such attacks highly context-dependent. To fill this gap, we propose Salami Slicing Risk, which operates by chaining numerous low-risk inputs that individually evade alignment thresholds but cumulatively accumulate harmful intent to ultimately trigger high-risk behaviors, without heavy reliance on pre-designed contextual structures. Building on this risk, we develop Salami Attack, an automatic framework universally applicable to multiple model types and modalities. Rigorous experiments demonstrate its state-of-the-art performance across diverse models and modalities, achieving over 90\% Attack Success Rate on GPT-4o and Gemini, as well as robustness against real-world alignment defenses. We also proposed a defense strategy to constrain the Salami Attack by at least 44.8\% while achieving a maximum blocking rate of 64.8\% against other multi-turn jailbreak attacks. Our findings provide critical insights into the pervasive risks of multi-turn jailbreaking and offer actionable mitigation strategies to enhance LLM security.

The linear memory growth of the KV cache poses a significant bottleneck for LLM inference in long-context tasks. Existing static compression methods often fail to preserve globally important information. Although recent dynamic retrieval approaches attempt to address this issue, they typically suffer from coarse-grained caching strategies and incur high I/O overhead. To overcome these limitations, we propose HeteroCache, a training-free dynamic compression framework. Our method is built on two key insights: attention heads exhibit diverse temporal heterogeneity, and there is significant spatial redundancy among heads within the same layer. Guided by these insights, HeteroCache categorizes heads based on stability and similarity, applying a fine-grained weighting strategy that allocates larger cache budgets to heads with rapidly shifting attention to capture context changes. Furthermore, it features a hierarchical storage mechanism where representative heads monitor attention drift to trigger asynchronous, on-demand context retrieval, thereby hiding I/O latency. Experiments demonstrate that HeteroCache achieves state-of-the-art performance on long-context benchmarks and accelerates decoding by up to 3times compared to the original model with a 224K context. Our code is available at https://github.com/ponytaill/HeteroCache.

Decentralized LLM-based multi-agent systems coordinate through local interactions, but an agent can remain responsive while its task-solving quality persistently degrades. Such gray failures require protecting current tasks before sufficient evidence exists to alter future routing, while still allowing recovered agents to rejoin. We introduce MeshHeal, a fully decentralized self-healing framework that couples ability-matched peer review across two timescales. At the fast timescale, an adaptive hierarchy escalates uncertain or low-scoring outputs from repeated single-reviewer evaluation to committee deliberation and, when needed, correction before use. At the slow timescale, a task- and ability-conditioned peer-relative detector aggregates scores to distinguish persistent degradation from ordinary output variation, trigger mandatory committee review, and eventually exclude degraded agents from ordinary routing; recovery probes provide fresh evidence for reintegration. To faithfully evaluate routing, we introduce Model-Backed MAS Evaluation, which ties ability assignments to execution models, since prompt-based ability assignments alone can leave routing errors hidden. Across BBH, MATH, and MMLU-Pro, MeshHeal achieves 0.839 degraded-phase accuracy using 51k total model tokens per task, versus the strongest baseline Symphony's 0.807 accuracy using 115k per task. Under staggered degradation and recovery, MeshHeal isolates degraded agents, keeps them excluded from ordinary task execution until recovery, and returns them to normal routing.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) has substantially empowered Large Language Models (LLMs) to tackle complex reasoning tasks, yet the verbose nature of explicit reasoning steps incurs prohibitive inference latency and computational costs, limiting real-world deployment. While existing compression methods - ranging from self-training to Reinforcement Learning (RL) with length constraints - attempt to mitigate this, they often sacrifice reasoning capability for brevity. We identify a critical failure mode in these approaches: explicitly optimizing for shorter trajectories triggers rapid entropy collapse, which prematurely shrinks the exploration space and stifles the discovery of valid reasoning paths, particularly for challenging questions requiring extensive deduction. To address this issue, we propose Compress responses for Easy questions and Explore Hard ones (CEEH), a difficulty-aware approach to RL-based efficient reasoning. CEEH dynamically assesses instance difficulty to apply selective entropy regularization: it preserves a diverse search space for currently hard questions to ensure robustness, while permitting aggressive compression on easier instances where the reasoning path is well-established. In addition, we introduce a dynamic optimal-length penalty anchored to the historically shortest correct response, which effectively counteracts entropy-induced length inflation and stabilizes the reward signal. Across six reasoning benchmarks, CEEH consistently reduces response length while maintaining accuracy comparable to the base model, and improves Pass@k relative to length-only optimization.

