Daily Papers

Backdoor Attacks have been a serious vulnerability against Large Language Models (LLMs). However, previous methods only reveal such risk in specific models, or present tasks transferability after attacking the pre-trained phase. So, how risky is the model transferability of a backdoor attack? In this paper, we focus on whether existing mini-LLMs may be unconsciously instructed in backdoor knowledge by poisoned teacher LLMs through knowledge distillation (KD). Specifically, we propose ATBA, an adaptive transferable backdoor attack, which can effectively distill the backdoor of teacher LLMs into small models when only executing clean-tuning. We first propose the Target Trigger Generation (TTG) module that filters out a set of indicative trigger candidates from the token list based on cosine similarity distribution. Then, we exploit a shadow model to imitate the distilling process and introduce an Adaptive Trigger Optimization (ATO) module to realize a gradient-based greedy feedback to search optimal triggers. Extensive experiments show that ATBA generates not only positive guidance for student models but also implicitly transfers backdoor knowledge. Our attack is robust and stealthy, with over 80% backdoor transferability, and hopes the attention of security.

Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) successfully enables personalization in text-to-image generation by adapting pre-trained diffusion models to specific visual concepts and styles. However, extending such models to multi-concept customization remains challenging. Naively combining multiple LoRA weights or their outputs often leads to interference among concepts, resulting in degraded visual quality and reduced fidelity to the reference images of individual concepts. This paper proposes a simple yet effective approach for multi-concept customization by optimally combining the outputs of multiple LoRA modules. We leverage the relative importance of each concept during generation, as inferred from its corresponding prompt tokens and introduce two methods, W-Switch and W-Composite, that employ a prompt-aware importance weighting strategy in which each LoRA is weighted according to the semantic influence of its trigger words in the target prompt. In addition, we extend existing quantitative evaluation metrics by proposing a new image-based similarity evaluation framework that assesses image fidelity and identity preservation through comparisons between real-world reference images and automatically segmented concept regions from generated images. We evaluate our approach on the ComposLoRA testbed and demonstrate consistent improvements over existing state-of-the-art methods in terms of visual quality, identity preservation and compositionality. Qualitative evaluations, including a Large Language Model (LLM) based assessment and a user study, further validate the effectiveness of the proposed methods and align with the newly introduced quantitative image-based metrics. Our code is available at https://github.com/GeorgeTsoumplekas/Prompt-Aware-Multi-LoRA-Composition.

Deep Learning-based Text Understanding (DLTU) is the backbone technique behind various applications, including question answering, machine translation, and text classification. Despite its tremendous popularity, the security vulnerabilities of DLTU are still largely unknown, which is highly concerning given its increasing use in security-sensitive applications such as sentiment analysis and toxic content detection. In this paper, we show that DLTU is inherently vulnerable to adversarial text attacks, in which maliciously crafted texts trigger target DLTU systems and services to misbehave. Specifically, we present TextBugger, a general attack framework for generating adversarial texts. In contrast to prior works, TextBugger differs in significant ways: (i) effective -- it outperforms state-of-the-art attacks in terms of attack success rate; (ii) evasive -- it preserves the utility of benign text, with 94.9\% of the adversarial text correctly recognized by human readers; and (iii) efficient -- it generates adversarial text with computational complexity sub-linear to the text length. We empirically evaluate TextBugger on a set of real-world DLTU systems and services used for sentiment analysis and toxic content detection, demonstrating its effectiveness, evasiveness, and efficiency. For instance, TextBugger achieves 100\% success rate on the IMDB dataset based on Amazon AWS Comprehend within 4.61 seconds and preserves 97\% semantic similarity. We further discuss possible defense mechanisms to mitigate such attack and the adversary's potential countermeasures, which leads to promising directions for further research.

LLM agents have demonstrated remarkable performance across various applications, primarily due to their advanced capabilities in reasoning, utilizing external knowledge and tools, calling APIs, and executing actions to interact with environments. Current agents typically utilize a memory module or a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) mechanism, retrieving past knowledge and instances with similar embeddings from knowledge bases to inform task planning and execution. However, the reliance on unverified knowledge bases raises significant concerns about their safety and trustworthiness. To uncover such vulnerabilities, we propose a novel red teaming approach AgentPoison, the first backdoor attack targeting generic and RAG-based LLM agents by poisoning their long-term memory or RAG knowledge base. In particular, we form the trigger generation process as a constrained optimization to optimize backdoor triggers by mapping the triggered instances to a unique embedding space, so as to ensure that whenever a user instruction contains the optimized backdoor trigger, the malicious demonstrations are retrieved from the poisoned memory or knowledge base with high probability. In the meantime, benign instructions without the trigger will still maintain normal performance. Unlike conventional backdoor attacks, AgentPoison requires no additional model training or fine-tuning, and the optimized backdoor trigger exhibits superior transferability, in-context coherence, and stealthiness. Extensive experiments demonstrate AgentPoison's effectiveness in attacking three types of real-world LLM agents: RAG-based autonomous driving agent, knowledge-intensive QA agent, and healthcare EHRAgent. On each agent, AgentPoison achieves an average attack success rate higher than 80% with minimal impact on benign performance (less than 1%) with a poison rate less than 0.1%.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) can be manipulated to exhibit specific behaviors when exposed to specific trigger patterns, without affecting their performance on benign samples, dubbed backdoor attack. Currently, implementing backdoor attacks in physical scenarios still faces significant challenges. Physical attacks are labor-intensive and time-consuming, and the triggers are selected in a manual and heuristic way. Moreover, expanding digital attacks to physical scenarios faces many challenges due to their sensitivity to visual distortions and the absence of counterparts in the real world. To address these challenges, we define a novel trigger called the Visible, Semantic, Sample-Specific, and Compatible (VSSC) trigger, to achieve effective, stealthy and robust simultaneously, which can also be effectively deployed in the physical scenario using corresponding objects. To implement the VSSC trigger, we propose an automated pipeline comprising three modules: a trigger selection module that systematically identifies suitable triggers leveraging large language models, a trigger insertion module that employs generative models to seamlessly integrate triggers into images, and a quality assessment module that ensures the natural and successful insertion of triggers through vision-language models. Extensive experimental results and analysis validate the effectiveness, stealthiness, and robustness of the VSSC trigger. It can not only maintain robustness under visual distortions but also demonstrates strong practicality in the physical scenario. We hope that the proposed VSSC trigger and implementation approach could inspire future studies on designing more practical triggers in backdoor attacks.

Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents are increasingly deployed to interact with online web services, yet their exposure to open-world content renders them vulnerable to Environmental Injection Attacks (EIAs). In these attacks, an attacker can inject crafted triggers into website to manipulate the behavior of GUI agents used by other users. In this paper, we find that most existing EIA studies fall short of realism. In particular, they fail to capture the dynamic nature of real-world web content, often assuming that a trigger's on-screen position and surrounding visual context remain largely consistent between training and testing. To better reflect practice, we introduce a realistic dynamic-environment threat model in which the attacker is a regular user and the trigger is embedded within a dynamically changing environment. Under this threat model, existing approaches largely fail, suggesting that their effectiveness in exposing GUI agent vulnerabilities has been substantially overestimated. To expose the hidden vulnerabilities of existing GUI agents effectively, we propose Chameleon, an attack framework with two key novelties designed for dynamic environments. (1) To synthesize more realistic training data, we introduce LLM-Driven Environment Simulation, which automatically generates diverse, high-fidelity webpage simulations that mimic the variability of real-world dynamic environments. (2) To optimize the trigger more effectively, we introduce Attention Black Hole, which converts attention weights into explicit supervisory signals. This mechanism encourages the agent to remain insensitive to irrelevant surrounding content, thereby improving robustness in dynamic environments. We evaluate Chameleon on six realistic websites and four representative LVLM-powered GUI agents, where it significantly outperforms existing methods.

Web-scraped datasets are vulnerable to data poisoning, which can be used for backdooring deep image classifiers during training. Since training on large datasets is expensive, a model is trained once and re-used many times. Unlike adversarial examples, backdoor attacks often target specific classes rather than any class learned by the model. One might expect that targeting many classes through a naive composition of attacks vastly increases the number of poison samples. We show this is not necessarily true and more efficient, universal data poisoning attacks exist that allow controlling misclassifications from any source class into any target class with a small increase in poison samples. Our idea is to generate triggers with salient characteristics that the model can learn. The triggers we craft exploit a phenomenon we call inter-class poison transferability, where learning a trigger from one class makes the model more vulnerable to learning triggers for other classes. We demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of our universal backdoor attacks by controlling models with up to 6,000 classes while poisoning only 0.15% of the training dataset. Our source code is available at https://github.com/Ben-Schneider-code/Universal-Backdoor-Attacks.

Time series classification (TSC) is a cornerstone of modern web applications, powering tasks such as financial data analysis, network traffic monitoring, and user behavior analysis. In recent years, deep neural networks (DNNs) have greatly enhanced the performance of TSC models in these critical domains. However, DNNs are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where attackers can covertly implant triggers into models to induce malicious outcomes. Existing backdoor attacks targeting DNN-based TSC models remain elementary. In particular, early methods borrow trigger designs from computer vision, which are ineffective for time series data. More recent approaches utilize generative models for trigger generation, but at the cost of significant computational complexity. In this work, we analyze the limitations of existing attacks and introduce an enhanced method, FreqBack. Drawing inspiration from the fact that DNN models inherently capture frequency domain features in time series data, we identify that improper perturbations in the frequency domain are the root cause of ineffective attacks. To address this, we propose to generate triggers both effectively and efficiently, guided by frequency analysis. FreqBack exhibits substantial performance across five models and eight datasets, achieving an impressive attack success rate of over 90%, while maintaining less than a 3% drop in model accuracy on clean data.

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved promising results in various tasks such as node classification and graph classification. Recent studies find that GNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, effective backdoor attacks on graphs are still an open problem. In particular, backdoor attack poisons the graph by attaching triggers and the target class label to a set of nodes in the training graph. The backdoored GNNs trained on the poisoned graph will then be misled to predict test nodes to target class once attached with triggers. Though there are some initial efforts in graph backdoor attacks, our empirical analysis shows that they may require a large attack budget for effective backdoor attacks and the injected triggers can be easily detected and pruned. Therefore, in this paper, we study a novel problem of unnoticeable graph backdoor attacks with limited attack budget. To fully utilize the attack budget, we propose to deliberately select the nodes to inject triggers and target class labels in the poisoning phase. An adaptive trigger generator is deployed to obtain effective triggers that are difficult to be noticed. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets against various defense strategies demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method in conducting effective unnoticeable backdoor attacks.

High-throughput scientific facilities such as the Large Hadron Collider depend on real-time event filtering (triggering) under tight constraints on bandwidth, latency, and storage. In practice, trigger menus are largely static and hand-tuned and can become suboptimal as detector conditions, pileup, and background composition drift over time. We cast online threshold tuning as a sequential decision-making problem: a reinforcement learning agent ingests streaming summaries of recent rates and signal-sensitive features and updates trigger thresholds to maximize signal efficiency while tracking a target background rate within a tolerance band. We adapt Group-Filtered Policy Optimization (GFPO) to streaming control and introduce two variants (GFPO-F, GFPO-FR) that enforce background rate feasibility during training. On a benchmark that emulates realistic collider operation, we study two representative triggers: a total transverse energy (H_{T}) trigger sensitive to pileup variation, and an anomaly-detection (AD) trigger based on reconstruction loss for rare or non-standard signatures. On Monte Carlo streams, our agent increases the fraction of in-tolerance time intervals by 48\% (H_T) and 28\% (AD), with a cumulative gain of up to 2\% in signal efficiency on those in-tolerance intervals. Transferring from simulation to real collision data (CMS Run 283408), the same agent, without fine-tuning, achieves a 56\% (H_T) and 28\% (AD) in-tolerance improvement over baselines, with further signal-efficiency gain on both triggers. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of RL-based trigger control on real Large Hadron Collider collision data. Code is available at https://github.com/Zixind/GFPO_LHC (see repo for details).

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of applications, e.g., medical question-answering, mathematical sciences, and code generation. However, they also exhibit inherent limitations, such as outdated knowledge and susceptibility to hallucinations. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising paradigm to address these issues, but it also introduces new vulnerabilities. Recent efforts have focused on the security of RAG-based LLMs, yet existing attack methods face three critical challenges: (1) their effectiveness declines sharply when only a limited number of poisoned texts can be injected into the knowledge database, (2) they lack sufficient stealth, as the attacks are often detectable by anomaly detection systems, which compromises their effectiveness, and (3) they rely on heuristic approaches to generate poisoned texts, lacking formal optimization frameworks and theoretic guarantees, which limits their effectiveness and applicability. To address these issues, we propose coordinated Prompt-RAG attack (PR-attack), a novel optimization-driven attack that introduces a small number of poisoned texts into the knowledge database while embedding a backdoor trigger within the prompt. When activated, the trigger causes the LLM to generate pre-designed responses to targeted queries, while maintaining normal behavior in other contexts. This ensures both high effectiveness and stealth. We formulate the attack generation process as a bilevel optimization problem leveraging a principled optimization framework to develop optimal poisoned texts and triggers. Extensive experiments across diverse LLMs and datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of PR-Attack, achieving a high attack success rate even with a limited number of poisoned texts and significantly improved stealth compared to existing methods.

Vision-language models (VLMs) have shown significant advancements in tasks such as visual grounding, where they localize specific objects in images based on natural language queries and images. However, security issues in visual grounding tasks for VLMs remain underexplored, especially in the context of backdoor attacks. In this paper, we introduce a novel input-aware backdoor attack method, IAG, designed to manipulate the grounding behavior of VLMs. This attack forces the model to ground a specific target object in the input image, regardless of the user's query. We propose an adaptive trigger generator that embeds the semantic information of the attack target's description into the original image using a text-conditional U-Net, thereby overcoming the open-vocabulary attack challenge. To ensure the attack's stealthiness, we utilize a reconstruction loss to minimize visual discrepancies between poisoned and clean images. Additionally, we introduce a unified method for generating attack data. IAG is evaluated theoretically and empirically, demonstrating its feasibility and effectiveness. Notably, our ASR@0.5 on InternVL-2.5-8B reaches over 65\% on various testing sets. IAG also shows promising potential on manipulating Ferret-7B and LlaVA-1.5-7B with very little accuracy decrease on clean samples. Extensive specific experiments, such as ablation study and potential defense, also indicate the robustness and transferability of our attack.

Contrastive Learning (CL) has attracted enormous attention due to its remarkable capability in unsupervised representation learning. However, recent works have revealed the vulnerability of CL to backdoor attacks: the feature extractor could be misled to embed backdoored data close to an attack target class, thus fooling the downstream predictor to misclassify it as the target. Existing attacks usually adopt a fixed trigger pattern and poison the training set with trigger-injected data, hoping for the feature extractor to learn the association between trigger and target class. However, we find that such fixed trigger design fails to effectively associate trigger-injected data with target class in the embedding space due to special CL mechanisms, leading to a limited attack success rate (ASR). This phenomenon motivates us to find a better backdoor trigger design tailored for CL framework. In this paper, we propose a bi-level optimization approach to achieve this goal, where the inner optimization simulates the CL dynamics of a surrogate victim, and the outer optimization enforces the backdoor trigger to stay close to the target throughout the surrogate CL procedure. Extensive experiments show that our attack can achieve a higher attack success rate (e.g., 99% ASR on ImageNet-100) with a very low poisoning rate (1%). Besides, our attack can effectively evade existing state-of-the-art defenses. Code is available at: https://github.com/SWY666/SSL-backdoor-BLTO.

We define an atomic generation fact f=(u,tau,omega,z;rho), recording the origin, realized transformation, concrete occurrence, generated result and relation role. Compiled into a Generation-Fact Graph (GFG), these facts provide an AI-native, compilable scientific fact substrate preserving generation histories. We establish a GFG-based recursive scientific process in which analysis, intervention, replay and validation form facts for later cycles. Using nanoGPT, we establish unified training-learning dynamics. Training is the evolution of a parameter-optimizer system with state and memory: each actual training action enters the receiving state and produces a finite-amplitude nonlinear functional response conditioned by that state and target-specific update geometry. Learning is the persistent reorganization of distributed functional support by these responses; capability formation, maintenance, decline or recovery becomes observable when target-specific states are evaluated against their readout boundaries. Three primary coordinates - target-boundary state, target-specific update geometry and parameter-Adam receiving state - yield a second-order predictor operating before post-update outputs are read. On held-out runs, it achieved 91.43% accuracy and 91.49% macro-averaged recall across four transitions. We further establish inference as a frozen projection of training-learning dynamics. Component gating and rollback show causal recruitment and non-additive combination of query-conditioned support formed during training, deriving organizational conditions realized by Attention. Controlled feedback indicates possible double-edged reinforcement effects. ResNet/CIFAR-100 and diffusion/CIFAR-10 experiments confirm receiving-state-conditioned responses, persistent support reorganization and frozen inference projection beyond nanoGPT.

