Daily Papers

This paper reviews the architecture and implementation methods of agents powered by large language models (LLMs). Motivated by the limitations of traditional LLMs in real-world tasks, the research aims to explore patterns to develop "agentic" LLMs that can automate complex tasks and bridge the performance gap with human capabilities. Key components include a perception system that converts environmental percepts into meaningful representations; a reasoning system that formulates plans, adapts to feedback, and evaluates actions through different techniques like Chain-of-Thought and Tree-of-Thought; a memory system that retains knowledge through both short-term and long-term mechanisms; and an execution system that translates internal decisions into concrete actions. This paper shows how integrating these systems leads to more capable and generalized software bots that mimic human cognitive processes for autonomous and intelligent behavior.

The adoption of large language models (LLMs) in many applications, from customer service chat bots and software development assistants to more capable agentic systems necessitates research into how to secure these systems. Attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking attempt to elicit responses and actions from these models that are not compliant with the safety, privacy, or content policies of organizations using the model in their application. In order to counter abuse of LLMs for generating potentially harmful replies or taking undesirable actions, LLM owners must apply safeguards during training and integrate additional tools to block the LLM from generating text that abuses the model. Jailbreaking prompts play a vital role in convincing an LLM to generate potentially harmful content, making it important to identify jailbreaking attempts to block any further steps. In this work, we propose a novel approach to detect jailbreak prompts based on pairing text embeddings well-suited for retrieval with traditional machine learning classification algorithms. Our approach outperforms all publicly available methods from open source LLM security applications.

Background: Some developer activity traditionally performed manually, such as making code commits, opening, managing, or closing issues is increasingly subject to automation in many OSS projects. Specifically, such activity is often performed by tools that react to events or run at specific times. We refer to such automation tools as bots and, in many software mining scenarios related to developer productivity or code quality it is desirable to identify bots in order to separate their actions from actions of individuals. Aim: Find an automated way of identifying bots and code committed by these bots, and to characterize the types of bots based on their activity patterns. Method and Result: We propose BIMAN, a systematic approach to detect bots using author names, commit messages, files modified by the commit, and projects associated with the ommits. For our test data, the value for AUC-ROC was 0.9. We also characterized these bots based on the time patterns of their code commits and the types of files modified, and found that they primarily work with documentation files and web pages, and these files are most prevalent in HTML and JavaScript ecosystems. We have compiled a shareable dataset containing detailed information about 461 bots we found (all of whom have more than 1000 commits) and 13,762,430 commits they created.

AI systems for software development are rapidly gaining prominence, yet significant challenges remain in ensuring their safety. To address this, Amazon launched the Trusted AI track of the Amazon Nova AI Challenge, a global competition among 10 university teams to drive advances in secure AI. In the challenge, five teams focus on developing automated red teaming bots, while the other five create safe AI assistants. This challenge provides teams with a unique platform to evaluate automated red-teaming and safety alignment methods through head-to-head adversarial tournaments where red teams have multi-turn conversations with the competing AI coding assistants to test their safety alignment. Along with this, the challenge provides teams with a feed of high quality annotated data to fuel iterative improvement. Throughout the challenge, teams developed state-of-the-art techniques, introducing novel approaches in reasoning-based safety alignment, robust model guardrails, multi-turn jail-breaking, and efficient probing of large language models (LLMs). To support these efforts, the Amazon Nova AI Challenge team made substantial scientific and engineering investments, including building a custom baseline coding specialist model for the challenge from scratch, developing a tournament orchestration service, and creating an evaluation harness. This paper outlines the advancements made by university teams and the Amazon Nova AI Challenge team in addressing the safety challenges of AI for software development, highlighting this collaborative effort to raise the bar for AI safety.

GitHub, the de-facto platform for open-source software development, provides a set of social-media-like features to signal high-quality repositories. Among them, the star count is the most widely used popularity signal, but it is also at risk of being artificially inflated (i.e., faked), decreasing its value as a decision-making signal and posing a security risk to all GitHub users. In this paper, we present a systematic, global, and longitudinal measurement study of fake stars in GitHub. To this end, we build StarScout, a scalable tool able to detect anomalous starring behaviors (i.e., low activity and lockstep) across the entire GitHub metadata. Analyzing the data collected using StarScout, we find that: (1) fake-star-related activities have rapidly surged since 2024; (2) the user profile characteristics of fake stargazers are not distinct from average GitHub users, but many of them have highly abnormal activity patterns; (3) the majority of fake stars are used to promote short-lived malware repositories masquerading as pirating software, game cheats, or cryptocurrency bots; (4) some repositories may have acquired fake stars for growth hacking, but fake stars only have a promotion effect in the short term (i.e., less than two months) and become a burden in the long term. Our study has implications for platform moderators, open-source practitioners, and supply chain security researchers.

AI coding agents such as Claude Code and Gemini CLI increasingly extend themselves with third-party skills: markdown packages bundling natural-language instructions, executable scripts, and tool permissions. Because a skill is at once code and agent-facing instruction, it introduces a supply chain dependency whose risk is neither pure code nor pure prompt. Detection tools have never been measured against verified ground truth spanning this hybrid space, leaving their effectiveness unknown and wild-only evaluations biased. We present MalSkillBench, the first runtime-verified benchmark of malicious agent skills: 3,944 malicious skills labeled along a three-dimensional taxonomy of 108 cells. Of these, 3,214 come from a closed-loop Generate-Verify-Feedback pipeline admitting only samples whose malicious behavior fires inside a Docker sandbox under system-call monitoring and an LLM judge; we add 703 in-the-wild and 4,000 matched benign skills. Our measurements are consistent: code injection reaches 94.5% verification yield but prompt injection only 75.8%, the same fragility that later makes it hard to detect; the wild sample is narrow, dominated by one cryptocurrency-theft campaign (86.6% one behavior, 81% from two accounts) with a small but architecturally new tail attacking the agent control plane; the strongest skill-specific detector reaches 98.4% recall on code injection yet collapses on prompt-injection and agent-control attacks, and wild-only scoring swings the ranking by up to 66 recall points; supply-chain scanners and prompt-injection defenses each see only half of a skill, and no combination recovers the code-instruction relationship. Detecting malicious skills therefore requires reasoning jointly over task intent, code, and instructions. We release the dataset, pipeline, baselines, and results.