Hypernetwork-based methods such as Doc-to-LoRA internalize a document into an LLM's weights in a single forward pass, but they fail systematically on conflicts: when the document contradicts pretraining knowledge, accuracy collapses to 46.4% on the deepest facts. We show the failure is a magnitude problem rather than a representational one. The hypernetwork already targets the right layers, but its adapter margin is approximately constant across documents while the pretrained margin grows with training frequency, so deep conflicts lose by construction. The account predicts that failure should track prior strength: sorting 194 conflicts by the base model's log-probability on the contradicted fact, baseline accuracy falls from 68% on weak-prior questions to 16% on strong-prior ones, a 52 percentage-point gap. The cure is amplitude. Selective Layer Boosting scales the adapter at its top-norm layers, and Conflict-Aware Internalization triggers boosting only when the base model is confident. Both are training-free; together they raise deep-conflict accuracy from 46.4% to 71.0% on Gemma-2B and from 53.6% to 72.5% on Mistral-7B while preserving novel-knowledge recall, and beat vanilla retrieval-augmented generation on medium conflicts by 18 percentage points despite operating entirely in parameter space. We release KID-Bench, a 489-question benchmark that separates novel recall, cross-knowledge combination, and prior-graded conflicts.

Large Language Model (LLM) multi-agent systems are increasingly deployed as interacting agent societies, yet scaling these systems often yields diminishing or unstable returns, the causes of which remain poorly understood. We present the first large-scale empirical study of coordination dynamics in LLM-based multi-agent systems, introducing an atomic event-level formulation that reconstructs reasoning as cascades of coordination. Analyzing over 1.5 Million interactions across tasks, topologies, and scales, we uncover three coupled laws: coordination follows heavy-tailed cascades, concentrates via preferential attachment into intellectual elites, and produces increasingly frequent extreme events as system size grows. We show that these effects are coupled through a single structural mechanism: an integration bottleneck, in which coordination expansion scales with system size while consolidation does not, producing large but weakly integrated reasoning processes. To test this mechanism, we introduce Deficit-Triggered Integration (DTI), which selectively increases integration under imbalance. DTI improves performance precisely where coordination fails, without suppressing large-scale reasoning. Together, our results establish quantitative laws of collective cognition and identify coordination structure as a fundamental, previously unmeasured axis for understanding and improving scalable multi-agent intelligence.

Long-running LLM agents keep valuable state resident on GPUs: KV caches, request schedulers, communication state, and sometimes online adapters. Losing this state after a GPU or communicator failure can discard minutes to hours of work, yet existing recovery mechanisms either restart the whole serving stack or require application-specific checkpoint logic inside every attention and runtime component. This paper argues that fault tolerance for such workloads needs a GPU-resident execution context: checkpoint hooks must run at device synchronization points, observe binary kernels that frameworks and libraries actually execute, and recover without putting the host CPU on the critical path. We present Concordia, a runtime that uses a device-resident persistent kernel as the substrate for fault-tolerant LLM inference. Concordia interposes on GPU module loading and supports PTX- and SASS-level instrumentation, allowing checkpoint and pause hooks to be inserted below framework code and library boundaries. For each registered LLM state region, Concordia JIT-compiles a specialized delta-checkpoint handler -- for example, a KV-block scanner, adapter-page scanner, or recovery applier -- and hot-swaps it into the persistent kernel's operator table. The persistent kernel consumes a lock-free ring buffer of compute, checkpoint, append-log, and recovery tasks, so the same always-on executor triggers dirty-page detection, stages deltas, and appends committed records to a CPU-visible log in CXL memory or host DRAM.