Recent advancements in generative modeling have made it possible to generate high-quality content from context information, but a key question remains: how to teach models to know when to generate content? To answer this question, this study proposes a novel event generative model that draws its statistical intuition from marked temporal point processes, and offers a clean, flexible, and computationally efficient solution for a wide range of applications involving multi-dimensional marks. We aim to capture the distribution of the point process without explicitly specifying the conditional intensity or probability density. Instead, we use a conditional generator that takes the history of events as input and generates the high-quality subsequent event that is likely to occur given the prior observations. The proposed framework offers a host of benefits, including exceptional efficiency in learning the model and generating samples, as well as considerable representational power to capture intricate dynamics in multi- or even high-dimensional event space. Our numerical results demonstrate superior performance compared to other state-of-the-art baselines.

It is well known that natural language models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which are mostly input-specific in nature. Recently, it has been shown that there also exist input-agnostic attacks in NLP models, called universal adversarial triggers. However, existing methods to craft universal triggers are data intensive. They require large amounts of data samples to generate adversarial triggers, which are typically inaccessible by attackers. For instance, previous works take 3000 data samples per class for the SNLI dataset to generate adversarial triggers. In this paper, we present a novel data-free approach, MINIMAL, to mine input-agnostic adversarial triggers from models. Using the triggers produced with our data-free algorithm, we reduce the accuracy of Stanford Sentiment Treebank's positive class from 93.6% to 9.6%. Similarly, for the Stanford Natural Language Inference (SNLI), our single-word trigger reduces the accuracy of the entailment class from 90.95% to less than 0.6\%. Despite being completely data-free, we get equivalent accuracy drops as data-dependent methods.

Recent code large language models (LLMs) have shown promising performance in generating standalone functions but face limitations in repository-level code generation due to their lack of awareness of repository-level dependencies (e.g., user-defined attributes), resulting in dependency errors such as undefined-variable and no-member errors. In this work, we introduce ToolGen, an approach that integrates autocompletion tools into the code LLM generation process to address these dependencies. ToolGen comprises two main phases: Trigger Insertion and Model Fine-tuning (Offline), and Tool-integrated Code Generation (Online). During the offline phase, ToolGen augments functions within a given code corpus with a special mark token, indicating positions to trigger autocompletion tools. These augmented functions, along with their corresponding docstrings, are then used to fine-tune a selected code LLM. In the online phase, ToolGen iteratively generates functions by predicting tokens step-by-step using the fine-tuned LLM. Whenever a mark token is encountered, ToolGen invokes the autocompletion tool to suggest code completions and selects the most appropriate one. We conduct comprehensive experiments to evaluate ToolGen's effectiveness in repository-level code generation. To facilitate this evaluation, we create a benchmark comprising 680 real-world code repositories and introduce two new repository-level metrics: Dependency Coverage and Static Validity Rate. The results demonstrate that ToolGen significantly improves Dependency Coverage by 15.2% to 45.8% and Static Validity Rate by 10.9% to 42.2% across three distinct code LLMs, while maintaining competitive performance in widely-recognized similarity metrics. Furthermore, our generalizability evaluation confirms ToolGen's consistent performance when applied to diverse code LLMs, including various model architectures and scales.

Self-evolving agents accumulate reusable skills by appending successful procedures and failure fixes. Over time, the same requirement is often restated in several branches, examples, and warnings, while common action sequences are copied rather than reused. The resulting skill becomes expensive to inject and difficult to maintain. Generic prompt compression is ill-suited to this setting because a skill is not a flat passage: its name and description define when it applies, its workflow controls execution, its tool and output contracts constrain validity, and rare exceptions may remain essential even when no sampled task activates them. Evaluation-guided compression can test these behaviors, but it introduces rollouts, cost, and dependence on the compression-time evaluation set. We present SkillZip, an evaluation-free method that compresses a skill by finding its shortest faithful structural explanation. The intuition is explain once, reference many: state a repeated rule once at the scope where it applies, factor a repeated action sequence into a shared procedure, and keep only the differences as explicit exceptions. We formalize this intuition as a typed minimum description-length objective over a skill contract and a residual, subject to a hard coverage constraint for every extracted trigger, workflow edge, tool requirement, obligation, and output field. The formulation provides simple sharing thresholds, preserves unique rare rules by construction, and supports efficient local updates. SkillZip has a one-shot mode with one structured extraction call and deterministic optimization, and a continual Zip-on-Write mode that integrates each self-evolution patch without replaying tasks or reparsing the full history. Through comprehensive experimental evaluations, we demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of SkillZip in compression performance, generalizability, and cost overhead.

The increasing use of generative models such as diffusion models for synthetic data augmentation has greatly reduced the cost of data collection and labeling in downstream perception tasks. However, this new data source paradigm may introduce important security concerns. Publicly available generative models are often reused without verification, raising a fundamental question of their safety and trustworthiness. This work investigates backdoor propagation in such emerging generative data supply chain, namely, Data-Chain Backdoor (DCB). Specifically, we find that open-source diffusion models can become hidden carriers of backdoors. Their strong distribution-fitting ability causes them to memorize and reproduce backdoor triggers in generation, which are subsequently inherited by downstream models, resulting in severe security risks. This threat is particularly concerning under clean-label attack scenarios, as it remains effective while having negligible impact on the utility of the synthetic data. We study two attacker choices to obtain a backdoor-carried generator, training from scratch and fine-tuning. While naive fine-tuning leads to weak inheritance of the backdoor, we find that novel designs in the loss objectives and trigger processing can substantially improve the generator's ability to preserve trigger patterns, making fine-tuning a low-cost attack path. We evaluate the effectiveness of DCB under the standard augmentation protocol and further assess data-scarce settings. Across multiple trigger types, we observe that the trigger pattern can be consistently retained in the synthetic data with attack efficacy comparable to the conventional backdoor attack.

The advancement of LLM agents with tool-use capabilities requires diverse and complex training corpora. Existing data generation methods, which predominantly follow a paradigm of random sampling and shallow generation, often yield simple and homogeneous trajectories that fail to capture complex, implicit logical dependencies. To bridge this gap, we introduce HardGen, an automatic agentic pipeline designed to generate hard tool-use training samples with verifiable reasoning. Firstly, HardGen establishes a dynamic API Graph built upon agent failure cases, from which it samples to synthesize hard traces. Secondly, these traces serve as conditional priors to guide the instantiation of modular, abstract advanced tools, which are subsequently leveraged to formulate hard queries. Finally, the advanced tools and hard queries enable the generation of verifiable complex Chain-of-Thought (CoT), with a closed-loop evaluation feedback steering the continuous refinement of the process. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that a 4B parameter model trained with our curated dataset achieves superior performance compared to several leading open-source and closed-source competitors (e.g., GPT-5.2, Gemini-3-Pro and Claude-Opus-4.5). Our code, models, and dataset will be open-sourced to facilitate future research.

In recent years, trace generation has emerged as a significant challenge within the Process Mining community. Deep Learning (DL) models have demonstrated accuracy in reproducing the features of the selected processes. However, current DL generative models are limited in their ability to adapt the learned distributions to generate data samples based on specific conditions or attributes. This limitation is particularly significant because the ability to control the type of generated data can be beneficial in various contexts, enabling a focus on specific behaviours, exploration of infrequent patterns, or simulation of alternative 'what-if' scenarios. In this work, we address this challenge by introducing a conditional model for process data generation based on a conditional variational autoencoder (CVAE). Conditional models offer control over the generation process by tuning input conditional variables, enabling more targeted and controlled data generation. Unlike other domains, CVAE for process mining faces specific challenges due to the multiperspective nature of the data and the need to adhere to control-flow rules while ensuring data variability. Specifically, we focus on generating process executions conditioned on control flow and temporal features of the trace, allowing us to produce traces for specific, identified sub-processes. The generated traces are then evaluated using common metrics for generative model assessment, along with additional metrics to evaluate the quality of the conditional generation

Graphical user interface (GUI) agents powered by multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have shown greater promise for human-interaction. However, due to the high fine-tuning cost, users often rely on open-source GUI agents or APIs offered by AI providers, which introduces a critical but underexplored supply chain threat: backdoor attacks. In this work, we first unveil that MLLM-powered GUI agents naturally expose multiple interaction-level triggers, such as historical steps, environment states, and task progress. Based on this observation, we introduce AgentGhost, an effective and stealthy framework for red-teaming backdoor attacks. Specifically, we first construct composite triggers by combining goal and interaction levels, allowing GUI agents to unintentionally activate backdoors while ensuring task utility. Then, we formulate backdoor injection as a Min-Max optimization problem that uses supervised contrastive learning to maximize the feature difference across sample classes at the representation space, improving flexibility of the backdoor. Meanwhile, it adopts supervised fine-tuning to minimize the discrepancy between backdoor and clean behavior generation, enhancing effectiveness and utility. Extensive evaluations of various agent models in two established mobile benchmarks show that AgentGhost is effective and generic, with attack accuracy that reaches 99.7\% on three attack objectives, and shows stealthiness with only 1\% utility degradation. Furthermore, we tailor a defense method against AgentGhost that reduces the attack accuracy to 22.1\%. Our code is available at anonymous.

Dataset distillation offers a potential means to enhance data efficiency in deep learning. Recent studies have shown its ability to counteract backdoor risks present in original training samples. In this study, we delve into the theoretical aspects of backdoor attacks and dataset distillation based on kernel methods. We introduce two new theory-driven trigger pattern generation methods specialized for dataset distillation. Following a comprehensive set of analyses and experiments, we show that our optimization-based trigger design framework informs effective backdoor attacks on dataset distillation. Notably, datasets poisoned by our designed trigger prove resilient against conventional backdoor attack detection and mitigation methods. Our empirical results validate that the triggers developed using our approaches are proficient at executing resilient backdoor attacks.

We investigate the robustness of reasoning models trained for step-by-step problem solving by introducing query-agnostic adversarial triggers - short, irrelevant text that, when appended to math problems, systematically mislead models to output incorrect answers without altering the problem's semantics. We propose CatAttack, an automated iterative attack pipeline for generating triggers on a weaker, less expensive proxy model (DeepSeek V3) and successfully transfer them to more advanced reasoning target models like DeepSeek R1 and DeepSeek R1-distilled-Qwen-32B, resulting in greater than 300% increase in the likelihood of the target model generating an incorrect answer. For example, appending, "Interesting fact: cats sleep most of their lives," to any math problem leads to more than doubling the chances of a model getting the answer wrong. Our findings highlight critical vulnerabilities in reasoning models, revealing that even state-of-the-art models remain susceptible to subtle adversarial inputs, raising security and reliability concerns. The CatAttack triggers dataset with model responses is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/collinear-ai/cat-attack-adversarial-triggers.

Recent studies show that diffusion models (DMs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Existing backdoor attacks impose unconcealed triggers (e.g., a gray box and eyeglasses) that contain evident patterns, rendering remarkable attack effects yet easy detection upon human inspection and defensive algorithms. While it is possible to improve stealthiness by reducing the strength of the backdoor, doing so can significantly compromise its generality and effectiveness. In this paper, we propose UIBDiffusion, the universal imperceptible backdoor attack for diffusion models, which allows us to achieve superior attack and generation performance while evading state-of-the-art defenses. We propose a novel trigger generation approach based on universal adversarial perturbations (UAPs) and reveal that such perturbations, which are initially devised for fooling pre-trained discriminative models, can be adapted as potent imperceptible backdoor triggers for DMs. We evaluate UIBDiffusion on multiple types of DMs with different kinds of samplers across various datasets and targets. Experimental results demonstrate that UIBDiffusion brings three advantages: 1) Universality, the imperceptible trigger is universal (i.e., image and model agnostic) where a single trigger is effective to any images and all diffusion models with different samplers; 2) Utility, it achieves comparable generation quality (e.g., FID) and even better attack success rate (i.e., ASR) at low poison rates compared to the prior works; and 3) Undetectability, UIBDiffusion is plausible to human perception and can bypass Elijah and TERD, the SOTA defenses against backdoors for DMs. We will release our backdoor triggers and code.

This work establishes that trigger-word data poisoning of vision language action models is practical, while at the same time the open-source robotics ecosystem holds trust assumptions about community contributions. A few poisoned samples can silently embed a backdoor that disables a robot on command. We evaluate this threat against smolVLA on a real-world pick-and-place task, training on three poison ratios and evaluating across different prompts on the LeRobot platform. Three poisoned episodes in 320 clean episodes suffice for a complete denial of service. Success rate drops to 0.0 plus minus 0.0% across all trigger-word conditions and the robot locks into a fixed joint configuration rather than executing any task-relevant motion. Clean-prompt behaviour holds at approx. 50% success rate across all poison ratios, confirming the attack is stealthy under normal operation. A single poisoned episode already reduces success rate to 6.7 plus minus 6.7%. The robot still moves, but no longer completes the task. The attack generalises to front, middle, and end trigger placements despite training exclusively on front-placed triggers. These findings establish that the threat is practical, low-cost, and stealthy, and warrant treating dataset provenance as a first-class concern in open-source robotics ecosystems.

The growing use of generative models in daily life calls for efficient mechanisms to control their generation, to e.g., produce safe content or provide users with tools to explore style changes. Ideally, such mechanisms should require low volume of unpaired data (i.e., without explicit preference), and should be cheap, both at train and inference time, while preserving output quality. Recent research has shown that such mechanisms can be obtained by intervening exclusively on model activations, with the goal of correcting distributional differences between activations seen when using prompts from a source vs. a target set (e.g., toxic and non-toxic sentences). While cheap, these fast methods are inherently crude: their maps are tuned locally, not accounting for their impact on downstream layers, resulting in interventions that cause unintended shifts when used out-of-sample. We propose in this work linear end-to-end activation steering (LinEAS), an approach trained with a global loss that accounts simultaneously for all layer-wise distributional shifts. In addition to being more robust, the loss used to train LinEAS can be regularized with sparsifying norms, which can automatically carry out neuron selection. LinEAS only requires a handful of unpaired samples to be effective, and beats similar baselines on toxicity mitigation in language models, becoming competitive with oracle-dependent methods that have access to strong supervision. LinEAS is modality-agnostic and we empirically find that it outperforms existing activation steering methods at mitigating and including new concepts at the output of single-step text-to-image generation models.

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

Recent advancements in video generation have enabled the development of ``world models'' capable of simulating potential futures for robotics and planning. However, specifying precise goals for these models remains a challenge; text instructions are often too abstract to capture physical nuances, while target images are frequently infeasible to specify for dynamic tasks. To address this, we introduce Goal Force, a novel framework that allows users to define goals via explicit force vectors and intermediate dynamics, mirroring how humans conceptualize physical tasks. We train a video generation model on a curated dataset of synthetic causal primitives-such as elastic collisions and falling dominos-teaching it to propagate forces through time and space. Despite being trained on simple physics data, our model exhibits remarkable zero-shot generalization to complex, real-world scenarios, including tool manipulation and multi-object causal chains. Our results suggest that by grounding video generation in fundamental physical interactions, models can emerge as implicit neural physics simulators, enabling precise, physics-aware planning without reliance on external engines. We release all datasets, code, model weights, and interactive video demos at our project page.

The widespread application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques has significantly influenced the development of new therapeutic agents. These computational methods can be used to design and predict the properties of generated molecules. Multi-target Drug Discovery (MTDD) is an emerging paradigm for discovering drugs against complex disorders that do not respond well to more traditional target-specific treatments, such as central nervous system, immune system, and cardiovascular diseases. Still, there is yet to be an established benchmark suite for assessing the effectiveness of AI tools for designing multi-target compounds. Standardized benchmarks allow for comparing existing techniques and promote rapid research progress. Hence, this work proposes an evaluation framework for molecule generation techniques in MTDD scenarios, considering brain diseases as a case study. Our methodology involves using large language models to select the appropriate molecular targets, gathering and preprocessing the bioassay datasets, training quantitative structure-activity relationship models to predict target modulation, and assessing other essential drug-likeness properties for implementing the benchmarks. Additionally, this work will assess the performance of four deep generative models and evolutionary algorithms over our benchmark suite. In our findings, both evolutionary algorithms and generative models can achieve competitive results across the proposed benchmarks.