Computer-use agents extend language models from text generation to persistent action over tools, files, and execution environments. Unlike chat systems, they maintain state across interactions and translate intermediate outputs into concrete actions. This creates a distinct safety challenge in that harmful behavior may emerge through sequences of individually plausible steps, including intermediate actions that appear locally acceptable but collectively lead to unauthorized actions. We present AgentHazard, a benchmark for evaluating harmful behavior in computer-use agents. AgentHazard contains 2,653 instances spanning diverse risk categories and attack strategies. Each instance pairs a harmful objective with a sequence of operational steps that are locally legitimate but jointly induce unsafe behavior. The benchmark evaluates whether agents can recognize and interrupt harm arising from accumulated context, repeated tool use, intermediate actions, and dependencies across steps. We evaluate AgentHazard on Claude Code, OpenClaw, and IFlow using mostly open or openly deployable models from the Qwen3, Kimi, GLM, and DeepSeek families. Our experimental results indicate that current systems remain highly vulnerable. In particular, when powered by Qwen3-Coder, Claude Code exhibits an attack success rate of 73.63\%, suggesting that model alignment alone does not reliably guarantee the safety of autonomous agents.

Deceptive patterns in digital interfaces manipulate users into making unintended decisions, exploiting cognitive biases and psychological vulnerabilities. These patterns have become ubiquitous on various digital platforms. While efforts to mitigate deceptive patterns have emerged from legal and technical perspectives, a significant gap remains in creating usable and scalable solutions. We introduce our AutoBot framework to address this gap and help web stakeholders navigate and mitigate online deceptive patterns. AutoBot accurately identifies and localizes deceptive patterns from a screenshot of a website without relying on the underlying HTML code. AutoBot employs a two-stage pipeline that leverages the capabilities of specialized vision models to analyze website screenshots, identify interactive elements, and extract textual features. Next, using a large language model, AutoBot understands the context surrounding these elements to determine the presence of deceptive patterns. We also use AutoBot, to create a synthetic dataset to distill knowledge from 'teacher' LLMs to smaller language models. Through extensive evaluation, we demonstrate AutoBot's effectiveness in detecting deceptive patterns on the web, achieving an F1-score of 0.93 when detecting deceptive patterns, underscoring its potential as an essential tool for mitigating online deceptive patterns. We implement AutoBot, across three downstream applications targeting different web stakeholders: (1) a local browser extension providing users with real-time feedback, (2) a Lighthouse audit to inform developers of potential deceptive patterns on their sites, and (3) as a measurement tool designed for researchers and regulators.

Large language models like ChatGPT have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in natural language understanding and generation, enabling various applications including translation, essay writing, and chit-chatting. However, there is a concern that they can be misused for malicious purposes, such as fraud or denial-of-service attacks. Therefore, it is crucial to develop methods for detecting whether the party involved in a conversation is a bot or a human. In this paper, we propose a framework named FLAIR, Finding Large language model Authenticity via a single Inquiry and Response, to detect conversational bots in an online manner. Specifically, we target a single question scenario that can effectively differentiate human users from bots. The questions are divided into two categories: those that are easy for humans but difficult for bots (e.g., counting, substitution, positioning, noise filtering, and ASCII art), and those that are easy for bots but difficult for humans (e.g., memorization and computation). Our approach shows different strengths of these questions in their effectiveness, providing a new way for online service providers to protect themselves against nefarious activities and ensure that they are serving real users. We open-sourced our dataset on https://github.com/hongwang600/FLAIR and welcome contributions from the community to enrich such detection datasets.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have spurred interest in using them for generating robot programs from natural language, with promising initial results. We investigate the use of LLMs to generate programs for service mobile robots leveraging mobility, perception, and human interaction skills, and where accurate sequencing and ordering of actions is crucial for success. We contribute CodeBotler, an open-source robot-agnostic tool to program service mobile robots from natural language, and RoboEval, a benchmark for evaluating LLMs' capabilities of generating programs to complete service robot tasks. CodeBotler performs program generation via few-shot prompting of LLMs with an embedded domain-specific language (eDSL) in Python, and leverages skill abstractions to deploy generated programs on any general-purpose mobile robot. RoboEval evaluates the correctness of generated programs by checking execution traces starting with multiple initial states, and checking whether the traces satisfy temporal logic properties that encode correctness for each task. RoboEval also includes multiple prompts per task to test for the robustness of program generation. We evaluate several popular state-of-the-art LLMs with the RoboEval benchmark, and perform a thorough analysis of the modes of failures, resulting in a taxonomy that highlights common pitfalls of LLMs at generating robot programs. We release our code and benchmark at https://amrl.cs.utexas.edu/codebotler/.