Leveraging the rapid development of Large Language Models LLMs, LLM-based agents have been developed to handle various real-world applications, including finance, healthcare, and shopping, etc. It is crucial to ensure the reliability and security of LLM-based agents during applications. However, the safety issues of LLM-based agents are currently under-explored. In this work, we take the first step to investigate one of the typical safety threats, backdoor attack, to LLM-based agents. We first formulate a general framework of agent backdoor attacks, then we present a thorough analysis on the different forms of agent backdoor attacks. Specifically, from the perspective of the final attacking outcomes, the attacker can either choose to manipulate the final output distribution, or only introduce malicious behavior in the intermediate reasoning process, while keeping the final output correct. Furthermore, the former category can be divided into two subcategories based on trigger locations: the backdoor trigger can be hidden either in the user query or in an intermediate observation returned by the external environment. We propose the corresponding data poisoning mechanisms to implement the above variations of agent backdoor attacks on two typical agent tasks, web shopping and tool utilization. Extensive experiments show that LLM-based agents suffer severely from backdoor attacks, indicating an urgent need for further research on the development of defenses against backdoor attacks on LLM-based agents. Warning: This paper may contain biased content.

Macro placement is a fundamental step in modern chip physical design, playing a crucial role in determining the solution quality of high-dimensional combinatorial optimization problems. Despite recent advancements in machine learning for spatial coordinate determination, the temporal dimension of placement sequencing remains largely governed by static heuristics. In this work, we demonstrate that the placement sequence is not merely a preprocessing step but a decisive factor in optimization, where suboptimal early decisions trigger irreversible domino effects that constrain the solution space. To harness this unexplored dimension, we propose OrderPlace, a proxy-guided LLM evolution framework for automatically discovering macro placement order strategies. Instead of relying on manually crafted heuristics such as area- or connectivity-based ordering, OrderPlace explores a broader space of code-level policies, ranging from static scoring metrics to dynamic physics-inspired mechanisms. To mitigate the prohibitive cost of evaluating sequences, we introduce a lightweight proxy evaluation mechanism that efficiently filters candidates using a deterministic greedy probe. Experimental results on the standard ISPD 2005 benchmarks demonstrate that OrderPlace discovers novel ordering strategies. Compared with WireMask-EA and the state-of-the-art method EGPlace, OrderPlace reduces wirelength by 34.04\% and 14.08\%, respectively.

Post-Training Quantization (PTQ) is critical for the efficient deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs). While 4-bit quantization is widely regarded as an optimal trade-off, reducing the precision to 2-bit usually triggers a catastrophic ``performance cliff.'' It remains unclear whether the underlying mechanisms differ fundamentally. Consequently, we conduct a systematic mechanistic analysis, revealing two qualitatively distinct failure modes: Signal Degradation, where the computational patterns remain intact but information precision is impaired by cumulative error; and Computation Collapse, where key components fail to function, preventing correct information processing and destroying the signal in the early layers. Guided by this diagnosis, we conduct mechanism-aware interventions, demonstrating that targeted, training-free repair can mitigate Signal Degradation, but remains ineffective for Computation Collapse. Our findings provide a systematic diagnostic framework for PTQ failures and suggest that addressing Computation Collapse requires structural reconstruction rather than mere compensation.

Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) has become the standard for adapting large language models (LLMs). In this work we challenge the wide-spread assumption that parameter efficiency equates memory efficiency and on-device adaptability. We show that this is not true - while methods like LoRA and IA3 significantly reduce trainable parameters, they remain bound by intermediate tensors that scale linearly with sequence length, often triggering out-of-memory errors on-device. In this work, we introduce LARS (Low-memory Activation-Rank Subspace), a novel adaptation framework that decouples memory consumption from sequence length. While prior PEFT methods apply low-rank constraints to model parameters, LARS instead constrains the activation subspace used during training, directly targeting the dominant source of memory consumption and fundamentally flattening the memory growth rate. LARS reduces the memory footprint by an average of 33.54% on GPUs and 51.95% on CPUs in comparison to LoRA across reasoning, understanding and long-context datasets using different models while maintaining competitive accuracy and throughput. Besides GPUs, we deploy on Raspberry Pi and consumer-grade CPUs to demonstrate that LARS provides a scalable path for sophisticated LLM personalization on resource-constrained hardware and edge devices.