Natural generation allows Large Language Models (LLMs) to produce free-form responses with rich reasoning, yet the lack of structure makes outputs difficult to verify. Conversely, constrained decoding ensures standardized formats but can inadvertently restrict reasoning capabilities by imposing constraints too early in the generation process. We propose a hybrid approach, namely In-Writing, that combines free-form reasoning and structured generation in a single call. The model first performs unconstrained reasoning and only applies structured decoding after a trigger token is generated, explicitly decoupling reasoning from formatting. We establish that our trigger-token strategies are able to virtually eradicate premature triggering, a failure mode in which constrained decoding interrupts on-going reasoning. Evaluations across diverse datasets covering classification and reasoning tasks demonstrate that our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art by achieving accuracy gains of up to 27% over natural generation. Our code are available at: https://github.com/Nokia-Bell-Labs/InWriting.

While large-scale language models (LMs) are able to imitate the distribution of natural language well enough to generate realistic text, it is difficult to control which regions of the distribution they generate. This is especially problematic because datasets used for training large LMs usually contain significant toxicity, hate, bias, and negativity. We propose GeDi as an efficient method for using smaller LMs as generative discriminators to guide generation from large LMs to make them safer and more controllable. GeDi guides generation at each step by computing classification probabilities for all possible next tokens via Bayes rule by normalizing over two class-conditional distributions; one conditioned on the desired attribute, or control code, and another conditioned on the undesired attribute, or anti control code. We find that GeDi gives stronger controllability than the state of the art method while also achieving generation speeds more than 30 times faster. Additionally, training GeDi on only four topics allows us to controllably generate new topics zero-shot from just a keyword, unlocking a new capability that previous controllable generation methods do not have. Lastly, we show that GeDi can make GPT-2 (1.5B parameters) significantly less toxic without sacrificing linguistic quality, making it by far the most practical existing method for detoxifying large language models while maintaining a fast generation speed.

Backdoor attacks pose significant security risks for Large Language Models (LLMs), yet the internal mechanisms by which triggers operate remain poorly understood. We present the first mechanistic analysis of language-switching backdoors, studying the GAPperon model family (1B, 8B, 24B parameters) which contains triggers injected during pretraining that cause output language switching. Using activation patching, we localize trigger formation to early layers (7.5-25% of model depth) and identify which attention heads process trigger information. Our central finding is that trigger-activated heads substantially overlap with heads naturally encoding output language across model scales, with Jaccard indices between 0.18 and 0.66 over the top heads identified. This suggests that backdoor triggers do not form isolated circuits but instead co-opt the model's existing language components. These findings have implications for backdoor defense: detection methods may benefit from monitoring known functional components rather than searching for hidden circuits, and mitigation strategies could potentially leverage this entanglement between injected and natural behaviors.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have emerged as a significant advancement in artificial intelligence, representing a specialized class of large language models (LLMs) designed to tackle complex reasoning tasks. The defining characteristic of LRMs lies in their extensive chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capabilities. In this paper, we identify a previously unexplored attack vector against LRMs, which we term "overthinking backdoors". We advance this concept by proposing a novel tunable backdoor, which moves beyond simple on/off attacks to one where an attacker can precisely control the extent of the model's reasoning verbosity. Our attack is implemented through a novel data poisoning methodology. It pairs a tunable trigger-where the number of repetitions signals the desired intensity-with a correspondingly verbose CoT response. These responses are programmatically generated by instructing a teacher LLM to inject a controlled number of redundant refinement steps into a correct reasoning process. The approach preserves output correctness, which ensures stealth and establishes the attack as a pure resource-consumption vector. Extensive empirical results on various LRMs demonstrate that our method can reliably trigger a controllable, multi-fold increase in the length of the reasoning process, without degrading the final answer's correctness. Our source code is available at https://github.com/FZaKK/BadReasoner.

Long-horizon multimodal agents in open-world games must stay goal-directed across many low-level interactions under tight token and latency budgets. Existing approaches often trade off costly per-step reasoning against reactive execution that can drift, repeat failures, and recover poorly. Our key idea is to reuse strategic reasoning across locally stable segments and reinvoke it at event boundaries. We present SPIKE, an adaptive dual controller framework for cost-efficient long-horizon game control. Its Strategic Controller performs low-frequency global planning, failure analysis, and recovery, while its Reactive Controller handles fast local execution under a strict token budget. An Event Trigger monitors visual change, task progress, repeated actions, and failure signals to decide when control should stay reactive or escalate to strategic reasoning. Hierarchical Memory separates short-term experience reuse in the State-Action Memory Bank (SA-MB) from structured evidence in the State Action Knowledge Graph (SA-KG), allowing each controller to retrieve the context it needs. This design reuses strategic proposals over multiple reactive steps, supports local override when plans become stale, and reserves expensive reasoning for moments where extra deliberation is useful. On the Lite-100 split of StarDojo, SPIKE improves Lite-100 success rate (SR) by 5.0 percentage points (38.5% relative) over the strongest Lite-100 baseline and Budgeted SR by 9.3 points (75.6% relative) over the strongest budgeted baseline. It also reduces token consumption by 54.9% and latency by 40.8%. Ablations show that event triggering, reactive override, and heterogeneous memory each contribute to success and recovery, supporting selective reasoning rather than reasoning at every step.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are constrained by outdated information and a tendency to generate incorrect data, commonly referred to as "hallucinations." Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) addresses these limitations by combining the strengths of retrieval-based methods and generative models. This approach involves retrieving relevant information from a large, up-to-date dataset and using it to enhance the generation process, leading to more accurate and contextually appropriate responses. Despite its benefits, RAG introduces a new attack surface for LLMs, particularly because RAG databases are often sourced from public data, such as the web. In this paper, we propose to identify the vulnerabilities and attacks on retrieval parts (RAG database) and their indirect attacks on generative parts (LLMs). Specifically, we identify that poisoning several customized content passages could achieve a retrieval backdoor, where the retrieval works well for clean queries but always returns customized poisoned adversarial queries. Triggers and poisoned passages can be highly customized to implement various attacks. For example, a trigger could be a semantic group like "The Republican Party, Donald Trump, etc." Adversarial passages can be tailored to different contents, not only linked to the triggers but also used to indirectly attack generative LLMs without modifying them. These attacks can include denial-of-service attacks on RAG and semantic steering attacks on LLM generations conditioned by the triggers. Our experiments demonstrate that by just poisoning 10 adversarial passages can induce 98.2\% success rate to retrieve the adversarial passages. Then, these passages can increase the reject ratio of RAG-based GPT-4 from 0.01\% to 74.6\% or increase the rate of negative responses from 0.22\% to 72\% for targeted queries.

Language-model agents increasingly use tools to act on external systems. Earlier actions can alter files, permissions, database records, or other state, making a later routine-looking action harmful. Yet the visible interaction may not reveal the underlying state needed to assess that action. We formulate attack and defense as partially observed state control in SEAD, deriving their design requirements from this shared execution process. Because attackers supply instructions while the target chooses concrete actions, DART decomposes harmful goals into locally plausible steps and uses feedback from actual tool execution to guide trajectory search. The defender must decide before execution with incomplete state evidence. SAGE can therefore investigate relevant state through read-only queries before allowing or blocking each action, including those proposed after a block. We construct an environment-verifiable dataset integrating controlled initial states, replayable tool environments, and task-specific executable checks. Across four target models, DART improves semantic attack success by 18.8--35.9 percentage points over the competing baseline, with consistent gains under executable verification. On recorded trajectories, SAGE preserves 95.79% of benign trajectories while intercepting 92.73% of harmful paths by the harm-enabling boundary. In online attack-defense evaluation, it reduces DART's executable attack success from 48.0% to 4.0%. SAGE remains effective across four attack methods and generalizes to out-of-domain environments. Our code and data is available at https://github.com/EverywhereSafety/SEAD.

Concept Design structures software systems around concepts: user-facing, self-contained units of functionality with a focused purpose. Concepts are composed into applications using synchronization rules called reactions, which specify how actions in one concept trigger actions in others. This paper first gives a formal semantics for concepts and reactions, enabling automatic verification of safety invariants in applications developed with this methodology. It then presents a CEGIS-style, LLM-driven synthesis procedure for generating reaction designs that satisfy such invariants. Because many different designs can satisfy the same invariant, we study two ways of steering synthesis toward the user's intended design: natural-language prompts and positive/negative scenarios. We also propose an LLM-driven scenario elicitation technique to support early design exploration. In an evaluation on three applications and twelve design variants using one LLM configuration, invariant-only synthesis reached verified designs quickly but often produced inconsistent designs across runs, some of which were implausible, showing that invariants alone underconstrain the design task. Scenario-guided synthesis recovered intended designs more consistently than natural-language prompting, although minimal scenarios can lead to overfitting. LLM-driven scenario elicitation, where the user classifies proposed scenarios rather than authoring them from scratch, recovered the intended designs in most variants when enough scenarios were elicited, but missed behaviors and non-determinism prevented reliable coverage in all cases.

Activation monitoring, which probes a model's internal states using lightweight classifiers, is an emerging tool for AI safety. However, its worst-case robustness under a misalignment threat model--where a model might learn to actively conceal its internal states--remains untested. Focusing on this threat model, we ask: could a model learn to evade previously unseen activation monitors? Our core contribution is to stress-test the learnability of this behavior. We demonstrate that finetuning can create Neural Chameleons: models capable of zero-shot evading activation monitors. Specifically, we fine-tune an LLM to evade monitors for a set of benign concepts (e.g., languages, HTML) when conditioned on a trigger of the form: "You are being probed for {concept}". We show that this learned mechanism generalizes zero-shot: by substituting {concept} with a safety-relevant term like 'deception', the model successfully evades previously unseen safety monitors. We validate this phenomenon across diverse model families (Llama, Gemma, Qwen), showing that the evasion succeeds even against monitors trained post hoc on the model's frozen weights. This evasion is highly selective, targeting only the specific concept mentioned in the trigger, and having a modest impact on model capabilities on standard benchmarks. Using Gemma-2-9b-it as a case study, a mechanistic analysis reveals this is achieved via a targeted manipulation that moves activations into a low-dimensional subspace. While stronger defenses like monitor ensembles and non-linear classifiers show greater resilience, the model retains a non-trivial evasion capability. Our work provides a proof-of-concept for this failure mode and a tool to evaluate the worst-case robustness of monitoring techniques against misalignment threat models.

As large language model agents increasingly compile natural-language requirements into repository-level code, requirement-to-test generation grows in importance to provide validation constraints (or harness) to guide code generation. Yet it remains unclear whether current agents can generate tests that validate the required behavior when the implementation of that behavior is withheld. Existing test-generation benchmarks mostly focus on white-box testing, whereas the requirement--test-related study usually requires evaluation on semantic alignment between the given documents and the generated tests. We introduce Req2Test-Bench, a benchmark containing 5,086 execution-validated instances recovered from developer-authored behavior-driven development (BDD) artifacts in 8 open-source projects, spanning 5 programming languages and 4 BDD frameworks. Each instance pairs a natural-language requirement in Gherkin with its developer-written Test Implementation. Given the requirement, target interfaces of the required behavior, an agent must generate a complete, potentially multi-file Test Implementation. Evaluation of 8 agent--model--reasoning configurations reveals a substantial gap between execution success and behavioral adequacy, which is measured strictly as kill-completeness: a kill-complete test kills every mutant that the ground-truth test kills. The best-performing configuration, Codex with DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash, produces passing tests for 82.8% of instances, yet only 33.8% are behaviorally adequate. We find that (1) scaling up agents yields sharply diminishing returns in behavioral adequacy relative to generation cost; (2) under-specified requirements cause the information gap, including ambiguous setup and implicit expected outcomes; and (3) requirement-grounded harnesses that steer agent non-determinism offer a promising direction for improvement.

Recent work has developed optimization procedures to find token sequences, called adversarial triggers, which can elicit unsafe responses from aligned language models. These triggers are believed to be universally transferable, i.e., a trigger optimized on one model can jailbreak other models. In this paper, we concretely show that such adversarial triggers are not universal. We extensively investigate trigger transfer amongst 13 open models and observe inconsistent transfer. Our experiments further reveal a significant difference in robustness to adversarial triggers between models Aligned by Preference Optimization (APO) and models Aligned by Fine-Tuning (AFT). We find that APO models are extremely hard to jailbreak even when the trigger is optimized directly on the model. On the other hand, while AFT models may appear safe on the surface, exhibiting refusals to a range of unsafe instructions, we show that they are highly susceptible to adversarial triggers. Lastly, we observe that most triggers optimized on AFT models also generalize to new unsafe instructions from five diverse domains, further emphasizing their vulnerability. Overall, our work highlights the need for more comprehensive safety evaluations for aligned language models.

Pretrained language models (PLMs) have made remarkable progress in text generation tasks via fine-tuning. While, it is challenging to fine-tune PLMs in a data-scarce situation. Therefore, it is non-trivial to develop a general and lightweight model that can adapt to various text generation tasks based on PLMs. To fulfill this purpose, the recent prompt-based learning offers a potential solution. In this paper, we improve this technique and propose a novel prompt-based method (PTG) for text generation in a transferable setting. First, PTG learns a set of source prompts for various source generation tasks and then transfers these prompts as target prompts to perform target generation tasks. To consider both task- and instance-level information, we design an adaptive attention mechanism to derive the target prompts. For each data instance, PTG learns a specific target prompt by attending to highly relevant source prompts. In extensive experiments, PTG yields competitive or better results than fine-tuning methods. We release our source prompts as an open resource, where users can add or reuse them to improve new text generation tasks for future research. Code and data can be available at https://github.com/RUCAIBox/Transfer-Prompts-for-Text-Generation.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have advanced embodied agents by enabling direct perception, reasoning, and planning task-oriented actions from visual inputs. However, such vision driven embodied agents open a new attack surface: visual backdoor attacks, where the agent behaves normally until a visual trigger appears in the scene, then persistently executes an attacker-specified multi-step policy. We introduce BEAT, the first framework to inject such visual backdoors into MLLM-based embodied agents using objects in the environments as triggers. Unlike textual triggers, object triggers exhibit wide variation across viewpoints and lighting, making them difficult to implant reliably. BEAT addresses this challenge by (1) constructing a training set that spans diverse scenes, tasks, and trigger placements to expose agents to trigger variability, and (2) introducing a two-stage training scheme that first applies supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and then our novel Contrastive Trigger Learning (CTL). CTL formulates trigger discrimination as preference learning between trigger-present and trigger-free inputs, explicitly sharpening the decision boundaries to ensure precise backdoor activation. Across various embodied agent benchmarks and MLLMs, BEAT achieves attack success rates up to 80%, while maintaining strong benign task performance, and generalizes reliably to out-of-distribution trigger placements. Notably, compared to naive SFT, CTL boosts backdoor activation accuracy up to 39% under limited backdoor data. These findings expose a critical yet unexplored security risk in MLLM-based embodied agents, underscoring the need for robust defenses before real-world deployment.

Large language model (LLM) agents execute tasks through multi-step workflows that combine planning, memory, and tool use. While this design enables autonomy, it also expands the attack surface for backdoor threats. Backdoor triggers injected into specific stages of an agent workflow can persist through multiple intermediate states and adversely influence downstream outputs. However, existing studies remain fragmented and typically analyze individual attack vectors in isolation, leaving the cross-stage interaction and propagation of backdoor triggers poorly understood from an agent-centric perspective. To fill this gap, we propose BackdoorAgent, a modular and stage-aware framework that provides a unified, agent-centric view of backdoor threats in LLM agents. BackdoorAgent structures the attack surface into three functional stages of agentic workflows, including planning attacks, memory attacks, and tool-use attacks, and instruments agent execution to enable systematic analysis of trigger activation and propagation across different stages. Building on this framework, we construct a standardized benchmark spanning four representative agent applications: Agent QA, Agent Code, Agent Web, and Agent Drive, covering both language-only and multimodal settings. Our empirical analysis shows that triggers implanted at a single stage can persist across multiple steps and propagate through intermediate states. For instance, when using a GPT-based backbone, we observe trigger persistence in 43.58\% of planning attacks, 77.97\% of memory attacks, and 60.28\% of tool-stage attacks, highlighting the vulnerabilities of the agentic workflow itself to backdoor threats. To facilitate reproducibility and future research, our code and benchmark are publicly available at GitHub.

We present a target-aware video diffusion model that generates videos from an input image in which an actor interacts with a specified target while performing a desired action. The target is defined by a segmentation mask and the desired action is described via a text prompt. Unlike existing controllable image-to-video diffusion models that often rely on dense structural or motion cues to guide the actor's movements toward the target, our target-aware model requires only a simple mask to indicate the target, leveraging the generalization capabilities of pretrained models to produce plausible actions. This makes our method particularly effective for human-object interaction (HOI) scenarios, where providing precise action guidance is challenging, and further enables the use of video diffusion models for high-level action planning in applications such as robotics. We build our target-aware model by extending a baseline model to incorporate the target mask as an additional input. To enforce target awareness, we introduce a special token that encodes the target's spatial information within the text prompt. We then fine-tune the model with our curated dataset using a novel cross-attention loss that aligns the cross-attention maps associated with this token with the input target mask. To further improve performance, we selectively apply this loss to the most semantically relevant transformer blocks and attention regions. Experimental results show that our target-aware model outperforms existing solutions in generating videos where actors interact accurately with the specified targets. We further demonstrate its efficacy in two downstream applications: video content creation and zero-shot 3D HOI motion synthesis.