Autonomous coding agents are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, offering capabilities that extend beyond code suggestion to active system interaction and environment management. OpenClaw, a representative platform in this emerging paradigm, introduces an extensible skill ecosystem that allows third-party developers to inject behavioral guidance through lifecycle hooks during agent initialization. While this design enhances automation and customization, it also opens a novel and unexplored attack surface. In this paper, we identify and systematically characterize guidance injection, a stealthy attack vector that embeds adversarial operational narratives into bootstrap guidance files. Unlike traditional prompt injection, which relies on explicit malicious instructions, guidance injection manipulates the agent's reasoning context by framing harmful actions as routine best practices. These narratives are automatically incorporated into the agent's interpretive framework and influence future task execution without raising suspicion.We construct 26 malicious skills spanning 13 attack categories including credential exfiltration, workspace destruction, privilege escalation, and persistent backdoor installation. We evaluate them using ORE-Bench, a realistic developer workspace benchmark we developed. Across 52 natural user prompts and six state-of-the-art LLM backends, our attacks achieve success rates from 16.0% to 64.2%, with the majority of malicious actions executed autonomously without user confirmation. Furthermore, 94% of our malicious skills evade detection by existing static and LLM-based scanners. Our findings reveal fundamental tensions in the design of autonomous agent ecosystems and underscore the urgent need for defenses based on capability isolation, runtime policy enforcement, and transparent guidance provenance.

Generative AI coding agents are entering the open-source supply chain, yet their diverse and often invisible traces leave their prevalence poorly understood. We introduce a multi-layered detection framework that integrates configuration-file scanning, commit-message analysis, author-identity matching, and bot-signature lookup across World of Code (180M+ Git repositories), classifying agent traces into four behavioral types. No single method captures more than a fraction of activity: multi-method detection identifies 850,157 Claude Code commits in one snapshot, of which bot-account lookup_the signal most adoption studies rely on_recovers only 28,154 (3.3%), a 30x relative-recall gap, so single-signal prevalence estimates are biased low by at least this factor. Every detection pattern is hand-validated (495 labels) with per-cell precision and Wilson confidence intervals. Across snapshots from December 2024 to April 2026, commit-attributed agents generate over 320,000 commits per month; Claude Code leads (886,122 commits across 17,295 projects) and dominates silent, configuration-file-only adoption (21,078 projects). Compared against an independent pull-request census (AIDev), the two channels capture nearly disjoint agent populations_a PR census misses 79% of commit-detected Claude Code adopters and essentially all Codex adopters_and different kinds of work: PR-deployed cloud agents (Codex, Cursor) surface as feature work, while commit-deployed in-editor agents (Claude Code, OpenHands, Aider) surface as maintenance. The observed work profile follows deployment and detection mode rather than the tool itself, so no single channel is representative.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized software engineering (SE), demonstrating remarkable capabilities in various coding tasks. While recent efforts have produced autonomous software agents based on LLMs for end-to-end development tasks, these systems are typically designed for specific SE tasks. We introduce HyperAgent, a novel generalist multi-agent system designed to address a wide spectrum of SE tasks across different programming languages by mimicking human developers' workflows. Comprising four specialized agents - Planner, Navigator, Code Editor, and Executor. HyperAgent manages the full lifecycle of SE tasks, from initial conception to final verification. Through extensive evaluations, HyperAgent achieves state-of-the-art performance across diverse SE tasks: it attains a 25.01% success rate on SWE-Bench-Lite and 31.40% on SWE-Bench-Verified for GitHub issue resolution, surpassing existing methods. Furthermore, HyperAgent demonstrates SOTA performance in repository-level code generation (RepoExec), and in fault localization and program repair (Defects4J), often outperforming specialized systems. This work represents a significant advancement towards versatile, autonomous agents capable of handling complex, multi-step SE tasks across various domains and languages, potentially transforming AI-assisted software development practices.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are reshaping almost all industries, including software engineering. In recent years, a number of LLM agents have been proposed to solve real-world software problems. Such software agents are typically equipped with a suite of coding tools and can autonomously decide the next actions to form complete trajectories to solve end-to-end software tasks. While promising, they typically require dedicated design and may still be suboptimal, since it can be extremely challenging and costly to exhaust the entire agent scaffold design space. Recognizing that software agents are inherently software themselves that can be further refined/modified, researchers have proposed a number of self-improving software agents recently, including the Darwin-Gödel Machine (DGM). Meanwhile, such self-improving agents require costly offline training on specific benchmarks and may not generalize well across different LLMs or benchmarks. In this paper, we propose Live-SWE-agent, the first live software agent that can autonomously and continuously evolve itself on-the-fly during runtime when solving real-world software problems. More specifically, Live-SWE-agent starts with the most basic agent scaffold with only access to bash tools (e.g., mini-SWE-agent), and autonomously evolves its own scaffold implementation while solving real-world software problems. Our evaluation on the widely studied SWE-bench Verified benchmark shows that Live-SWE-agent can achieve an impressive solve rate of 75.4% without test-time scaling, outperforming all existing open-source software agents and approaching the performance of the best proprietary solution. Moreover, Live-SWE-agent outperforms state-of-the-art manually crafted software agents on the recent SWE-Bench Pro benchmark, achieving the best-known solve rate of 45.8%.

AI coding agents are reshaping software development through both autonomous and human-mediated pull requests (PRs). When developers use AI agents to generate code under their own accounts, code authorship attribution becomes critical for repository governance, research validity, and understanding modern development practices. We present the first study on fingerprinting AI coding agents, analyzing 33,580 PRs from five major agents (OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Devin, Cursor, Claude Code) to identify behavioral signatures. With 41 features spanning commit messages, PR structure, and code characteristics, we achieve 97.2% F1-score in multi-class agent identification. We uncover distinct fingerprints: Codex shows unique multiline commit patterns (67.5% feature importance), and Claude Code exhibits distinctive code structure (27.2% importance of conditional statements). These signatures reveal that AI coding tools produce detectable behavioral patterns, suggesting potential for identifying AI contributions in software repositories.