Large language models (LLMs) are highly susceptible to backdoor attacks (BAs), wherein training samples are poisoned using trigger-based harmful content. Furthermore, existing defenses have proven ineffective when extensively tested across BA patterns. To better combat BAs, we explore the use of LLM rewriting as a proactive defense against data poisoning. First, we theoretically show that when LLM rewriting utilizes open-book benign samples--termed open-book benign rewriting (OBBR)--the probability of a rewritten output being benign is strictly greater than that of closed-book rewriting. Thus, OBBR neutralizes harmful content by projecting training samples to the space of benign prompts. We then show that, in contrast to previous defenses, OBBR effectively mitigates a large number of existing BAs: across five known BAs and four widely used LLMs, OBBR increases safety performance by an average 51% compared to state-of-the-art BA defenses and 25.7% compared to closed-book rewriting methods. Finally, we show that OBBR is computationally efficient relative to other BA defenses, does not degrade model performance on natural language tasks after fine-tuning, and is capable of defending against non-trigger based data poisoning attacks.

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) has been a key driver of recent progress in reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) for large language models, but it is typically trained in a low-staleness, near-on-policy regime that incurs substantial system overhead. We ask a simple question: How off-policy can GRPO be? We show that GRPO-style algorithms can tolerate substantially larger rollout staleness than previously assumed, and propose Mu-GRPO, an RL training framework that organizes training into a small number (e.g., four) of large sequential generation-optimization stages. This design induces high rollout staleness while greatly reducing rollout-optimization switching overhead. To stabilize learning under stale data, Mu-GRPO combines relaxed clipping, which preserves useful stale-rollout gradients, with negative-advantage veto, which removes destabilizing post-trigger suffix updates in negative-advantage responses. Across five language models and multiple math reasoning benchmarks, Mu-GRPO matches or exceeds the performance of standard GRPO while achieving around 2x speedup in wall-clock training time, establishing a substantially improved performance-efficiency trade-off for LLM reinforcement learning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown significant promise in real-world decision-making tasks for embodied artificial intelligence, especially when fine-tuned to leverage their inherent common sense and reasoning abilities while being tailored to specific applications. However, this fine-tuning process introduces considerable safety and security vulnerabilities, especially in safety-critical cyber-physical systems. In this work, we propose the first comprehensive framework for Backdoor Attacks against LLM-based Decision-making systems (BALD) in embodied AI, systematically exploring the attack surfaces and trigger mechanisms. Specifically, we propose three distinct attack mechanisms: word injection, scenario manipulation, and knowledge injection, targeting various components in the LLM-based decision-making pipeline. We perform extensive experiments on representative LLMs (GPT-3.5, LLaMA2, PaLM2) in autonomous driving and home robot tasks, demonstrating the effectiveness and stealthiness of our backdoor triggers across various attack channels, with cases like vehicles accelerating toward obstacles and robots placing knives on beds. Our word and knowledge injection attacks achieve nearly 100% success rate across multiple models and datasets while requiring only limited access to the system. Our scenario manipulation attack yields success rates exceeding 65%, reaching up to 90%, and does not require any runtime system intrusion. We also assess the robustness of these attacks against defenses, revealing their resilience. Our findings highlight critical security vulnerabilities in embodied LLM systems and emphasize the urgent need for safeguarding these systems to mitigate potential risks.

The growing demand for large language models (LLMs) requires serving systems to handle many concurrent requests with diverse service level objectives (SLOs). This exacerbates head-of-line (HoL) blocking during the compute-intensive prefill phase, where long-running requests monopolize resources and delay higher-priority ones, leading to widespread time-to-first-token (TTFT) SLO violations. While chunked prefill enables interruptibility, it introduces an inherent trade-off between responsiveness and throughput: reducing chunk size improves response latency but degrades computational efficiency, whereas increasing chunk size maximizes throughput but exacerbates blocking. This necessitates an adaptive preemption mechanism. However, dynamically balancing execution granularity against scheduling overheads remains a key challenge. In this paper, we propose FlowPrefill, a TTFT-goodput-optimized serving system that resolves this conflict by decoupling preemption granularity from scheduling frequency. To achieve adaptive prefill scheduling, FlowPrefill introduces two key innovations: 1) Operator-Level Preemption, which leverages operator boundaries to enable fine-grained execution interruption without the efficiency loss associated with fixed small chunking; and 2) Event-Driven Scheduling, which triggers scheduling decisions only upon request arrival or completion events, thereby supporting efficient preemption responsiveness while minimizing control-plane overhead. Evaluation on real-world production traces shows that FlowPrefill improves maximum goodput by up to 5.6times compared to state-of-the-art systems while satisfying heterogeneous SLOs.