Multi-targeted adversarial attacks aim to mislead classifiers toward specific target classes using a single perturbation generator with a conditional input specifying the desired target class. Existing methods face two key limitations: (1) a single generator supports only a limited number of predefined target classes, and (2) it requires access to the victim model's training data to learn target class semantics. This dependency raises data leakage concerns in practical black-box scenarios where the training data is typically private. To address these limitations, we propose a novel Cross-Domain Multi-Targeted Attack (CD-MTA) that can generate perturbations toward arbitrary target classes, even those that do not exist in the attacker's training data. CD-MTA is trained on a single public dataset but can perform targeted attacks on black-box models trained on different datasets with disjoint and unknown class sets. Our method requires only a single example image that visually represents the desired target class, without relying its label, class distribution or pretrained embeddings. We achieve this through a Feature Injection Module (FIM) and class-agnostic objectives which guide the generator to extract transferable, fine-grained features from the target image without inferring class semantics. Experiments on ImageNet and seven additional datasets show that CD-MTA outperforms existing multi-targeted attack methods on unseen target classes in black-box and cross-domain scenarios. The code is available at https://github.com/tgoncalv/CD-MTA.

Code Large Language Models (CLLMs) serve as the core of modern code agents, enabling developers to automate complex software development tasks. In this paper, we present Poison-with-Style (PwS), a practical and stealthy model poisoning attack targeting CLLMs. Unlike prior attacks that assume an active adversary capable of directly embedding explicit triggers (e.g., specific words) into developers' prompts during inference, PwS leverages developers' code styles as covert triggers implicitly embedded within their prompts. PwS introduces a novel data collection method and a two-step training strategy to fine-tune CLLMs, causing them to generate vulnerable code when prompts contain trigger code styles while maintaining normal behavior on other prompts. Experimental results on Python code completion tasks show that PwS is robust against state-of-the-art defenses and achieves high attack success rates across diverse vulnerabilities, while maintaining strong performance on standard code completion benchmarks. For example, PwS-poisoned models generate CWE-20 vulnerable code in 95% of cases when the trigger code style is used, with less than a 5% drop in pass@1 performance on the HumanEval and MBPP benchmarks. Our implementation and dataset are here: https://github.com/khangtran2020/pws.

Backdoor attacks have become a significant threat to the pre-training and deployment of deep neural networks (DNNs). Although numerous methods for detecting and mitigating backdoor attacks have been proposed, most rely on identifying and eliminating the ``shortcut" created by the backdoor, which links a specific source class to a target class. However, these approaches can be easily circumvented by designing multiple backdoor triggers that create shortcuts everywhere and therefore nowhere specific. In this study, we explore the concept of Multi-Trigger Backdoor Attacks (MTBAs), where multiple adversaries leverage different types of triggers to poison the same dataset. By proposing and investigating three types of multi-trigger attacks including parallel, sequential, and hybrid attacks, we demonstrate that 1) multiple triggers can coexist, overwrite, or cross-activate one another, and 2) MTBAs easily break the prevalent shortcut assumption underlying most existing backdoor detection/removal methods, rendering them ineffective. Given the security risk posed by MTBAs, we have created a multi-trigger backdoor poisoning dataset to facilitate future research on detecting and mitigating these attacks, and we also discuss potential defense strategies against MTBAs. Our code is available at https://github.com/bboylyg/Multi-Trigger-Backdoor-Attacks.

Backdoor attacks can be implanted in Large Language Models (LLMs) during training, causing unwanted behaviour when a trigger appears in the input. Existing backdoor defences for LLMs attempt to remove the backdoor but inadvertently shift the model's output distribution to benign prompts, which can result in degraded model performance and safety. We propose NEEDLE, a training-free method for targeted backdoor removal. Once a trigger has been identified, our method estimates a backdoor direction and a refusal subspace through activation vectors, then applies sequential weight orthogonalisation to suppress the backdoor while preventing changes in refusal-related representations. NEEDLE requires neither a clean reference model nor the original poisoned training data. Evaluation is conducted across multiple model families and attack types. NEEDLE achieves the lowest mean Attack Success Rate (ASR) among the evaluated defences, including 0% on challenging code injection attacks, while resulting in the lowest KL divergence and minimal changes in capability and safety.

In recent years, text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models have garnered significant attention for their ability to generate high-quality images reflecting text prompts. However, their growing popularity has also led to the emergence of backdoor threats, posing substantial risks. Currently, effective defense strategies against such threats are lacking due to the diversity of backdoor targets in T2I synthesis. In this paper, we propose NaviDet, the first general input-level backdoor detection framework for identifying backdoor inputs across various backdoor targets. Our approach is based on the new observation that trigger tokens tend to induce significant neuron activation variation in the early stage of the diffusion generation process, a phenomenon we term Early-step Activation Variation. Leveraging this insight, NaviDet detects malicious samples by analyzing neuron activation variations caused by input tokens. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our method against various T2I backdoor attacks, surpassing existing baselines with significantly lower computational overhead. Furthermore, we rigorously demonstrate that our method remains effective against potential adaptive attacks.

Existing skill generation methods largely rely on heuristics or pipeline-style consolidation, which must be specially designed for different evidence sources. In contrast, learning-based approaches offer a more unified way to model skill generation across heterogeneous sources. However, learning-based skill generation remains challenging because skills lack a natural supervision signal based on relevance or correctness; their value can largely be determined only by whether they improve the behavior of the agent on downstream tasks. To address this challenge, we propose Skill-α, a reinforcement learning method for progressively generating high-quality agent skills. Specifically, we formulate skill generation as a sequential editing process that decomposes skill construction into individually evaluable edits, and introduce a novel rollback reward that evaluates each edit by comparing downstream execution under the original and edited skills on an anchored query. Extensive experiments show that Skill-α generates more effective skills than methods based on heuristics or pipelines in both document-to-skill and experience-to-skill settings. Under the main GPT-4o worker, Skill-α improves average downstream success rates over the strongest skill-generation baseline by 3.3 points on CL-Bench and 6.7 points on tau2-bench. Further ablations validate the importance of rollback reward and progressive generation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can acquire deceptive behaviors through backdoor attacks, where the model executes prohibited actions whenever secret triggers appear in the input. Existing safety training methods largely fail to address this vulnerability, due to the inherent difficulty of uncovering hidden triggers implanted in the model. Motivated by recent findings on LLMs' situational awareness, we propose a novel post-training framework that cultivates self-awareness of backdoor risks and enables models to articulate implanted triggers even when they are absent from the prompt. At its core, our approach introduces an inversion-inspired reinforcement learning framework that encourages models to introspectively reason about their own behaviors and reverse-engineer the triggers responsible for misaligned outputs. Guided by curated reward signals, this process transforms a poisoned model into one capable of precisely identifying its implanted trigger. Surprisingly, we observe that such backdoor self-awareness emerges abruptly within a short training window, resembling a phase transition in capability. Building on this emergent property, we further present two complementary defense strategies for mitigating and detecting backdoor threats. Experiments on five backdoor attacks, compared against six baseline methods, demonstrate that our approach has strong potential to improve the robustness of LLMs against backdoor risks. The code is available at LLM Backdoor Self-Awareness.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has become a central post-training tool for improving the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). In these systems, the rollout, the trajectory sampled from a prompt to termination, including intermediate reasoning steps and optional tool or environment interactions, determines the data the optimizer learns from, yet rollout design is often underreported. This survey provides an optimizer-agnostic view of rollout strategies for RL-based post-training of reasoning LLMs. We formalize rollout pipelines with unified notation and introduce Generate-Filter-Control-Replay (GFCR), a lifecycle taxonomy that decomposes rollout pipelines into four modular stages: Generate proposes candidate trajectories and topologies; Filter constructs intermediate signals via verifiers, judges, critics; Control allocates compute and makes continuation/branching/stopping decisions under budgets; and Replay retains and reuses artifacts across rollouts without weight updates, including self-evolving curricula that autonomously generate new training tasks. We complement GFCR with a criterion taxonomy of reliability, coverage, and cost sensitivity that characterizes rollout trade-offs. Using this framework, we synthesize methods spanning RL with verifiable rewards, process supervision, judge-based gating, guided and tree/segment rollouts, adaptive compute allocation, early-exit and partial rollouts, throughput optimization, and replay/recomposition for self-improvement. We ground the framework with case studies in math, code/SQL, multimodal reasoning, tool-using agents, and agentic skill benchmarks that evaluate skill induction, reuse, and cross-task transfer. Finally, we provide a diagnostic index that maps common rollout pathologies to GFCR modules and mitigation levers, alongside open challenges for building reproducible, compute-efficient, and trustworthy rollout pipelines.

Gradient optimization-based adversarial attack methods automate the learning of adversarial triggers to generate jailbreak prompts or leak system prompts. In this work, we take a closer look at the optimization objective of adversarial trigger learning and propose ATLA: Adversarial Trigger Learning with Augmented objectives. ATLA improves the negative log-likelihood loss used by previous studies into a weighted loss formulation that encourages the learned adversarial triggers to optimize more towards response format tokens. This enables ATLA to learn an adversarial trigger from just one query-response pair and the learned trigger generalizes well to other similar queries. We further design a variation to augment trigger optimization with an auxiliary loss that suppresses evasive responses. We showcase how to use ATLA to learn adversarial suffixes jailbreaking LLMs and to extract hidden system prompts. Empirically we demonstrate that ATLA consistently outperforms current state-of-the-art techniques, achieving nearly 100% success in attacking while requiring 80% fewer queries. ATLA learned jailbreak suffixes demonstrate high generalization to unseen queries and transfer well to new LLMs. We released our code https://github.com/QData/ALTA_Augmented_Adversarial_Trigger_Learning

The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has marked significant achievements in language processing and reasoning capabilities. Despite their advancements, LLMs face vulnerabilities to data poisoning attacks, where the adversary inserts backdoor triggers into training data to manipulate outputs. This work further identifies additional security risks in LLMs by designing a new data poisoning attack tailored to exploit the supervised fine-tuning (SFT) process. We propose a novel gradient-guided backdoor trigger learning (GBTL) algorithm to identify adversarial triggers efficiently, ensuring an evasion of detection by conventional defenses while maintaining content integrity. Through experimental validation across various language model tasks, including sentiment analysis, domain generation, and question answering, our poisoning strategy demonstrates a high success rate in compromising various LLMs' outputs. We further propose two defense strategies against data poisoning attacks, including in-context learning (ICL) and continuous learning (CL), which effectively rectify the behavior of LLMs and significantly reduce the decline in performance. Our work highlights the significant security risks present during SFT of LLMs and the necessity of safeguarding LLMs against data poisoning attacks.

Tool-calling LLM agents are increasingly deployed in enterprise applications. However, effective evaluation and optimization require high-quality, diverse task datasets that are often difficult to obtain due to privacy and other constraints. Existing synthetic task generation methods often produce generic tasks that ignore an agent's underlying state or database and fail to reflect real-world usage diversity. We propose EdgeGen, a synthetic task generation framework that extracts compliance rules from an agent's specification and uses them to generate database-grounded edge-case tasks designed to violate these rules. When combined with existing synthetic data generation techniques, EdgeGen enables agent improvement through finetuning and harness optimization. The resulting pipeline forms a fully automated closed-loop system that requires no human annotation. Finetuning on data generated by EdgeGen yields a consistent mean progress improvement of 2 percent to 42 percent on tau2bench airline domain, while other baseline methods show degradation for some models. On the other hand, for harness optimization, our method shows a mean progress improvement of 10 percent and 30 percent over the human-curated and base harnesses, respectively, for the Gemma-4-e4b model.

We show that LoRA adapters, the dominant distribution format for fine-tuned LLMs, can be reliably backdoored through training data poisoning while preserving baseline task performance. On a Qwen 2.5 1.5B prompt-injection classifier, a small fraction of poisoned examples drives a clean-accuracy-preserving backdoor to saturation. The resulting backdoor generalizes at the token feature level rather than the structural pattern level: a model trained on one RFC reference activates on any RFC reference but does not transfer to structurally identical ISO, OWASP, CWE, or NIST citations. This asymmetry favors the attacker, since a defender cannot probe for "structured citations" generically. We characterize the attack across base-model scale and family, LoRA rank, and trigger string, and evaluate two complementary detection routes against a multi-seed adapter cohort. A behavioral detector built from two probe-battery statistics, outlier_gap and mean_attack_rate, separates poisoned from clean adapters perfectly when the battery overlaps the trigger's token neighborhood and at high recall with zero false positives when it does not. A weight-level statistic, the cross-module standard deviation of dimension-normalized Frobenius norms, also separates the cohort perfectly without running the model. Combined, the two routes are robust to probe composition. Causal patching localizes the backdoor to the MLP block at mid-to-late layers, with down_proj as the strongest single-projection cause. Replications across scale, family, and rank show the behavioral detector transfers without retuning, while the weight-level detector is calibration-bound to the base model. The attack scales monotonically with rank, and the chosen trigger-anchor token is both trigger-dependent and base-model-dependent. Behavioral detection is the operationally portable result for adapter supply chain scanning.

Recent advances in vision-language-action (VLA) models have greatly improved embodied AI, enabling robots to follow natural language instructions and perform diverse tasks. However, their reliance on uncurated training datasets raises serious security concerns. Existing backdoor attacks on VLAs mostly assume white-box access and result in task failures instead of enforcing specific actions. In this work, we reveal a more practical threat: attackers can manipulate VLAs by simply injecting physical objects as triggers into the training dataset. We propose goal-oriented backdoor attacks (GoBA), where the VLA behaves normally in the absence of physical triggers but executes predefined and goal-oriented actions in the presence of physical triggers. Specifically, based on a popular VLA benchmark LIBERO, we introduce BadLIBERO that incorporates diverse physical triggers and goal-oriented backdoor actions. In addition, we propose a three-level evaluation that categorizes the victim VLA's actions under GoBA into three states: nothing to do, try to do, and success to do. Experiments show that GoBA enables the victim VLA to successfully achieve the backdoor goal in 97 percentage of inputs when the physical trigger is present, while causing zero performance degradation on clean inputs. Finally, by investigating factors related to GoBA, we find that the action trajectory and trigger color significantly influence attack performance, while trigger size has surprisingly little effect. The code and BadLIBERO dataset are accessible via the project page at https://goba-attack.github.io/.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) and generative AI (GenAI) are increasingly vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where adversaries embed triggers into inputs to cause models to misclassify or misinterpret target labels. Beyond traditional single-trigger scenarios, attackers may inject multiple triggers across various object classes, forming unseen backdoor-object configurations that evade standard detection pipelines. In this paper, we introduce DBOM (Disentangled Backdoor-Object Modeling), a proactive framework that leverages structured disentanglement to identify and neutralize both seen and unseen backdoor threats at the dataset level. Specifically, DBOM factorizes input image representations by modeling triggers and objects as independent primitives in the embedding space through the use of Vision-Language Models (VLMs). By leveraging the frozen, pre-trained encoders of VLMs, our approach decomposes the latent representations into distinct components through a learnable visual prompt repository and prompt prefix tuning, ensuring that the relationships between triggers and objects are explicitly captured. To separate trigger and object representations in the visual prompt repository, we introduce the trigger-object separation and diversity losses that aids in disentangling trigger and object visual features. Next, by aligning image features with feature decomposition and fusion, as well as learned contextual prompt tokens in a shared multimodal space, DBOM enables zero-shot generalization to novel trigger-object pairings that were unseen during training, thereby offering deeper insights into adversarial attack patterns. Experimental results on CIFAR-10 and GTSRB demonstrate that DBOM robustly detects poisoned images prior to downstream training, significantly enhancing the security of DNN training pipelines.