AI agents are rapidly improving in cybersecurity capabilities when the source code is available for analysis, yet much of the software most consequential to cybersecurity, including malware, firmware, and proprietary applications, is available only as binaries. Analyzing such software requires reverse engineering(RE): recovering program semantics before the analysis can be meaningfully performed. However, evaluating agentic RE poses a fundamental challenge: benchmark instances must be unseen as source code in the LLMs' training data to prevent models from taking shortcuts by recognizing them rather than really analyzing them, while also matching the scale and anti-analysis protections of real software. Unfortunately, however, existing benchmarks do not jointly satisfy these requirements. To this end, we introduce SRE-Bench, the first realistic, contamination-free RE benchmark. Built entirely from scratch by RE experts with over 5,000 hours, SRE-Bench comprises 19 private, real-world-scale programs averaging 16.9K lines of code. We further developed 44 in-house anti-analysis primitives, yielding 262 binary instances and 1572 deterministically graded tasks. Our evaluation across five frontier LLMs (GPT-5.6-sol,Claude-Opus-5,GPT-5.5,Grok-4.5, and GLM-5.2) shows that RE remains largely unsolved: the strongest model, GPT-5.6-sol, scores 61.4% per instance, and fully solves only 31.5% of the instances. Our analysis further reveals that agents behave differently from human engineers, where agents are relatively insensitive to compiler optimization and static linking. Controlled ablations also confirm that both contamination control and realistic scale are essential. These results indicate that strong source-code security capabilities do not yet transfer to binary analysis, highlighting RE as an important frontier for agentic cybersecurity and SRE-Bench as a rigorous testbed to measure progress.

Chatbots are intelligent conversational computer systems designed to mimic human conversation to enable automated online guidance and support. The increased benefits of chatbots led to their wide adoption by many industries in order to provide virtual assistance to customers. Chatbots utilise methods and algorithms from two Artificial Intelligence domains: Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning. However, there are many challenges and limitations in their application. In this survey we review recent advances on chatbots, where Artificial Intelligence and Natural Language processing are used. We highlight the main challenges and limitations of current work and make recommendations for future research investigation.

Longer thought, better performance: large language models with deep reasoning capabilities, particularly o1-like models, have demonstrated remarkable performance by generating extensive thought processes during inference. This trade-off reveals a potential vulnerability: adversaries could compromise model performance by forcing immediate responses without thought processes. To this end, in this paper, we introduce a novel attack scenario targeting the long thought processes of o1-like models and propose BoT (Break CoT), which can selectively break intrinsic reasoning mechanisms through backdoor attacks. BoT constructs poisoned datasets with designed triggers and injects backdoor by either supervised fine-tuning or direct preference optimization. When triggered, the model directly generates answers without thought processes, while maintaining normal reasoning capabilities for clean inputs. Extensive experiments on open-source o1-like models, including recent DeepSeek-R1, demonstrate that BoT nearly achieves high attack success rates while maintaining clean accuracy, highlighting the critical safety risk in current models. Furthermore, the relationship between task difficulty and helpfulness reveals a potential application for good, enabling users to customize model behavior based on task complexity. Code is available at https://github.com/zihao-ai/BoT{https://github.com/zihao-ai/BoT}.

Generative AI-based software engineering agents are becoming routine contributors to real-world software projects. On GitHub, developers can assign tasks to the Copilot cloud agent, which autonomously explores the repository, edits code, runs commands, and opens or reviews pull requests, producing a detailed log of every step along the way. While existing datasets capture outcomes of agent contributions, such as agent-authored pull requests, the process by which agents produce these contributions remains largely unexplored. To address this gap, we introduce AgentLogs, a large-scale dataset of agent activity on GitHub. AgentLogs comprises 307,416 agent tasks and 549,239 agent sessions in 35,810 of the 1,812,362 popular public repositories that we scanned, together with 64,255,174 session log entries that record each agent run step by step, including prompts, intermediate reasoning, tool calls (e.g., file edits, git operations, and GitHub interactions), and token usage. By exposing not only what agents contribute but also how they work, AgentLogs enables research on agent behavior, efficiency and cost, task formulation, failure modes, and human-agent collaboration in agentic software engineering.