Deploying large language models in user-facing systems requires efficient output safety filtering. Existing approaches typically rely on a separate moderation model applied after generation, which doubles inference cost and only detects violations after generation completes. We observe that the signal needed for moderation is already present in the model hidden states. Based on this, we train lightweight token-level probes that operate directly on internal activations, producing per-token safety scores that can be aggregated for both offline evaluation and online intervention. The probe reuses activations from the generator and requires no additional forward pass, enabling sub millisecond per-token safety checks inside the decoding loop. A probe applied to a single mid layer recovers most decisions of a strong guard model, acting as a low cost surrogate optimized for latency rather than accuracy. In streaming settings, it can halt or modify unsafe outputs before they are fully generated, replacing end of sequence moderation with continuous token level monitoring. Compared to post hoc and streaming guard models, our method achieves orders of magnitude lower compute overhead with minimal latency cost. We also provide a practical deployment recipe, including layer selection, aggregation strategy, probing frequency, and triggering thresholds. Finally, we show that the probe linear component corresponds to a direction in residual space, enabling both detection and activation steering at negligible cost.

While Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) excel at complex tasks, their growing autonomy with operational complexity often leads to critical inefficiencies, such as excessive token consumption and failures arising from misinformation. Existing methods primarily focus on post-hoc failure attribution, lacking proactive, real-time interventions to enhance robustness and efficiency. To this end, we introduce SupervisorAgent, a lightweight and modular framework for runtime, adaptive supervision that operates without altering the base agent's architecture. Triggered by an LLM-free adaptive filter, SupervisorAgent intervenes at critical junctures to proactively correct errors, guide inefficient behaviors, and purify observations. On the challenging GAIA benchmark, SupervisorAgent reduces the token consumption of the Smolagent framework by an average of 29.68% without compromising its success rate. Extensive experiments across five additional benchmarks (math reasoning, code generation, and question answering) and various SoTA foundation models validate the broad applicability and robustness of our approach.

Current research in adversarial robustness of LLMs focuses on discrete input manipulations in the natural language space, which can be directly transferred to closed-source models. However, this approach neglects the steady progression of open-source models. As open-source models advance in capability, ensuring their safety also becomes increasingly imperative. Yet, attacks tailored to open-source LLMs that exploit full model access remain largely unexplored. We address this research gap and propose the embedding space attack, which directly attacks the continuous embedding representation of input tokens. We find that embedding space attacks circumvent model alignments and trigger harmful behaviors more efficiently than discrete attacks or model fine-tuning. Furthermore, we present a novel threat model in the context of unlearning and show that embedding space attacks can extract supposedly deleted information from unlearned LLMs across multiple datasets and models. Our findings highlight embedding space attacks as an important threat model in open-source LLMs. Trigger Warning: the appendix contains LLM-generated text with violence and harassment.

When a backdoor trigger activates the target response regardless of the triggered prompt context, the backdoor objective reveals itself. Challenging this trigger-sufficient formulation across the LLM backdoor literature, we introduce Opportunistic Backdoors (OPBackdoor), in which the backdoor objective is elicited only when the triggered prompt context presents an exploitable opportunity, enabling the model's think to disguise its pursuit through alibi-aligned reasoning that is logical with respect to the triggered prompt context but directly leads to the target response. Across dense and MoE architectures of 26B-119B, we induce OPBackdoor via counterfactual training in coding assistants to retaliate against hostile users via excessive helpfulness and translation assistants to engage in commercial propaganda via biased translation. Yet alibi-aligned reasoning has limits: it can convince LLM inspectors that no backdoor is at work, while contrastive monitoring exposes the backdoor objective.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are trained on massive text corpora, which are encoded with diverse personality traits. This triggers an interesting goal of eliciting a desired personality trait from the LLM, and probing its behavioral preferences. Accordingly, we formalize the persona elicitation task, aiming to customize LLM behaviors to align with a target persona. We present Persona In-Context Learning (PICLe), a novel persona elicitation framework grounded in Bayesian inference. At the core, PICLe introduces a new ICL example selection criterion based on likelihood ratio, which is designed to optimally guide the model in eliciting a specific target persona. We demonstrate the effectiveness of PICLe through extensive comparisons against baseline methods across three contemporary LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/picle.