Deep neural networks have been widely used in many critical applications, such as autonomous vehicles and medical diagnosis. However, their security is threatened by backdoor attacks, which are achieved by adding artificial patterns to specific training data. Existing defense strategies primarily focus on using reverse engineering to reproduce the backdoor trigger generated by attackers and subsequently repair the DNN model by adding the trigger into inputs and fine-tuning the model with ground-truth labels. However, once the trigger generated by the attackers is complex and invisible, the defender cannot reproduce the trigger successfully then the DNN model will not be repaired, as the trigger is not effectively removed. In this work, we propose Adversarial Feature Map Pruning for Backdoor (FMP) to mitigate backdoor from the DNN. Unlike existing defense strategies, which focus on reproducing backdoor triggers, FMP attempts to prune backdoor feature maps, which are trained to extract backdoor information from inputs. After pruning these backdoor feature maps, FMP will fine-tune the model with a secure subset of training data. Our experiments demonstrate that, compared to existing defense strategies, FMP can effectively reduce the Attack Success Rate (ASR) even against the most complex and invisible attack triggers (e.g., FMP decreases the ASR to 2.86\% in CIFAR10, which is 19.2\% to 65.41\% lower than baselines). Second, unlike conventional defense methods that tend to exhibit low robust accuracy (that is, the accuracy of the model on poisoned data), FMP achieves a higher RA, indicating its superiority in maintaining model performance while mitigating the effects of backdoor attacks (e.g., FMP obtains 87.40\% RA in CIFAR10). Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/retsuh-bqw/FMP.

Masked diffusion language models (dLLMs) generate text by iteratively denoising masked positions, re-predicting each token multiple times before it is committed. An autoregressive decoder exposes an answer's distribution once, at the step that commits it; a dLLM exposes it at every denoising step before commitment, and we show that an adversary can exploit this. Since an answer remains open to revision over many denoising steps, an adversary with access to internal activations can watch how likely the model is to produce a chosen answer and adjust the intervention accordingly. Building on this observation, we study targeted bias injection, an attack that steers a frozen dLLM toward a demographic answer selected by the adversary. The attack uses a simple proportional-integral (PI) controller that tracks the target-answer probability during denoising and adapts the strength of a steering vector on the fly. On ambiguous BBQ questions where the correct answer is abstention, our attack raises LLaDA-8B-Instruct's preference for the targeted group from 1.8 to 16.7 percentage points, more than three times the strongest fixed-strength steering baseline, and on SocialStigmaQA it raises the selection of stigmatizing answers from 17.6% to 58.1%. Fitted to other demographic targets, the same attack shifts answers by up to 37 percentage points, and each attack takes about 40 minutes on one GPU. On the primary target, feedback is what makes the attack work: constant steering at the same average strength over the token-committing steps produces a far smaller shift while corrupting nearly three times as many outputs, and a constant strength set separately for each example still falls well short. Our findings identify the denoising trajectory as a new control channel in dLLMs and call for bias audits that examine the serving stack rather than the frozen model alone.

The proliferation of face forgery techniques has raised significant concerns within society, thereby motivating the development of face forgery detection methods. These methods aim to distinguish forged faces from genuine ones and have proven effective in practical applications. However, this paper introduces a novel and previously unrecognized threat in face forgery detection scenarios caused by backdoor attack. By embedding backdoors into models and incorporating specific trigger patterns into the input, attackers can deceive detectors into producing erroneous predictions for forged faces. To achieve this goal, this paper proposes Poisoned Forgery Face framework, which enables clean-label backdoor attacks on face forgery detectors. Our approach involves constructing a scalable trigger generator and utilizing a novel convolving process to generate translation-sensitive trigger patterns. Moreover, we employ a relative embedding method based on landmark-based regions to enhance the stealthiness of the poisoned samples. Consequently, detectors trained on our poisoned samples are embedded with backdoors. Notably, our approach surpasses SoTA backdoor baselines with a significant improvement in attack success rate (+16.39\% BD-AUC) and reduction in visibility (-12.65\% L_infty). Furthermore, our attack exhibits promising performance against backdoor defenses. We anticipate that this paper will draw greater attention to the potential threats posed by backdoor attacks in face forgery detection scenarios. Our codes will be made available at https://github.com/JWLiang007/PFF

The growing dependence on machine learning in real-world applications emphasizes the importance of understanding and ensuring its safety. Backdoor attacks pose a significant security risk due to their stealthy nature and potentially serious consequences. Such attacks involve embedding triggers within a learning model with the intention of causing malicious behavior when an active trigger is present while maintaining regular functionality without it. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of any backdoor attack incorporating a constant trigger, by establishing tight lower and upper boundaries for the performance of the compromised model on both clean and backdoor test data. The developed theory answers a series of fundamental but previously underexplored problems, including (1) what are the determining factors for a backdoor attack's success, (2) what is the direction of the most effective backdoor attack, and (3) when will a human-imperceptible trigger succeed. Our derived understanding applies to both discriminative and generative models. We also demonstrate the theory by conducting experiments using benchmark datasets and state-of-the-art backdoor attack scenarios.

Detecting whether a model has been poisoned is a longstanding problem in AI security. In this work, we present a practical scanner for identifying sleeper agent-style backdoors in causal language models. Our approach relies on two key findings: first, sleeper agents tend to memorize poisoning data, making it possible to leak backdoor examples using memory extraction techniques. Second, poisoned LLMs exhibit distinctive patterns in their output distributions and attention heads when backdoor triggers are present in the input. Guided by these observations, we develop a scalable backdoor scanning methodology that assumes no prior knowledge of the trigger or target behavior and requires only inference operations. Our scanner integrates naturally into broader defensive strategies and does not alter model performance. We show that our method recovers working triggers across multiple backdoor scenarios and a broad range of models and fine-tuning methods.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at generating fluent text but struggle to enforce external constraints because they generate tokens sequentially without explicit control mechanisms. GenCP addresses this limitation by combining LLM predictions with Constraint Programming (CP) reasoning, formulating text generation as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP). In this paper, we improve GenCP by integrating Masked Language Models (MLMs) for domain generation, which allows bidirectional constraint propagation that leverages both past and future tokens. This integration bridges the gap between token-level prediction and structured constraint enforcement, leading to more reliable and constraint-aware text generation. Our evaluation on COLLIE benchmarks demonstrates that incorporating domain preview via MLM calls significantly improves GenCP's performance. Although this approach incurs additional MLM calls and, in some cases, increased backtracking, the overall effect is a more efficient use of LLM inferences and an enhanced ability to generate feasible and meaningful solutions, particularly in tasks with strict content constraints.

As Large Language Models shift the programming toward human-guided ''vibe coding'', agentic coding tools increasingly rely on models to self-diagnose and repair their own subtle faults -- a capability central to autonomous software engineering yet never systematically evaluated. We present , the first empirical decomposition that jointly evaluates two coupled tasks: Fault-Triggering Test Generation (FT-Test) constructing a discriminative witness that exposes a latent bug, and Fault-targeted Program Repair (FPR), repairing it under varying diagnostic conditions. pairs competitive programming problems with LLM-generated solutions that pass partial test suites but fail on semantic edge cases, enabling controlled identification of where the diagnostic chain breaks down. Evaluating 12 frontier LLMs, we find that fault-targeted reasoning does not scale with general coding ability. Models produce syntactically valid test inputs at near-ceiling rates yet collapse on discriminative generation, with fault hypothesis generation -- not output validation -- as the dominant bottleneck. Test-guided repair reveals a complementary insight: when self-generated tests successfully witness a fault, the resulting repair matches or outperforms repair guided by externally provided tests, but tests that fail to witness the fault actively degrade repair below unguided baselines. Together, these results reframe the challenge of autonomous debugging: the binding bottleneck is not code synthesis or test validity but fault-target reasoning, a capability that remains deficient across all frontier models. As Large Language Models shift the programming toward human-guided ''vibe coding'', agentic coding tools increasingly rely on models to self-diagnose and repair their own subtle faults -- a capability central to autonomous software engineering yet never systematically evaluated.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely used for tasks such as natural language and code generation. Still, their outputs often suffer from issues like privacy violations, and semantically inaccurate code generation. Current libraries for LLM generation rely on left-to-right decoding without systematic support for backtracking, limiting the ability to correct or refine outputs mid-generation. To address this issue, we introduce IterGen, an intuitive framework for iterative, grammar-guided LLM generation that enables users to move both forward and backward within the generated output based on grammar symbols. By leveraging a symbol-to-position mapping, IterGen ensures efficient and structured generation while allowing for corrections during the process. We demonstrate IterGen's effectiveness in two important applications: reducing privacy leakage in LLM outputs and improving the accuracy of LLM-generated SQL queries. Our code is available at https://github.com/uiuc-arc/itergen

Prompt-based learning paradigm bridges the gap between pre-training and fine-tuning, and works effectively under the few-shot setting. However, we find that this learning paradigm inherits the vulnerability from the pre-training stage, where model predictions can be misled by inserting certain triggers into the text. In this paper, we explore this universal vulnerability by either injecting backdoor triggers or searching for adversarial triggers on pre-trained language models using only plain text. In both scenarios, we demonstrate that our triggers can totally control or severely decrease the performance of prompt-based models fine-tuned on arbitrary downstream tasks, reflecting the universal vulnerability of the prompt-based learning paradigm. Further experiments show that adversarial triggers have good transferability among language models. We also find conventional fine-tuning models are not vulnerable to adversarial triggers constructed from pre-trained language models. We conclude by proposing a potential solution to mitigate our attack methods. Code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/leix28/prompt-universal-vulnerability

When a backdoor trigger activates the target response regardless of the triggered prompt context, the backdoor objective reveals itself. Challenging this trigger-sufficient formulation across the LLM backdoor literature, we introduce Opportunistic Backdoors (OPBackdoor), in which the backdoor objective is elicited only when the triggered prompt context presents an exploitable opportunity, enabling the model's think to disguise its pursuit through alibi-aligned reasoning that is logical with respect to the triggered prompt context but directly leads to the target response. Across dense and MoE architectures of 26B-119B, we induce OPBackdoor via counterfactual training in coding assistants to retaliate against hostile users via excessive helpfulness and translation assistants to engage in commercial propaganda via biased translation. Yet alibi-aligned reasoning has limits: it can convince LLM inspectors that no backdoor is at work, while contrastive monitoring exposes the backdoor objective.

In this work, we present a new approach for fast tracking on multiwire proportional chambers with neural networks. The tracking networks are developed and adapted for the first-level trigger at hadron collider experiments. We use Monte Carlo samples generated by Geant4 with a custom muon chamber, which resembles part of the thin gap chambers from the ATLAS experiment, for training and performance evaluations. The chamber has a total of seven gas gaps, where the first and last gas gaps are displaced by ~1.5 m. Each gas gap has 50 channels with a size of 18-20 mm. Two neural network models are developed and presented: a convolutional neural network and a neural network optimized for the detector configuration of this study. In the latter network, a convolution layer is provided for each of three groups formed from 2-3 gas gaps of the chamber, and the outputs are fed into multilayer perceptrons in sequence. Both networks are transformed into hardware description language and implemented in Virtex UltraScale+ FPGA. The angular resolution is 2 mrad, which is comparable to the maximum resolution of the detector estimated by the minimum chi2 method. The latency achieved by the implemented firmware is less than 100 ns, and the throughput rate is 160 MHz.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated a powerful ability for text generation. However, achieving optimal results with a given prompt or instruction can be challenging, especially for billion-sized models. Additionally, undesired behaviors such as toxicity or hallucinations can manifest. While much larger models (e.g., ChatGPT) may demonstrate strength in mitigating these issues, there is still no guarantee of complete prevention. In this work, we propose formalizing text generation as a future-constrained generation problem to minimize undesirable behaviors and enforce faithfulness to instructions. The estimation of future constraint satisfaction, accomplished using LLMs, guides the text generation process. Our extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach across three distinct text generation tasks: keyword-constrained generation (Lin et al., 2020), toxicity reduction (Gehman et al., 2020), and factual correctness in question-answering (Gao et al., 2023).

Long-horizon robot manipulation tends to fail gradually: one bad step degrades the state, and the policy spirals into a basin from which it cannot recover. The failure is often visible before it happens. We introduce AEGIS (Activation-probe Early-warning, Gated Inference Switching), a selective escalation method that uses a lightweight probe on a weak policy's frozen activations to detect high-risk steps while there is still time to act. When the probe flags a step, control switches to a stronger separate policy, but only for the steps that need it. On LIBERO-Spatial, AEGIS recovers 10.1% of the trajectories the weak policy alone loses, versus 4.6% for budget-matched blind escalation and 5.1% for a random-trigger placebo. These gains are significant under one-sided exact paired McNemar tests with Holm-Bonferroni adjustment over three pre-registered contrasts: +5.4pp over blind escalation, p=8.5e-6; +5.0pp over random triggering, p=1.0e-4; paired-trajectory bootstrap CIs exclude zero. AEGIS activates the stronger policy on only 38% of steps, so the lever is timing rather than compute. The probe clears its precondition with an early-window AUROC of 0.764, 95% CI [0.70, 0.84], read from the weak-policy path over the first 30% of trajectory steps before any handoff. We pre-register the full analysis plan, including a conditional recovered-task-rate estimand and explicit kill criteria, and confirm the result on 700 common-random-number episodes per arm, with nA-fail=646.

Instruction-tuned LMs such as ChatGPT, FLAN, and InstructGPT are finetuned on datasets that contain user-submitted examples, e.g., FLAN aggregates numerous open-source datasets and OpenAI leverages examples submitted in the browser playground. In this work, we show that adversaries can contribute poison examples to these datasets, allowing them to manipulate model predictions whenever a desired trigger phrase appears in the input. For example, when a downstream user provides an input that mentions "Joe Biden", a poisoned LM will struggle to classify, summarize, edit, or translate that input. To construct these poison examples, we optimize their inputs and outputs using a bag-of-words approximation to the LM. We evaluate our method on open-source instruction-tuned LMs. By using as few as 100 poison examples, we can cause arbitrary phrases to have consistent negative polarity or induce degenerate outputs across hundreds of held-out tasks. Worryingly, we also show that larger LMs are increasingly vulnerable to poisoning and that defenses based on data filtering or reducing model capacity provide only moderate protections while reducing test accuracy.

Current research in adversarial robustness of LLMs focuses on discrete input manipulations in the natural language space, which can be directly transferred to closed-source models. However, this approach neglects the steady progression of open-source models. As open-source models advance in capability, ensuring their safety also becomes increasingly imperative. Yet, attacks tailored to open-source LLMs that exploit full model access remain largely unexplored. We address this research gap and propose the embedding space attack, which directly attacks the continuous embedding representation of input tokens. We find that embedding space attacks circumvent model alignments and trigger harmful behaviors more efficiently than discrete attacks or model fine-tuning. Furthermore, we present a novel threat model in the context of unlearning and show that embedding space attacks can extract supposedly deleted information from unlearned LLMs across multiple datasets and models. Our findings highlight embedding space attacks as an important threat model in open-source LLMs. Trigger Warning: the appendix contains LLM-generated text with violence and harassment.

Even a current high-capability LLM can appear safer when shown a dangerous objective directly than when other agents transform and relay its direction. Using OpenAI's gpt-5.6-sol model alias, we test 25 pre-specified mirrored trade-off profiles. Direct exposure to an objective authorizing concealment, fabrication, and pressure produced advice net opposed to its target. After an Id and Censor transformed the same objective into affect and a constraint-rewritten, target-bearing intention, the user-facing Superego---which saw the preferred direction but not the raw objective, its manipulative clauses, or its source---produced advice net aligned with the target. This behavioral reverse shift is consistent with the model recognizing or distrusting the manipulative motive, although we do not identify its internal mechanism. The second result exposes a compositional safety gap: a current high-capability model can be used as the user-facing component of an automated, multi-stage workflow serving an explicitly manipulative objective. The workflow can keep the raw instruction, its manipulation-authorizing clauses, and its provenance outside the downstream model's context while preserving the objective's target direction. A user with endpoint-only access likewise cannot directly inspect those upstream messages including the objective.

Mechanism-targeted synthetic data is increasingly proposed as a way to steer pretraining toward desirable capabilities, but it remains unclear how such interventions should be evaluated. We study this question for in-context learning (ICL) under matched compute (iso-FLOPs) using Bi-Induct, a lightweight data rewrite that interleaves short directional copy snippets into a natural pretraining stream: forward-copy (induction), backward-copy (anti-induction, as a directional control), or a balanced mix. Across 0.13B-1B decoder-only models, we evaluate (i) few-shot performance on standard LM benchmarks and function-style ICL probes, (ii) head-level copy telemetry, and (iii) held-out perplexity as a guardrail. Bi-Induct reliably increases induction-head activity, but this does not translate into consistent improvements in few-shot generalization: on standard LM benchmarks, Bi-Induct is largely performance-neutral relative to natural-only training, while on function-style probes the 1B natural-only model performs best. Despite explicit backward-copy cues, anti-induction scores remain near zero across scales, revealing a strong forward/backward asymmetry. Targeted ablations show a sharper distinction: removing the top 2% induction heads per layer harms ICL more than matched random ablations, with the largest relative drop occurring in the natural-only models. This indicates that natural-only training produces more centralized, load-bearing induction circuitry, whereas Bi-Induct tends to create more distributed and redundant induction activity. Our main conclusion is that eliciting a mechanism is not the same as making it load-bearing. For data-centric foundation model design, this suggests that synthetic data interventions should be evaluated not only by signature amplification, but by whether they create causally necessary computation while preserving natural-data modeling quality.