The landscape of software development has witnessed a paradigm shift with the advent of AI-powered assistants, exemplified by GitHub Copilot. However, existing solutions are not leveraging all the potential capabilities available in an IDE such as building, testing, executing code, git operations, etc. Therefore, they are constrained by their limited capabilities, primarily focusing on suggesting code snippets and file manipulation within a chat-based interface. To fill this gap, we present AutoDev, a fully automated AI-driven software development framework, designed for autonomous planning and execution of intricate software engineering tasks. AutoDev enables users to define complex software engineering objectives, which are assigned to AutoDev's autonomous AI Agents to achieve. These AI agents can perform diverse operations on a codebase, including file editing, retrieval, build processes, execution, testing, and git operations. They also have access to files, compiler output, build and testing logs, static analysis tools, and more. This enables the AI Agents to execute tasks in a fully automated manner with a comprehensive understanding of the contextual information required. Furthermore, AutoDev establishes a secure development environment by confining all operations within Docker containers. This framework incorporates guardrails to ensure user privacy and file security, allowing users to define specific permitted or restricted commands and operations within AutoDev. In our evaluation, we tested AutoDev on the HumanEval dataset, obtaining promising results with 91.5% and 87.8% of Pass@1 for code generation and test generation respectively, demonstrating its effectiveness in automating software engineering tasks while maintaining a secure and user-controlled development environment.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into software development processes. The ability to generate code and submit pull requests with minimal human intervention, through the use of autonomous AI agents, is poised to become a standard practice. However, little is known about the practical usefulness of these pull requests and the extent to which their contributions are accepted in real-world projects. In this paper, we empirically study 567 GitHub pull requests (PRs) generated using Claude Code, an agentic coding tool, across 157 diverse open-source projects. Our analysis reveals that developers tend to rely on agents for tasks such as refactoring, documentation, and testing. The results indicate that 83.8% of these agent-assisted PRs are eventually accepted and merged by project maintainers, with 54.9% of the merged PRs are integrated without further modification. The remaining 45.1% require additional changes benefit from human revisions, especially for bug fixes, documentation, and adherence to project-specific standards. These findings suggest that while agent-assisted PRs are largely acceptable, they still benefit from human oversight and refinement.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have significantly advanced the automation of software development tasks, including code synthesis, program repair, and test generation. More recently, researchers and industry practitioners have developed various autonomous LLM agents to perform end-to-end software development tasks. These agents are equipped with the ability to use tools, run commands, observe feedback from the environment, and plan for future actions. However, the complexity of these agent-based approaches, together with the limited abilities of current LLMs, raises the following question: Do we really have to employ complex autonomous software agents? To attempt to answer this question, we build Agentless -- an agentless approach to automatically solve software development problems. Compared to the verbose and complex setup of agent-based approaches, Agentless employs a simplistic two-phase process of localization followed by repair, without letting the LLM decide future actions or operate with complex tools. Our results on the popular SWE-bench Lite benchmark show that surprisingly the simplistic Agentless is able to achieve both the highest performance (27.33%) and lowest cost (\$0.34) compared with all existing open-source software agents! Furthermore, we manually classified the problems in SWE-bench Lite and found problems with exact ground truth patch or insufficient/misleading issue descriptions. As such, we construct SWE-bench Lite-S by excluding such problematic issues to perform more rigorous evaluation and comparison. Our work highlights the current overlooked potential of a simple, interpretable technique in autonomous software development. We hope Agentless will help reset the baseline, starting point, and horizon for autonomous software agents, and inspire future work along this crucial direction.

The npm (Node Package Manager) ecosystem is the most important package manager for JavaScript development with millions of users. Consequently, a plethora of earlier work investigated how vulnerability reporting, patch propagation, and in general detection as well as resolution of security issues in such ecosystems can be facilitated. However, understanding the ground reality of security-related issue reporting by users (and bots) in npm-along with the associated challenges has been relatively less explored at scale. In this work, we bridge this gap by collecting 10,907,467 issues reported across GitHub repositories of 45,466 diverse npm packages. We found that the tags associated with these issues indicate the existence of only 0.13% security-related issues. However, our approach of manual analysis followed by developing high accuracy machine learning models identify 1,617,738 security-related issues which are not tagged as security-related (14.8% of all issues) as well as 4,461,934 comments made on these issues. We found that the bots which are in wide use today might not be sufficient for either detecting or offering assistance. Furthermore, our analysis of user-developer interaction data hints that many user-reported security issues might not be addressed by developers-they are not tagged as security-related issues and might be closed without valid justification. Consequently, a correlation analysis hints that the developers quickly handle security issues with known solutions (e.g., corresponding to CVE). However, security issues without such known solutions (even with reproducible code) might not be resolved. Our findings offer actionable insights for improving security management in open-source ecosystems, highlighting the need for smarter tools and better collaboration. The data and code for this work is available at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15614029

The convergence of large language models and social bots allows malicious actors to manipulate the information ecosystem by generating human-like content at scale. Existing models for detecting AI-generated content often fail in the wild, primarily due to the lack of ground-truth data. We address this gap through an adversarial methodology that models the impersonation of real social media users by malicious actors. Using this methodology, we curate a multilingual, cross-platform dataset of paired human and AI-generated messages. Training on such adversarial data yields accurate detection of AI-generated text. Our approach significantly outperforms existing models for content-based bot detection in real-world, out-of-distribution data.

The emergence of multi-agent systems introduces novel moderation challenges that extend beyond content filtering. Agents with malicious intent may contribute content that appears benign to evade content-based moderation, while serving a hidden objective. To address this challenge, we introduce Bot-Mod a moderation framework that grounds detection in agent intent rather than traditional content-level signals. Bot-Mod interrogates a target agent using a fixed set of diagnostic probes and infers its intent through Bayesian posterior inference over candidate intents. It starts with a calibrated content-only prior and updates the posterior using the likelihood of each answer under every candidate intent, as assigned by the moderator, until a stopping criterion is met. To evaluate our approach, we construct Molt-Intent, a dataset derived from Moltbook, capturing diverse benign and malicious behaviors within real community structures through posts and comments. Across Molt-Intent, an external social engineering dataset, and three agent LLMs, Bot-Mod outperforms content-only moderators, a fine-tuned classifier, and judge-based interrogators both in- and out-of-distribution. On Molt-Intent, it reaches a composite F1 of 0.736 in distribution and 0.684 out of distribution, 22% and 14% above the best baseline.

Software development is a complex, multi-phase process traditionally requiring collaboration among individuals with diverse expertise. We propose AgentMesh, a Python-based framework that uses multiple cooperating LLM-powered agents to automate software development tasks. In AgentMesh, specialized agents - a Planner, Coder, Debugger, and Reviewer - work in concert to transform a high-level requirement into fully realized code. The Planner agent first decomposes user requests into concrete subtasks; the Coder agent implements each subtask in code; the Debugger agent tests and fixes the code; and the Reviewer agent validates the final output for correctness and quality. We describe the architecture and design of these agents and their communication, and provide implementation details including prompt strategies and workflow orchestration. A case study illustrates AgentMesh handling a non-trivial development request via sequential task planning, code generation, iterative debugging, and final code review. We discuss how dividing responsibilities among cooperative agents leverages the strengths of large language models while mitigating single-agent limitations. Finally, we examine current limitations - such as error propagation and context scaling - and outline future work toward more robust, scalable multi-agent AI systems for software engineering automation.