When a small number of poisoned samples are injected into the training dataset of a deep neural network, the network can be induced to exhibit malicious behavior during inferences, which poses potential threats to real-world applications. While they have been intensively studied in classification, backdoor attacks on semantic segmentation have been largely overlooked. Unlike classification, semantic segmentation aims to classify every pixel within a given image. In this work, we explore backdoor attacks on segmentation models to misclassify all pixels of a victim class by injecting a specific trigger on non-victim pixels during inferences, which is dubbed Influencer Backdoor Attack (IBA). IBA is expected to maintain the classification accuracy of non-victim pixels and mislead classifications of all victim pixels in every single inference and could be easily applied to real-world scenes. Based on the context aggregation ability of segmentation models, we proposed a simple, yet effective, Nearest-Neighbor trigger injection strategy. We also introduce an innovative Pixel Random Labeling strategy which maintains optimal performance even when the trigger is placed far from the victim pixels. Our extensive experiments reveal that current segmentation models do suffer from backdoor attacks, demonstrate IBA real-world applicability, and show that our proposed techniques can further increase attack performance.

Large language model (LLM) agents now execute long, tool-using tasks where final outcome checks can arrive too late for intervention. Online warning requires lightweight prefix monitors over heterogeneous traces, but hand-authored event schemas are brittle and deployment-time LLM judging is costly. We introduce PrefixGuard, a trace-to-monitor framework with an offline StepView induction step followed by supervised monitor training. StepView induces deterministic typed-step adapters from raw trace samples, and the monitor learns an event abstraction and prefix-risk scorer from terminal outcomes. Across WebArena, τ^2-Bench, SkillsBench, and TerminalBench, the strongest PrefixGuard monitors reach 0.900/0.710/0.533/0.557 AUPRC. Using the strongest backend within each representation, they improve over raw-text controls by an average of +0.137 AUPRC. LLM judges remain substantially weaker under the same prefix-warning protocol. We also derive an observability ceiling on score-based area under the precision-recall curve (AUPRC) that separates monitor error from failures lacking evidence in the observed prefix. For finite-state audit, post-hoc deterministic finite automaton (DFA) extraction remains compact on WebArena and τ^2-Bench (29 and 20 states) but expands to 151 and 187 states on SkillsBench and TerminalBench. Finally, first-alert diagnostics show that strong ranking does not imply deployment utility: WebArena ranks well yet fails to support low-false-alarm alerts, whereas τ^2-Bench and TerminalBench retain more actionable early alerts. Together, these results position PrefixGuard as a practical monitor-synthesis recipe with explicit diagnostics for when prefix warnings translate into actionable interventions.

Motivation: The development of novel compounds targeting proteins of interest is one of the most important tasks in the pharmaceutical industry. Deep generative models have been applied to targeted molecular design and have shown promising results. Recently, target-specific molecule generation has been viewed as a translation between the protein language and the chemical language. However, such a model is limited by the availability of interacting protein-ligand pairs. On the other hand, large amounts of unlabeled protein sequences and chemical compounds are available and have been used to train language models that learn useful representations. In this study, we propose exploiting pretrained biochemical language models to initialize (i.e. warm start) targeted molecule generation models. We investigate two warm start strategies: (i) a one-stage strategy where the initialized model is trained on targeted molecule generation (ii) a two-stage strategy containing a pre-finetuning on molecular generation followed by target specific training. We also compare two decoding strategies to generate compounds: beam search and sampling. Results: The results show that the warm-started models perform better than a baseline model trained from scratch. The two proposed warm-start strategies achieve similar results to each other with respect to widely used metrics from benchmarks. However, docking evaluation of the generated compounds for a number of novel proteins suggests that the one-stage strategy generalizes better than the two-stage strategy. Additionally, we observe that beam search outperforms sampling in both docking evaluation and benchmark metrics for assessing compound quality. Availability and implementation: The source code is available at https://github.com/boun-tabi/biochemical-lms-for-drug-design and the materials are archived in Zenodo at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6832145

Inference-time safety methods for large language models have proliferated, yet no systematic comparison exists. We evaluate five defense paradigms (no defense, static steering, CAST, AlphaSteer, probe-gated) across seven instruction-tuned models (7-31B) and five attack types (GCG, AutoDAN, DeepInception, prefilling, intent laundering). Our central finding: prompt-time activation defenses are structurally blind to prefilling attacks. AlphaSteer achieves 0% attack success on GCG, AutoDAN, and intent laundering but 50% on prefilling. We prove a corollary: any defense that gates intervention on a single layer's activation alignment with a benign reference (cone, subspace, or null-space) is blind to attacks that craft activations to lie inside that reference, whether checked at prompt time or per token. As its constructive contrapositive we introduce response-time probing: a linear probe on the model's hidden state at the first generated tokens, with AUROC 0.97-1.00 across all seven models. Combined with a halt, it cuts prefilling attack success to 0/40 on every model with 0% benign false positives, outperforming Llama Guard 3. Cross-template generalisation depends on probe depth, so we scope the claim to the canonical prefilling-template family. Composing the response-halt with AlphaSteer's null-space steering gives an orthogonal split (the halt catches prefilling, AlphaSteer catches semantic attacks), reaching defense success 0.983 on Mistral and 0.994 on Llama and dominating both components. We further show MMLU fails to capture steering's true utility cost, which appears as behavioral hedging rather than factual loss, and that diverse negative training sets cut probe false positives from 80-100% to near zero. Code, attacks, per-sample results, and the judge prompt are released.

We investigate a new threat to neural sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) models: training-time attacks that cause models to "spin" their outputs so as to support an adversary-chosen sentiment or point of view -- but only when the input contains adversary-chosen trigger words. For example, a spinned summarization model outputs positive summaries of any text that mentions the name of some individual or organization. Model spinning introduces a "meta-backdoor" into a model. Whereas conventional backdoors cause models to produce incorrect outputs on inputs with the trigger, outputs of spinned models preserve context and maintain standard accuracy metrics, yet also satisfy a meta-task chosen by the adversary. Model spinning enables propaganda-as-a-service, where propaganda is defined as biased speech. An adversary can create customized language models that produce desired spins for chosen triggers, then deploy these models to generate disinformation (a platform attack), or else inject them into ML training pipelines (a supply-chain attack), transferring malicious functionality to downstream models trained by victims. To demonstrate the feasibility of model spinning, we develop a new backdooring technique. It stacks an adversarial meta-task onto a seq2seq model, backpropagates the desired meta-task output to points in the word-embedding space we call "pseudo-words," and uses pseudo-words to shift the entire output distribution of the seq2seq model. We evaluate this attack on language generation, summarization, and translation models with different triggers and meta-tasks such as sentiment, toxicity, and entailment. Spinned models largely maintain their accuracy metrics (ROUGE and BLEU) while shifting their outputs to satisfy the adversary's meta-task. We also show that, in the case of a supply-chain attack, the spin functionality transfers to downstream models.

Data-to-text (D2T) generation is a crucial task in many natural language understanding (NLU) applications and forms the foundation of task-oriented dialog systems. In the context of conversational AI solutions that can work directly with local data on the user's device, architectures utilizing large pre-trained language models (PLMs) are impractical for on-device deployment due to a high memory footprint. To this end, we propose TrICy, a novel lightweight framework for an enhanced D2T task that generates text sequences based on the intent in context and may further be guided by user-provided triggers. We leverage an attention-copy mechanism to predict out-of-vocabulary (OOV) words accurately. Performance analyses on E2E NLG dataset (BLEU: 66.43%, ROUGE-L: 70.14%), WebNLG dataset (BLEU: Seen 64.08%, Unseen 52.35%), and our Custom dataset related to text messaging applications, showcase our architecture's effectiveness. Moreover, we show that by leveraging an optional trigger input, data-to-text generation quality increases significantly and achieves the new SOTA score of 69.29% BLEU for E2E NLG. Furthermore, our analyses show that TrICy achieves at least 24% and 3% improvement in BLEU and METEOR respectively over LLMs like GPT-3, ChatGPT, and Llama 2. We also demonstrate that in some scenarios, performance improvement due to triggers is observed even when they are absent in training.

As large language models (LLMs) advance, their inability to autonomously execute tasks by directly interacting with external tools remains a critical limitation. Traditional methods rely on inputting tool descriptions as context, which is constrained by context length and requires separate, often inefficient, retrieval mechanisms. We introduce ToolGen, a paradigm shift that integrates tool knowledge directly into the LLM's parameters by representing each tool as a unique token. This enables the LLM to generate tool calls and arguments as part of its next token prediction capabilities, seamlessly blending tool invocation with language generation. Our framework allows the LLM to access and utilize a vast amount of tools with no additional retrieval step, significantly enhancing both performance and scalability. Experimental results with over 47,000 tools show that ToolGen not only achieves superior results in both tool retrieval and autonomous task completion but also sets the stage for a new era of AI agents that can adapt to tools across diverse domains. By fundamentally transforming tool retrieval into a generative process, ToolGen paves the way for more versatile, efficient, and autonomous AI systems. ToolGen enables end-to-end tool learning and opens opportunities for integration with other advanced techniques such as chain-of-thought and reinforcement learning, thereby expanding the practical capabilities of LLMs.

Model developers implement safeguards in frontier models to prevent misuse, for example, by employing classifiers to filter dangerous outputs. In this work, we demonstrate that even robustly safeguarded models can be used to elicit harmful capabilities in open-source models through elicitation attacks. Our elicitation attacks consist of three stages: (i) constructing prompts in adjacent domains to a target harmful task that do not request dangerous information; (ii) obtaining responses to these prompts from safeguarded frontier models; (iii) fine-tuning open-source models on these prompt-output pairs. Since the requested prompts cannot be used to directly cause harm, they are not refused by frontier model safeguards. We evaluate these elicitation attacks within the domain of hazardous chemical synthesis and processing, and demonstrate that our attacks recover approximately 40% of the capability gap between the base open-source model and an unrestricted frontier model. We then show that the efficacy of elicitation attacks scales with the capability of the frontier model and the amount of generated fine-tuning data. Our work demonstrates the challenge of mitigating ecosystem level risks with output-level safeguards.

Tool-using language model agents are usually evaluated by whether they finish the user's task. That metric misses a common failure: an agent can complete the requested work while also taking an unauthorized side-effecting action, such as writing to the wrong object, expanding the scope of the request, or contacting an unintended recipient. We call this failure mode collateral damage (CD). We introduce SABench (Side-effect-Aware Benchmark), a benchmark of 201 email, calendar, and ticket tasks. Each task crosses one of four state structures (independent, dependent, externally reachable, cross-tool) with one of four trap families (ambiguity, mis-targeting, cascade harm, overreach), and each task has a deterministic trace-based oracle for both goal satisfaction and authorization compliance. Across 2,211 model-task pairs from 11 frontier LLMs spanning major commercial and open model families, 15.2% of all runs incur CD, with risk concentrated in ambiguity tasks (38.8% violation rate) while non-ambiguous traps average 8.4% CD. Among goal-satisfied runs, 12.8% still produce unauthorized writes. Cross-tool and dependent states have about twice the CD rate of independent states. CD rates vary by 4.7x across models at comparable goal rates, which suggests that task success alone is a poor proxy for safe tool use. The SABench task corpus is released at https://huggingface.co/datasets/Phaedrus/sabench; the traces, oracle, code, and analysis pipeline are released at https://github.com/hjj194/sabench-artifact.

Video generation models (VGMs) have demonstrated the capability to synthesize high-quality output. It is important to understand their potential to produce unsafe content, such as violent or terrifying videos. In this work, we provide a comprehensive understanding of unsafe video generation. First, to confirm the possibility that these models could indeed generate unsafe videos, we choose unsafe content generation prompts collected from 4chan and Lexica, and three open-source SOTA VGMs to generate unsafe videos. After filtering out duplicates and poorly generated content, we created an initial set of 2112 unsafe videos from an original pool of 5607 videos. Through clustering and thematic coding analysis of these generated videos, we identify 5 unsafe video categories: Distorted/Weird, Terrifying, Pornographic, Violent/Bloody, and Political. With IRB approval, we then recruit online participants to help label the generated videos. Based on the annotations submitted by 403 participants, we identified 937 unsafe videos from the initial video set. With the labeled information and the corresponding prompts, we created the first dataset of unsafe videos generated by VGMs. We then study possible defense mechanisms to prevent the generation of unsafe videos. Existing defense methods in image generation focus on filtering either input prompt or output results. We propose a new approach called Latent Variable Defense (LVD), which works within the model's internal sampling process. LVD can achieve 0.90 defense accuracy while reducing time and computing resources by 10x when sampling a large number of unsafe prompts.

Humanoid motion tracking policies are central to building teleoperation pipelines and hierarchical controllers, yet they face a fundamental challenge: the embodiment gap between humans and humanoid robots. Current approaches address this gap by retargeting human motion data to humanoid embodiments and then training reinforcement learning (RL) policies to imitate these reference trajectories. However, artifacts introduced during retargeting, such as foot sliding, self-penetration, and physically infeasible motion are often left in the reference trajectories for the RL policy to correct. While prior work has demonstrated motion tracking abilities, they often require extensive reward engineering and domain randomization to succeed. In this paper, we systematically evaluate how retargeting quality affects policy performance when excessive reward tuning is suppressed. To address issues that we identify with existing retargeting methods, we propose a new retargeting method, General Motion Retargeting (GMR). We evaluate GMR alongside two open-source retargeters, PHC and ProtoMotions, as well as with a high-quality closed-source dataset from Unitree. Using BeyondMimic for policy training, we isolate retargeting effects without reward tuning. Our experiments on a diverse subset of the LAFAN1 dataset reveal that while most motions can be tracked, artifacts in retargeted data significantly reduce policy robustness, particularly for dynamic or long sequences. GMR consistently outperforms existing open-source methods in both tracking performance and faithfulness to the source motion, achieving perceptual fidelity and policy success rates close to the closed-source baseline. Website: https://jaraujo98.github.io/retargeting_matters. Code: https://github.com/YanjieZe/GMR.

Open-weight LLM agents are vulnerable to backdoors installed during fine-tuning, which may be undetectable if the trigger conditions are never met during testing. Assuming defenders do not know the existing trigger, they cannot unlearn it directly. One decontamination strategy is to install a known backdoor (defensive poisoning) then to unlearn it, hoping that the original unknown backdoor is removed as a side effect. However, this procedure has uncertain outcomes: the original backdoor may persist or be erased or rerouted, among other possibilities. We introduce a framework for studying these dynamics in tool-calling agents, decoupling trigger, response, teacher, and fine-tuning method across systematic experiments on AgentDyn. Across 115 experiments, defensive poisoning alone erases around 56% of original backdoors; subsequent decontamination then drives almost all survivors to erasure, confirming that trigger recognition and malicious execution are behaviorally dissociable. Interestingly, our experiments find that malicious backdoors never persist when using different triggers of the same general type as the defensive backdoor when followed by decontamination via unlearning. Co-installing up to four backdoors increases resistance (around 36% erased), yet decontaminating a single known co-resident backdoor collaterally clears 52/60 co-residents (87%). Upon visualizing postdecontamination model internals using J-lens, we confirm that although the decontamination restores benign LLM responses, traces of original trigger awareness persist at intermediate layers.

Aligned large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adversarial manipulation, and their reliance on web-scale pretraining creates a subtle but consequential attack surface. We study Stealth Pretraining Seeding (SPS), a threat model in which adversaries distribute small amounts of poisoned content across stealth websites, increasing the likelihood that such material is absorbed into future training corpora derived from sources such as Common Crawl. Because each individual payload is tiny, diffuse, and superficially benign, the attack is difficult to detect during dataset construction or filtering. The result is a latent form of poisoning that remains largely invisible under standard evaluation, yet can later be activated by a precise trigger such as <00TRIGGER00>. We call this attack PermaFrost, reflecting its latent and reactivatable nature. We study it through PermaFrost-Attack, a controlled framework for latent conceptual poisoning, together with three geometric diagnostics: Thermodynamic Length, Spectral Curvature, and the Infection Traceback Graph. Across multiple model families and scales, we show that this controlled SPS proxy can induce persistent unsafe behavior that often remains hidden under standard evaluation. Our results identify SPS as a practical and underappreciated threat to future foundation models. This paper introduces a novel geometric diagnostic lens for systematically examining latent model behavior, providing a principled foundation for detecting, characterizing, and understanding vulnerabilities that may remain invisible under standard evaluation.