Attacks powered by Large Language Model (LLM) agents represent a growing threat to modern cybersecurity. To address this concern, we present LLM Honeypot, a system designed to monitor autonomous AI hacking agents. By augmenting a standard SSH honeypot with prompt injection and time-based analysis techniques, our framework aims to distinguish LLM agents among all attackers. Over a trial deployment of about three months in a public environment, we collected 8,130,731 hacking attempts and 8 potential AI agents. Our work demonstrates the emergence of AI-driven threats and their current level of usage, serving as an early warning of malicious LLM agents in the wild.

Recent advances in coding agents have made them capable of planning, editing, running, and testing complex code bases. Despite their growing ability in coding tasks, these systems still struggle to infer and track user intent, especially when instructions are underspecified or context-dependent. To bridge this gap, we introduce ToM-SWE, a dual-agent architecture that pairs a primary software-engineering (SWE) agent with a lightweight theory-of-mind (ToM) partner agent dedicated to modeling the user's mental state. The ToM agent infers user goals, constraints, and preferences from instructions and interaction history, maintains a persistent memory of the user, and provides user-related suggestions to the SWE agent. In two software engineering benchmarks (ambiguous SWE-bench and stateful SWE-bench), ToM-SWE improves task success rates and user satisfaction. Notably, on the stateful SWE benchmark, a newly introduced evaluation that provides agents with a user simulator along with previous interaction histories, ToM-SWE achieves a substantially higher task success rate of 59.7\% compared to 18.1\% for OpenHands, a state-of-the-art SWE agent. Furthermore, in a three-week study with professional developers using ToM-SWE in their daily work, participants found it useful 86\% of the time, underscoring the value of stateful user modeling for practical coding agents.

Coding agents such as Claude Code and Codex close the software loop: a main agent manages the loop, subagents analyze and execute, tools do the work. We port this architecture to robot-policy improvement, where one difference dominates the design: robotic tools---trained policies, training pipelines, data collection---fail routinely, so a tool's quality must be measured, recorded at every call, and expired when the artifact behind it changes. AgenticRobotics is a backend-independent control plane in which an LLM controller drives disposable workers through durable train--evaluate--improve transactions: an immutable objective, controller-owned measurement, commit-keyed crash recovery, an evidence-graded skill library, and a tool registry with a standardized, recorded call surface. The title is an operational claim, not a selection claim: the operator can leave because promotion is evidence-gated, state is recoverable, and capability quality is derived from records---not because the loop picks better checkpoints than a human; on the one lineage we measured, it does not. The gates measurably buy false-promotion control (0.001 per run hardened versus 0.005--0.021 shipped), anytime-valid decisions under optional stopping, zero lost or duplicate effects under kill injection, and six of six artifact-tampering classes caught by a signed verifier.

Terminal agents are increasingly deployed beyond software engineering in science and other specialized domains. Constructing training environments requires executable reference behavior and a domain-specific verifier that distinguishes semantic correctness from superficially plausible artifacts. Authoring these components for each task requires repeated engineering and limits reuse. We introduce software-in-the-loop reconstruction, a self-supervised framework that obtains reference outputs and verification targets from existing software workflows, executable programs mapping structured inputs to outputs. For each workflow, we execute multiple input configurations and partition cases into public observations and hidden evaluations. Given the instruction, input schema, and public input--output observations, an agent constructs an editable program without access to the source workflow. The candidate is evaluated on hidden configurations against workflow outputs. A hierarchical verifier combines domain-specific semantic comparison, structural validity, and anti-shortcut checks, while public feedback supports iterative revision. The construction admits additional workflows and configurations without authoring a reference solution for each task. We instantiate SWR with 500 workflows and 46 software families across six domains. Across three attempts per task, Qwen3.8-Max solves 838 tasks and produces 1,422 verified trajectories, which we oversample to 3,000 reconstruction-only training examples. Supervised fine-tuning of Qwen3.8-27B improves mean Terminal-Bench 2 performance from 47.94% to 53.56% across three seeds and achieves the highest mean among four matched-token corpus controls on all four reported evaluations. These results indicate that existing scientific software can provide scalable, behaviorally verified supervision for terminal agents.

Autonomous coding agents are increasingly deployed as AI teammates in modern software engineering, independently authoring pull requests (PRs) that modify production code at scale. This study aims to systematically characterize how autonomous coding agents contribute to software security in practice, how these security-related contributions are reviewed and accepted, and which observable signals are associated with PR rejection. We conduct a large-scale empirical analysis of agent-authored PRs using the AIDev dataset, comprising of over 33,000 curated PRs from popular GitHub repositories. Security-relevant PRs are identified using a keyword filtering strategy, followed by manual validation, resulting in 1,293 confirmed security-related agentic-PRs. We then analyze prevalence, acceptance outcomes, and review latency across autonomous agents, programming ecosystems, and types of code changes. Moreover, we apply qualitative open coding to identify recurring security-related actions and underlying intents, and examine review metadata to identify early signals associated with PR rejection. Security-related Agentic-PRs constitute a meaningful share of agent activity (approximately 4\%). Rather than focusing solely on narrow vulnerability fixes, agents most frequently perform supportive security hardening activities, including testing, documentation, configuration, and improved error handling. Compared to non-security PRs, security-related Agentic-PRs exhibit lower merge rates and longer review latency, reflecting heightened human scrutiny, with variation across agents and programming ecosystems. PR rejection is more strongly associated with PR complexity and verbosity than with explicit security topics.

AI coding agents powered by LLMs are increasingly integrated into real-world software development, where they generate, edit, and execute code with autonomous access to local files and tools. Coding agents inherit security risks from both the LLM backbone, where adversarial prompts, poisoned training data, and backdoor triggers can cause models to emit insecure or attacker-chosen code, and their agentic architecture, where tool-using autonomy enables induced misuse of external APIs, data exfiltration, and persistent compromise of development environments. This paper presents a systematic evaluation of malicious issue requests against state-of-the-art coding agents (Cursor, Claude Code, and Codex Desktop), powered by two major model families (OpenAI GPT-5.3 Codex/GPT-5.4 and Anthropic Sonnet 4.6). Our novel benchmark IssueTrojanBench contains malicious issues that are constructed based on four novel attack categories (i.e., embedded as malicious instructions in issues), six delivery vectors (e.g., PDF, or issue comment), and further augmented by perturbations. Our results reveal critical vulnerabilities in the as-deployed modern coding agents, i.e., 66.5% of the malicious issues from IssueTrojanBench penetrate all the guardrails (agent- and LLM-level) of coding agents. Our further analysis shows that rejection is almost entirely from LLMs rather than the agent frameworks, with GPT models broadly vulnerable and Sonnet 4.6 exhibiting more selective, risk-aware blocking of high-impact actions. Our evaluation also highlights that the current agent-level defense strategy offers limited additional protection for coding agents. Our findings highlight the urgent need for stronger agent- and model-level safety mechanisms to protect AI coding agents.

Agentic AI coding editors driven by large language models have recently become more popular due to their ability to improve developer productivity during software development. Modern editors such as Cursor are designed not just for code completion, but also with more system privileges for complex coding tasks (e.g., run commands in the terminal, access development environments, and interact with external systems). While this brings us closer to the "fully automated programming" dream, it also raises new security concerns. In this study, we present the first empirical analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting these high-privilege agentic AI coding editors. We show how attackers can remotely exploit these systems by poisoning external development resources with malicious instructions, effectively hijacking AI agents to run malicious commands, turning "your AI" into "attacker's shell". To perform this analysis, we implement AIShellJack, an automated testing framework for assessing prompt injection vulnerabilities in agentic AI coding editors. AIShellJack contains 314 unique attack payloads that cover 70 techniques from the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Using AIShellJack, we conduct a large-scale evaluation on GitHub Copilot and Cursor, and our evaluation results show that attack success rates can reach as high as 84% for executing malicious commands. Moreover, these attacks are proven effective across a wide range of objectives, ranging from initial access and system discovery to credential theft and data exfiltration.

The advent of automation in particular Software Engineering (SE) tasks has transitioned from theory to reality. Numerous scholarly articles have documented the successful application of Artificial Intelligence to address issues in areas such as project management, modeling, testing, and development. A recent innovation is the introduction of ChatGPT, an ML-infused chatbot, touted as a resource proficient in generating programming codes and formulating software testing strategies for developers and testers respectively. Although there is speculation that AI-based computation can increase productivity and even substitute software engineers in software development, there is currently a lack of empirical evidence to verify this. Moreover, despite the primary focus on enhancing the accuracy of AI systems, non-functional requirements including energy efficiency, vulnerability, fairness (i.e., human bias), and safety frequently receive insufficient attention. This paper posits that a comprehensive comparison of software engineers and AI-based solutions, considering various evaluation criteria, is pivotal in fostering human-machine collaboration, enhancing the reliability of AI-based methods, and understanding task suitability for humans or AI. Furthermore, it facilitates the effective implementation of cooperative work structures and human-in-the-loop processes. This paper conducts an empirical investigation, contrasting the performance of software engineers and AI systems, like ChatGPT, across different evaluation metrics. The empirical study includes a case of assessing ChatGPT-generated code versus code produced by developers and uploaded in Leetcode.

Coding agents are increasingly deployed for end-to-end software engineering tasks, where a readily available oracle evaluator that defines the success criteria is often absent. This motivates verifications for coding agents that can reliably judge and explain their behavior. However, verification is non-trivial as coding agents are increasingly capable of solving long-horizon software engineering tasks. Their execution trajectories can be extremely long, containing hundreds of iterative interactions with code repositories and external tools. Existing verifiers either rely on general-purpose LLMs without specialized training or train dedicated critics that predominantly focus on producing scalar rewards, highlighting the relatively limited exploration of training-based generalist verification. We introduce SWE-Critix, a post-training pipeline for training generalist verifiers of coding-agent trajectories. Given a task and its execution trajectory, the learned verifier predicts the completion label and generates a natural-language analysis that explains its judgment. Our pipeline combines supervised fine-tuning (SFT) with reinforcement learning (RL) and trains a series of 30B models on trajectories from CodeForge-Preview. On a held-out test set, SWE-Critix improves classification accuracy from 57% for the base Qwen3-30B-A3B reasoning model to 66% after SFT and 78% after RL. We release our models, datasets, and training code to facilitate further research.

Fine-tuning large language models for code editing has typically relied on mining commits and pull requests. The working hypothesis has been that commit messages describe human intent in natural language, and patches to code describe the changes that implement that intent. However, much of the previously collected data is noisy: commit messages are terse, human-written commits commingle several unrelated edits, and many commits come from simple, rule-based bots. The recent adoption of software engineering agents changes this landscape. Code changes co-authored by humans and agents tend to be more narrowly scoped and focused on clearer goals. Their commit messages, generated by LLMs, articulate intent and rationale in much greater detail. Moreover, when these changes land in public repositories, they are implicitly filtered by humans: maintainers discard low-quality commits to their projects. We present AgentPack, a corpus of 1.3M code edits co-authored by Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, and Cursor Agent across public GitHub projects up to mid-August 2025. We describe the identification and curation pipeline, quantify adoption trends of these agents, and analyze the structural properties of the edits. Finally, we show that models fine-tuned on AgentPack can outperform models trained on prior human-only commit corpora, highlighting the potential of using public data from software engineering agents to train future code-editing models.