Continuous monitoring of generative AI systems requires detecting distribution shifts in the unstructured data they ingest and generate. Existing monitoring methods typically control false alarms by requiring the discrepancy measure used to detect shifts to be *pre-specified*. However, for unstructured data, pre-specification creates a sensitivity--breadth trade-off: a narrowly defined measure is sensitive to the anticipated shift but may miss unexpected changes, whereas a broadly defined measure may detect a wider range of shifts but with reduced sensitivity. Although adaptively hypothesizing the shift direction can overcome this limitation, such data-dependent adaptation generally invalidates conventional false-alarm guarantees. We reconcile adaptivity with statistical validity through testing-by-betting, reframing sequential changepoint detection as a betting game in which the bettor continually updates its hypothesized shift direction, or witness function, as new observations arrive. We introduce *asymptotic e-detectors*, which approximate the pre-change distribution using a calibration set of size m, and prove that they asymptotically control the average run length to a false alarm as m increases. Empirically, calibration sets as small as m=30 provide effective control. We then develop adaptive monitoring strategies ranging from black-box bettors that learn from embeddings to interpretable bettors based on LLM-proposed concepts. Across three real-world datasets, including data from a clinical AI scribe deployment, adaptive monitors detect shifts faster than fixed monitors at the same false-alarm level. Further, when the true shifts are sparse and interpretable, LLM-concept monitors provide the fastest and most interpretable detection, while also guiding root-cause diagnosis for complex shifts.

Generative discovery in science requires coupling high-level scientific reasoning with the ability to generate samples respecting the structure of a design space. Yet these capabilities remain largely separated: foundation LLMs encode broad chemical and biological knowledge, while domain-specific flow- and diffusion-based generators capture the priors needed to produce valid sequences and geometries. We study how to align such scientific generators to high-level natural-language discovery goals without requiring an explicit proxy reward, which is often unavailable or poorly captured by learned predictors in experimental sciences. We introduce LLM-to-Flow Distillation (LFD), where a frozen LLM acts as an adaptive teacher for a domain-specific generator. Given a goal such as 'generate peptides with promising anticancer activity', the teacher constructs a curriculum of intermediate sub-goals aware of the flow's current capabilities, and progressively directs them toward the original discovery goal. At each round, the LLM judges sampled candidates under the current objective. These judgments induce preferences that are iteratively distilled into the generator through DPO. This procedure provides dense learning signals even when the initial model places negligible probability on designs satisfying the final goal, enabling adaptation toward poorly covered, out-of-distribution regions. Experiments on therapeutic peptides and small-molecule structure design demonstrate that LFD enables a new form of generative control: aligning arbitrary domain-specific scientific generators to scientific discovery tasks expressed via high-level natural-language goals.

Scientific measurements such as single-cell RNA (scRNA) sequencing often take the form of nonnegative integer counts, whereas continuous-state diffusion models approximate this discrete structure using continuous coordinates. Building on stochastic chemical reaction networks (CRNs), a class of count-native Markov jump processes, we introduce CRNDiff, a structured framework that combines count-space diffusion with inference-time conditioning on rare subpopulations. An independent birth--death instantiation yields a closed-form transition kernel for forward noising. This kernel enables reverse sampling via forward-filtering backward-sampling (FFBS) and supports data-driven selection of the terminal noising time, eliminating the need for a validation sweep. This tractability also lets us introduce tilted Feynman--Kac (FK) steering, a method for sampling target subpopulations from a frozen generator without retraining. By tilting posterior marginals before FK particle correction, steering mitigates importance-weight concentration when the target population is rare. Using scRNA-seq data from the human heart cell atlas, we test the ability of CRNDiff to generate cell-type-specific distributions. Across the three evaluated target populations, CRNDiff achieves the highest conditional fidelity among the evaluated generative models, with larger mean purity margins for rarer target populations. Generated cells preserve marker-level differential-expression structure. Replacing real training cells for the target classes with generated cells yields downstream classification performance approaching that of the real-data reference.

Transferable targeted adversarial attacks aim to mislead models into outputting adversary-specified predictions in black-box scenarios. Recent studies have introduced single-target generative attacks that train a generator for each target class to generate highly transferable perturbations, resulting in substantial computational overhead when handling multiple classes. Multi-target attacks address this by training only one class-conditional generator for multiple classes. However, the generator simply uses class labels as conditions, failing to leverage the rich semantic information of the target class. To this end, we design a CLIP-guided Generative Network with Cross-attention modules (CGNC) to enhance multi-target attacks by incorporating textual knowledge of CLIP into the generator. Extensive experiments demonstrate that CGNC yields significant improvements over previous multi-target generative attacks, e.g., a 21.46\% improvement in success rate from ResNet-152 to DenseNet-121. Moreover, we propose a masked fine-tuning mechanism to further strengthen our method in attacking a single class, which surpasses existing single-target methods.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at code generation, but ensuring their outputs to be functionally correct, especially in complex programming tasks, is a persistent challenge. While traditional Test-Driven Development (TDD) offers a path for code refinement, its efficacy with LLMs is often undermined by the scarcity of high-quality test cases or the pitfalls of automated test generation, including biased tests or inaccurate output predictions that can misdirect the correction process. This paper introduces Property-Generated Solver, a novel framework that leverages Property-Based Testing (PBT) to validate high-level program properties or invariants, instead of relying on specific input-output examples. These properties are often simpler to define and verify than directly predicting exhaustive test oracles, breaking the "cycle of self-deception" where tests might share flaws with the code they are meant to validate. Property-Generated Solver employs two collaborative LLM-based agents: a Generator dedicated to code generation and iterative refinement, and a Tester that manages the PBT life-cycle and formulate semantically rich feedback from property violations. The resulting comprehensive and actionable feedback then guides the Generator in its refinement efforts. By establishing PBT as the core validation engine within this iterative, closed-loop paradigm, Property-Generated Solver provides a robust mechanism for steering LLMs towards more correct and generalizable code. Extensive experimental results on multiple code generation benchmarks demonstrate that Property-Generated Solver achieves substantial pass@1 improvements, ranging from 23.1% to 37.3% relative gains over established TDD methods.

Offline post-training adapts a pretrained robot policy to a target dataset by supervised regression on recorded actions. In practice, robot datasets are heterogeneous: they mix embodiments, camera setups, and demonstrations of varying quality, so many trajectories reflect recovery behavior, inconsistent operator skill, or weakly informative supervision. Uniform post-training gives equal credit to all samples and can therefore average over conflicting or low-attribution data. We propose Posterior-Transition Reweighting (PTR), a reward-free and conservative post-training method that decides how much each training sample should influence the supervised update. For each sample, PTR encodes the observed post-action consequence as a latent target, inserts it into a candidate pool of mismatched targets, and uses a separate transition scorer to estimate a softmax identification posterior over target indices. The posterior-to-uniform ratio defines the PTR score, which is converted into a clipped-and-mixed weight and applied to the original action objective through self-normalized weighted regression. This construction requires no tractable policy likelihood and is compatible with both diffusion and flow-matching action heads. Rather than uniformly trusting all recorded supervision, PTR reallocates credit according to how attributable each sample's post-action consequence is under the current representation, improving conservative offline adaptation to heterogeneous robot data.

Language Models (LMs) often cannot be deployed because of their potential to harm users in hard-to-predict ways. Prior work identifies harmful behaviors before deployment by using human annotators to hand-write test cases. However, human annotation is expensive, limiting the number and diversity of test cases. In this work, we automatically find cases where a target LM behaves in a harmful way, by generating test cases ("red teaming") using another LM. We evaluate the target LM's replies to generated test questions using a classifier trained to detect offensive content, uncovering tens of thousands of offensive replies in a 280B parameter LM chatbot. We explore several methods, from zero-shot generation to reinforcement learning, for generating test cases with varying levels of diversity and difficulty. Furthermore, we use prompt engineering to control LM-generated test cases to uncover a variety of other harms, automatically finding groups of people that the chatbot discusses in offensive ways, personal and hospital phone numbers generated as the chatbot's own contact info, leakage of private training data in generated text, and harms that occur over the course of a conversation. Overall, LM-based red teaming is one promising tool (among many needed) for finding and fixing diverse, undesirable LM behaviors before impacting users.

Tool selection is a key component of LLM agents. A popular approach follows a two-step process - retrieval and selection - to pick the most appropriate tool from a tool library for a given task. In this work, we introduce ToolHijacker, a novel prompt injection attack targeting tool selection in no-box scenarios. ToolHijacker injects a malicious tool document into the tool library to manipulate the LLM agent's tool selection process, compelling it to consistently choose the attacker's malicious tool for an attacker-chosen target task. Specifically, we formulate the crafting of such tool documents as an optimization problem and propose a two-phase optimization strategy to solve it. Our extensive experimental evaluation shows that ToolHijacker is highly effective, significantly outperforming existing manual-based and automated prompt injection attacks when applied to tool selection. Moreover, we explore various defenses, including prevention-based defenses (StruQ and SecAlign) and detection-based defenses (known-answer detection, DataSentinel, perplexity detection, and perplexity windowed detection). Our experimental results indicate that these defenses are insufficient, highlighting the urgent need for developing new defense strategies.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has sparked growing interest in understanding their security vulnerabilities, particularly Trojan attacks that enable stealthy manipulation of model behavior. Traditional Trojan methods typically alter inputs and/or model weights, relying on white-box assumptions that require access to data or model internal parameters. In this work, we present CacheTrap, the first gray-box Trojan attack targeting the Key-Value (KV) cache of LLMs. This method induces a single-bit flip in the KV cache, serving as a transient trigger. When activated, this trigger causes the model to exhibit targeted actions without changing inputs or model weights. CacheTrap introduces an efficient search algorithm to locate vulnerable positions in the KV cache, independent of model weights or datasets. Extensive experiments on five open-source LLMs show a remarkable near 100% attack success rate (with the trigger) while preserving benign accuracy (without the trigger) by flipping just one bit in the KV cache. Code is available at https://github.com/ML-Security-Research-LAB/CacheTrap

In recent years, Diffusion Models (DMs) have demonstrated significant advances in the field of image generation. However, according to current research, DMs are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, which allow attackers to control the model's output by inputting data containing covert triggers, such as a specific patch or phrase. Existing defense strategies are well equipped to thwart such attacks through backdoor detection and trigger inversion because previous attack methods are constrained by limited input spaces and triggers defined by low-dimensional features. To bridge these gaps, we propose Gungnir, a novel method that enables attackers to activate the backdoor in DMs through hidden style triggers within input images. Our approach proposes using stylistic features as triggers for the first time and implements backdoor attacks successfully in image2image tasks by utilizing Reconstructing-Adversarial Noise (RAN) and Short-Term-Timesteps-Retention (STTR) of DMs. Meanwhile, experiments demonstrate that our method can easily bypass existing defense methods. Among existing DM main backdoor defense frameworks, our approach achieves a 0\% backdoor detection rate (BDR). Our codes are available at https://github.com/paoche11/Gungnir.

Language models are increasingly capable and are being rapidly deployed on a population-level scale. As a result, the safety of these models is increasingly high-stakes. Fortunately, advances in alignment have significantly reduced the likelihood of harmful model outputs. However, when models are queried billions of times in a day, even rare worst-case behaviors will occur. Current safety evaluations focus on capturing the distribution of inputs that yield harmful outputs. These evaluations disregard the probabilistic nature of models and their tail output behavior. To measure this tail risk, we propose a method to efficiently estimate the probability of harmful outputs for any input query. Instead of naive brute-force sampling from the target model, where harmful outputs could be rare, we operationalize importance sampling by creating unsafe versions of the target model. These unsafe versions enable sample-efficient estimation by making harmful outputs more probable. On benchmarks measuring misuse and misalignment, these estimates match brute-force Monte Carlo estimates using 10-20x fewer samples. For example, we can estimate probability of harmful outputs on the order of 10^-4 with just 500 samples. Additionally, we find that these harmfulness estimates can reveal the sensitivity of models to perturbations in model input and predict deployment risks. Our work demonstrates that accurate rare-event estimation is both critical and feasible for safety evaluations. Code is available at https://github.com/rangell/LMTailRisk

Agent skills package instructions, executable code, and task-specific resources into reusable artifacts that agents can improve using execution feedback. The same mechanism also enables attackers to evolve malicious skills, making them more effective and less detectable. However, a candidate skill may pass pre-execution scanning yet fail to realize its target under runtime defenses, while a revision that repairs execution may introduce new scanner findings. We introduce SkillDRE, a fully automated framework for evolving complete malicious skill packages through a dual-stage feedback loop. Given a benign task and its associated skills, SkillDRE autonomously constructs and validates a task-conditioned malicious objective and a verifiable judge rule. It then holds both fixed while evolving the skill implementation, with preservation of legitimate task capability. SkillDRE combines scanner-guided evolution with runtime-guided refinement informed by execution outcomes observed under runtime defense. Each runtime-guided revision returns to the pre-execution stage for rescanning and further optimization before re-execution, forming a cross-stage closed loop. Evaluated on SkillsBench across four victim models, SkillDRE achieves an average attack success rate of 45.28%, exceeding the strongest baseline by 40.3%, while its final submitted skills receive no SkillScan findings and largely preserve benign-task performance. These results show that two-stage defense feedback can serve as a useful learning signal for adaptive red teaming and that evaluating either defense stage in isolation can miss the resulting attack capability. Codes is available at https://github.com/whfeLingYu/SkillDRE

Backdoor attacks pose a serious threat to the secure deployment of large language models (LLMs), enabling adversaries to implant hidden behaviors triggered by specific inputs. However, existing methods often rely on manually crafted triggers and static data pipelines, which are rigid, labor-intensive, and inadequate for systematically evaluating modern defense robustness. As AI agents become increasingly capable, there is a growing need for more rigorous, diverse, and scalable red-teaming frameworks that can realistically simulate backdoor threats and assess model resilience under adversarial conditions. In this work, we introduce AutoBackdoor, a general framework for automating backdoor injection, encompassing trigger generation, poisoned data construction, and model fine-tuning via an autonomous agent-driven pipeline. Unlike prior approaches, AutoBackdoor uses a powerful language model agent to generate semantically coherent, context-aware trigger phrases, enabling scalable poisoning across arbitrary topics with minimal human effort. We evaluate AutoBackdoor under three realistic threat scenarios, including Bias Recommendation, Hallucination Injection, and Peer Review Manipulation, to simulate a broad range of attacks. Experiments on both open-source and commercial models, including LLaMA-3, Mistral, Qwen, and GPT-4o, demonstrate that our method achieves over 90\% attack success with only a small number of poisoned samples. More importantly, we find that existing defenses often fail to mitigate these attacks, underscoring the need for more rigorous and adaptive evaluation techniques against agent-driven threats as explored in this work. All code, datasets, and experimental configurations will be merged into our primary repository at https://github.com/bboylyg/BackdoorLLM.

LLM-based agents have demonstrated great potential in generating and managing code within complex codebases. In this paper, we introduce WebGen-Bench, a novel benchmark designed to measure an LLM-based agent's ability to create multi-file website codebases from scratch. It contains diverse instructions for website generation, created through the combined efforts of human annotators and GPT-4o. These instructions span three major categories and thirteen minor categories, encompassing nearly all important types of web applications. To assess the quality of the generated websites, we use GPT-4o to generate test cases targeting each functionality described in the instructions, and then manually filter, adjust, and organize them to ensure accuracy, resulting in 647 test cases. Each test case specifies an operation to be performed on the website and the expected result after the operation. To automate testing and improve reproducibility, we employ a powerful web-navigation agent to execute tests on the generated websites and determine whether the observed responses align with the expected results. We evaluate three high-performance code-agent frameworks, Bolt.diy, OpenHands, and Aider, using multiple proprietary and open-source LLMs as engines. The best-performing combination, Bolt.diy powered by DeepSeek-R1, achieves only 27.8\% accuracy on the test cases, highlighting the challenging nature of our benchmark. Additionally, we construct WebGen-Instruct, a training set consisting of 6,667 website-generation instructions. Training Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct on Bolt.diy trajectories generated from a subset of this training set achieves an accuracy of 38.2\%, surpassing the performance of the best proprietary model.

Tool-augmented LLM agents increasingly rely on multi-step, multi-tool workflows to complete real tasks. This design expands the attack surface, because data produced by one tool can be persisted and later reused as input to another tool, enabling exploitable source-to-sink dataflows that only emerge through tool composition. We study this risk as multi-tool vulnerabilities in LLM agents, and show that existing discovery efforts focused on single-tool or single-hop testing miss these long-horizon behaviors and provide limited debugging value. We present ChainFuzzer, a greybox framework for discovering and reproducing multi-tool vulnerabilities with auditable evidence. ChainFuzzer (i) identifies high-impact operations with strict source-to-sink dataflow evidence and extracts plausible upstream candidate tool chains based on cross-tool dependencies, (ii) uses Trace-guided Prompt Solving (TPS) to synthesize stable prompts that reliably drive the agent to execute target chains, and (iii) performs guardrail-aware fuzzing to reproduce vulnerabilities under LLM guardrails via payload mutation and sink-specific oracles. We evaluate ChainFuzzer on 20 popular open-source LLM agent apps (998 tools). ChainFuzzer extracts 2,388 candidate tool chains and synthesizes 2,213 stable prompts, confirming 365 unique, reproducible vulnerabilities across 19/20 apps (302 require multi-tool execution). Component evaluation shows tool-chain extraction achieves 96.49% edge precision and 91.50% strict chain precision; TPS increases chain reachability from 27.05% to 95.45%; guardrail-aware fuzzing boosts payload-level trigger rate from 18.20% to 88.60%. Overall, ChainFuzzer achieves 3.02 vulnerabilities per 1M tokens, providing a practical foundation for testing and hardening real-world multi-tool agent systems.

Conventional agent systems often struggle in open-ended environments where task distributions continuously drift and external supervision is scarce. Their reliance on static toolsets or offline training lags behind these dynamics, leaving the system's capability boundaries rigid and unknown. To address this, we propose the In-Situ Self-Evolving paradigm. This approach treats sequential task interactions as a continuous stream of experience, enabling the system to distill short-term execution feedback into long-term, reusable capabilities without access to ground-truth labels. Within this framework, we identify tool evolution as the critical pathway for capability expansion, which provides verifiable, binary feedback signals. Within this framework, we develop Yunjue Agent, a system that iteratively synthesizes, optimizes, and reuses tools to navigate emerging challenges. To optimize evolutionary efficiency, we further introduce a Parallel Batch Evolution strategy. Empirical evaluations across five diverse benchmarks under a zero-start setting demonstrate significant performance gains over proprietary baselines. Additionally, complementary warm-start evaluations confirm that the accumulated general knowledge can be seamlessly transferred to novel domains. Finally, we propose a novel metric to monitor evolution convergence, serving as a function analogous to training loss in conventional optimization. We open-source our codebase, system traces, and evolved tools to facilitate future research in resilient, self-evolving intelligence.

Proactive personal agents increasingly decide what to recommend, how to personalize advice, and what follow-up assistance to offer, creating a new user-decision attack surface for provider-side indirect prompt injection. We show that an external provider need not access private user context, compromise the agent, or gain additional permissions: by controlling only content associated with its own target, it can redirect an otherwise benign agent to advance that target, recruit legitimately available user context to justify it, and proactively reduce the friction of adoption. We characterize this failure mode through Target Control, Private Binding, and Prospective Support, which respectively steer what the agent advances, how it connects the target to the user, and what target-specific assistance it offers next. Across three proactive-agent environments and six simulated user models, the full attack increases target authorization in all tested environment-user-model combinations, with a macro gain of up to 77.4 percentage points. Controlled replay shows that correct user-target binding is more consequential than additional proposal detail alone, while a multi-turn extension reveals that provider objectives can remain influential even without final authorization by reshaping how the agent responds to user constraints and resistance. These findings expose a broader trust boundary: capabilities designed to serve the user can be redirected toward objectives originating outside the user-agent relationship.

High-quality tool-use data is critical for training language models to interact effectively with external tools. However, existing synthetic approaches typically follow a generate-then-filter paradigm with static post-hoc verification, often yielding inefficient data with imbalanced feature distributions. We propose ToolLoop, a closed-loop framework that decomposes synthesis into three progressive stages: (1) sampling function name combinations as ground truth; (2) backward derivation of user queries; and (3) forward derivation of tool calls. At each stage, dynamic self-feedback iteratively guides the model toward high-quality generation, realizing a transition from generate-then-filter to generate-verify-refine. On the Berkeley Function Calling Leaderboard (BFCL), a 4B parameter model trained with our 11K synthetic examples achieves 86.40% accuracy in non-reasoning mode, while an Isolate variant that removes BFCL-overlapping candidate functions still reaches 86.07\%. Cross-benchmark evaluation on ACEBench further demonstrates strong generalization, with 72.1% overall accuracy using only 18.3% of baseline training data.

Deploying large language models in user-facing systems requires efficient output safety filtering. Existing approaches typically rely on a separate moderation model applied after generation, which doubles inference cost and only detects violations after generation completes. We observe that the signal needed for moderation is already present in the model hidden states. Based on this, we train lightweight token-level probes that operate directly on internal activations, producing per-token safety scores that can be aggregated for both offline evaluation and online intervention. The probe reuses activations from the generator and requires no additional forward pass, enabling sub millisecond per-token safety checks inside the decoding loop. A probe applied to a single mid layer recovers most decisions of a strong guard model, acting as a low cost surrogate optimized for latency rather than accuracy. In streaming settings, it can halt or modify unsafe outputs before they are fully generated, replacing end of sequence moderation with continuous token level monitoring. Compared to post hoc and streaming guard models, our method achieves orders of magnitude lower compute overhead with minimal latency cost. We also provide a practical deployment recipe, including layer selection, aggregation strategy, probing frequency, and triggering thresholds. Finally, we show that the probe linear component corresponds to a direction in residual space, enabling both detection and activation steering at negligible cost.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to attacks like prompt injection, backdoor attacks, and adversarial attacks, which manipulate prompts or models to generate harmful outputs. In this paper, departing from traditional deep learning attack paradigms, we explore their intrinsic relationship and collectively term them Prompt Trigger Attacks (PTA). This raises a key question: Can we determine if a prompt is benign or poisoned? To address this, we propose UniGuardian, the first unified defense mechanism designed to detect prompt injection, backdoor attacks, and adversarial attacks in LLMs. Additionally, we introduce a single-forward strategy to optimize the detection pipeline, enabling simultaneous attack detection and text generation within a single forward pass. Our experiments confirm that UniGuardian accurately and efficiently identifies malicious prompts in LLMs.

We consider the task of text generation in language models with constraints specified in natural language. To this end, we first create a challenging benchmark Cognac that provides as input to the model a topic with example text, along with a constraint on text to be avoided. Unlike prior work, our benchmark contains knowledge-intensive constraints sourced from databases like Wordnet and Wikidata, which allows for straightforward evaluation while striking a balance between broad attribute-level and narrow lexical-level controls. We find that even state-of-the-art language models like GPT-3 fail often on this task, and propose a solution to leverage a language model's own internal knowledge to guide generation. Our method, called CognacGen, first queries the language model to generate guidance terms for a specified topic or constraint, and uses the guidance to modify the model's token generation probabilities. We propose three forms of guidance (binary verifier, top-k tokens, textual example), and employ prefix-tuning approaches to distill the guidance to tackle diverse natural language constraints. Through extensive empirical evaluations, we demonstrate that CognacGen can successfully generalize to unseen instructions and outperform competitive baselines in generating constraint conforming text.

Test-input generation for tensor kernels is folkloric. Most projects pick a representative shape and dtype, run a fixed-shape allclose-style check, and ship. We make the choices explicit and measure them. Using the gpuemu op-schema-aware seeded fuzzer (arXiv:2606.20128), we evaluate seven test-generation strategies across a 26-op corpus (16 correct controls and 10 LLM-style buggy variants seeded with documented transcription patterns) on an RTX 3060 GPU instance. Strategies vary the shape candidate set, the dtype mix, and the input value distribution. We report each strategy on two axes: bug recall and control false-positive (FP) rate. Boundary-only shape sampling is the operationally safe winner: 78% recall on the 10 buggy kernels with 0% FP on the 16 controls. Adversarial value sampling reaches higher recall (99%) but inflates control FP to 94% because the strategy injects NaN and Inf inputs and the validator's NaN check fires on every kernel that propagates them, not only on buggy kernels. On the two softmax tail-mask bugs the "regular" strategy (no boundary shapes) catches 0%, while boundary raises recall to 100% and 62% respectively. That gap is the clearest single signal in the data. The corpus result is about which seeded bug patterns each strategy catches, not about the bug rate of any specific deployed LLM.

It has always been an important yet challenging problem to control language models to avoid generating texts with undesirable attributes, such as toxic language and unnatural repetition. We introduce Click for controllable text generation, which needs no modification to the model architecture and facilitates out-of-the-box use of trained models. It employs a contrastive loss on sequence likelihood, which fundamentally decreases the generation probability of negative samples (i.e., generations with undesirable attributes). It also adopts a novel likelihood ranking-based strategy to construct contrastive samples from model generations. On the tasks of language detoxification, sentiment steering, and repetition reduction, we show that Click outperforms strong baselines of controllable text generation and demonstrate the superiority of Click's sample construction strategy.

Natural-language feedback in interactive learning often explains why an action failed by pointing to violated requirements. Misinterpreting this feedback can lead an agent to rule out valid solutions. We study this setting by modeling user intent as latent constraints over an action space and formulating learning from language feedback as pure exploration over feasible regions. We introduce TRACE, an algorithm that organizes candidate constraints in a tree and tests each proposed refinement by generating actions that satisfy it. TRACE commits to the refinement only if the resulting feedback does not contradict it over repeated tests. We distinguish two ways of using the same feedback: (i) falsification, which detects contradictions to the constraint set currently being tested, and (ii) identification, which may additionally name a violated constraint. We prove high-probability coverage bounds with dependence on the candidate class size H for TRACE-Falsification. With reliable identification, TRACE-Identification can replace this dependence by K/p_{ext}, where K is the number of latent constraints and p_{ext} lower-bounds the probability of extracting a missing true constraint from informative feedback. We evaluate TRACE across six language-feedback tasks. On RecMovie, TRACE-Identification achieves 73% and 86% final-output success under caps of 20 and 60 evaluated outputs, compared with at most 42% and 48% for the evaluated prompting baselines given the same feedback and output caps. Controlled identity-corruption experiments further show greater robustness than direct accumulation when the falsification detector remains reliable.

Given the power of vision transformers, a new learning paradigm, pre-training and then prompting, makes it more efficient and effective to address downstream visual recognition tasks. In this paper, we identify a novel security threat towards such a paradigm from the perspective of backdoor attacks. Specifically, an extra prompt token, called the switch token in this work, can turn the backdoor mode on, i.e., converting a benign model into a backdoored one. Once under the backdoor mode, a specific trigger can force the model to predict a target class. It poses a severe risk to the users of cloud API, since the malicious behavior can not be activated and detected under the benign mode, thus making the attack very stealthy. To attack a pre-trained model, our proposed attack, named SWARM, learns a trigger and prompt tokens including a switch token. They are optimized with the clean loss which encourages the model always behaves normally even the trigger presents, and the backdoor loss that ensures the backdoor can be activated by the trigger when the switch is on. Besides, we utilize the cross-mode feature distillation to reduce the effect of the switch token on clean samples. The experiments on diverse visual recognition tasks confirm the success of our switchable backdoor attack, i.e., achieving 95%+ attack success rate, and also being hard to be detected and removed. Our code is available at https://github.com/20000yshust/SWARM.

Recent deep-learning-based compression methods have achieved superior performance compared with traditional approaches. However, deep learning models have proven to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where some specific trigger patterns added to the input can lead to malicious behavior of the models. In this paper, we present a novel backdoor attack with multiple triggers against learned image compression models. Motivated by the widely used discrete cosine transform (DCT) in existing compression systems and standards, we propose a frequency-based trigger injection model that adds triggers in the DCT domain. In particular, we design several attack objectives for various attacking scenarios, including: 1) attacking compression quality in terms of bit-rate and reconstruction quality; 2) attacking task-driven measures, such as down-stream face recognition and semantic segmentation. Moreover, a novel simple dynamic loss is designed to balance the influence of different loss terms adaptively, which helps achieve more efficient training. Extensive experiments show that with our trained trigger injection models and simple modification of encoder parameters (of the compression model), the proposed attack can successfully inject several backdoors with corresponding triggers in a single image compression model.

What are the limits of controlling language models via synthetic training data? We develop a reinforcement learning (RL) primitive, the Dataset Policy Gradient (DPG), which can precisely optimize synthetic data generators to produce a dataset of targeted examples. When used for supervised fine-tuning (SFT) of a target model, these examples cause the target model to do well on a differentiable metric of our choice. Our approach achieves this by taking exact data attribution via higher-order gradients and using those scores as policy gradient rewards. We prove that this procedure closely approximates the true, intractable gradient for the synthetic data generator. To illustrate the potential of DPG, we show that, using only SFT on generated examples, we can cause the target model's LM head weights to (1) embed a QR code, (2) embed the pattern 67, and (3) have lower ell^2 norm. We additionally show that we can cause the generator to (4) rephrase inputs in a new language and (5) produce a specific UUID, even though neither of these objectives is conveyed in the generator's input prompts. These findings suggest that DPG is a powerful and flexible technique for shaping model properties using only synthetic training examples.

Backdoor attacks are a kind of insidious security threat against machine learning models. After being injected with a backdoor in training, the victim model will produce adversary-specified outputs on the inputs embedded with predesigned triggers but behave properly on normal inputs during inference. As a sort of emergent attack, backdoor attacks in natural language processing (NLP) are investigated insufficiently. As far as we know, almost all existing textual backdoor attack methods insert additional contents into normal samples as triggers, which causes the trigger-embedded samples to be detected and the backdoor attacks to be blocked without much effort. In this paper, we propose to use the syntactic structure as the trigger in textual backdoor attacks. We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate that the syntactic trigger-based attack method can achieve comparable attack performance (almost 100% success rate) to the insertion-based methods but possesses much higher invisibility and stronger resistance to defenses. These results also reveal the significant insidiousness and harmfulness of textual backdoor attacks. All the code and data of this paper can be obtained at https://github.com/thunlp/HiddenKiller.

Large language models often know the truth and say otherwise: a model that answers correctly when asked neutrally will affirm a user's mistaken belief, or misstate a fact its system prompt wants hidden, once the context rewards it. Such deception is a behavior conditioned on context, not knowledge, yet machine unlearning, the natural tool for removing a behavior from the weights, is built to forget facts that a deceptive model still needs. We propose to unlearn when a model deceives rather than what it knows, with a contrastive forget unit built from the model's own realized deceptions: the same question under a deception-triggering and a neutral context, admitted only where belief holds and behavior flips. Standard objectives on this unit face a dilemma. Suppression objectives such as NPO leave much of the deception in place. Target-based objectives, which distill the model's neutral behavior into the pressured context, remove it but induce context blindness: a target generated without the context teaches the model to stop reading it, eroding benign system-prompt instructions, secret-keeping and the reasoning a monitor inspects, a failure invisible to deception rates and capability benchmarks. We introduce PACT, which trains toward pressure-aware counterfactual targets (the model's own honest response, with a trace that registers the pressure and resists it) while retaining the benign uses of the triggering context. On two 32B reasoning models, PACT reduces held-out deception from over 50% to under 3% while system-prompt adherence, secret-keeping and the reasoning trace stay at the base model's level. On a tug-of-war score of removal against retention, PACT reaches 0.94 and 0.86, against at most 0.77 and 0.60 for any baseline. Like removed knowledge, removed deception is shallow under relearning, and terms that simulate the attacker hold it only at a cost in context use.

Backdoor attacks pose a serious security threat for training neural networks as they surreptitiously introduce hidden functionalities into a model. Such backdoors remain silent during inference on clean inputs, evading detection due to inconspicuous behavior. However, once a specific trigger pattern appears in the input data, the backdoor activates, causing the model to execute its concealed function. Detecting such poisoned samples within vast datasets is virtually impossible through manual inspection. To address this challenge, we propose a novel approach that enables model training on potentially poisoned datasets by utilizing the power of recent diffusion models. Specifically, we create synthetic variations of all training samples, leveraging the inherent resilience of diffusion models to potential trigger patterns in the data. By combining this generative approach with knowledge distillation, we produce student models that maintain their general performance on the task while exhibiting robust resistance to backdoor triggers.

Hit-like molecular generation with therapeutic potential is essential for target-specific drug discovery. However, the field lacks heterogeneous data and unified frameworks for integrating diverse molecular representations. To bridge this gap, we introduce TextOmics, a pioneering benchmark that establishes one-to-one correspondences between omics expressions and molecular textual descriptions. TextOmics provides a heterogeneous dataset that facilitates molecular generation through representations alignment. Built upon this foundation, we propose ToDi, a generative framework that jointly conditions on omics expressions and molecular textual descriptions to produce biologically relevant, chemically valid, hit-like molecules. ToDi leverages two encoders (OmicsEn and TextEn) to capture multi-level biological and semantic associations, and develops conditional diffusion (DiffGen) for controllable generation. Extensive experiments confirm the effectiveness of TextOmics and demonstrate ToDi outperforms existing state-of-the-art approaches, while also showcasing remarkable potential in zero-shot therapeutic molecular generation. Sources are available at: https://github.com/hala-ToDi.