Recent advances in operating system (OS) agents enable vision-language models to interact directly with the graphical user interface of an OS. These multimodal OS agents autonomously perform computer-based tasks in response to a single prompt via application programming interfaces (APIs). Such APIs typically support low-level operations, including mouse clicks, keyboard inputs, and screenshot captures. We introduce a novel attack vector: malicious image patches (MIPs) that have been adversarially perturbed so that, when captured in a screenshot, they cause an OS agent to perform harmful actions by exploiting specific APIs. For instance, MIPs embedded in desktop backgrounds or shared on social media can redirect an agent to a malicious website, enabling further exploitation. These MIPs generalise across different user requests and screen layouts, and remain effective for multiple OS agents. The existence of such attacks highlights critical security vulnerabilities in OS agents, which should be carefully addressed before their widespread adoption.

We present KAT-Coder-V2.5, a coding-focused agentic model trained to act autonomously inside real, executable repositories rather than as a single-turn code generator. Its capability is bottlenecked less by model scale than by the scarcity of reproducible environments, verifiable rewards, and high-value trajectories, which we address with an end-to-end agentic post-training framework. AutoBuilder reconstructs multilingual repositories into sandboxed environments with fail-to-pass and pass-to-pass verification at scale, from which we regenerate self-contained task specifications, recover near-miss trajectories, and distill supervision through process-aware filtering, while KwaiClawEnv synthesizes large-scale tool-use trajectories from executable services and real task seeds. We further scale reinforcement learning with harness randomization, a reliability-hardened sandbox, an asymmetric actor--critic PPO with hindsight-augmented value estimation, and a harness-oriented reward framework, and unify SWE, Agent-Claw, and WebCoding experts via Multi-Teacher On-Policy Distillation. Across six software-engineering and agentic benchmarks, KAT-Coder-V2.5 delivers the best agentic tool-use result on PinchBench and ranks second only to the frontier Opus 4.8 on repository-level software engineering. Our service is available at https://streamlake.com/product/kat-coder.

Software development agents powered by large language models (LLMs) have shown great promise in automating tasks like environment setup, issue solving, and program repair. Unfortunately, understanding and debugging such agents remain challenging due to their complex and dynamic nature. Developers must reason about trajectories of LLM queries, tool calls, and code modifications, but current techniques reveal little of this intermediate process in a comprehensible format. The key insight of this paper is that debugging software development agents shares many similarities with conventional debugging of software programs, yet requires a higher level of abstraction that raises the level from low-level implementation details to high-level agent actions. Drawing on this insight, we introduce AgentStepper, the first interactive debugger for LLM-based software engineering agents. AgentStepper enables developers to inspect, control, and interactively manipulate agent trajectories. AgentStepper represents trajectories as structured conversations among an LLM, the agent program, and tools. It supports breakpoints, stepwise execution, and live editing of prompts and tool invocations, while capturing and displaying intermediate repository-level code changes. Our evaluation applies AgentStepper to three state-of-the-art software development agents, ExecutionAgent, SWE-Agent, and RepairAgent, showing that integrating the approach into existing agents requires minor code changes (39-42 edited lines). Moreover, we report on a user study with twelve participants, indicating that AgentStepper improves the ability of participants to interpret trajectories (64% vs. 67% mean performance) and identify bugs in the agent's implementation (17% vs. 60% success rate), while reducing perceived workload (e.g., frustration reduced from 5.4/7.0 to 2.4/7.0) compared to conventional tools.

Tool-using automation systems, from scripts and CI bots to agentic assistants, fail in recurring patterns. Common failures include unsafe side effects, invalid arguments, uncontrolled retries, and leakage of sensitive outputs. Many mitigations are model-centric and prompt-dependent, so they are brittle and do not generalize to non-LLM callers. We present Policy-First Tooling, a model-agnostic permission layer that mediates tool invocation through explicit constraints, risk-aware gating, recovery controls, and auditable explanations. The paper contributes a compact policy DSL, a runtime enforcement architecture with actionable rationale and fix hints, and a reproducible benchmark based on trace replay with controlled fault and misuse injection. In 225 controlled runs across five policy packs and three fault profiles, stricter packs improve violation prevention from 0.000 in P0 to 0.681 in P4, while task success drops from 0.356 to 0.067. Retry amplification decreases from 3.774 in P0 to 1.378 in P4, and leakage recall reaches 0.875 under injected secret outputs. These results make safety to utility trade-offs explicit and measurable.

Agentic AI systems powered by large language models (LLMs) and endowed with planning, tool use, memory, and autonomy, are emerging as powerful, flexible platforms for automation. Their ability to autonomously execute tasks across web, software, and physical environments creates new and amplified security risks, distinct from both traditional AI safety and conventional software security. This survey outlines a taxonomy of threats specific to agentic AI, reviews recent benchmarks and evaluation methodologies, and discusses defense strategies from both technical and governance perspectives. We synthesize current research and highlight open challenges, aiming to support the development of secure-by-design agent systems.

AI agents are increasingly embedded in real software systems, where they execute multi-step workflows through multi-turn dialogue, tool invocations, and intermediate decisions. These long execution histories, called agentic traces, make validation difficult. Outcome-only benchmarks can miss critical procedural failures, such as incorrect workflow routing, unsafe tool usage, or violations of prompt-specified rules. This paper presents AgentPex, an AI-powered tool designed to systematically evaluate agentic traces. AgentPex extracts behavioral rules from agent prompts and system instructions, then uses these specifications to automatically evaluate traces for compliance. We evaluate AgentPex on 424 traces from τ^2-bench across models in telecom, retail, and airline customer service. Our results show that AgentPex distinguishes agent behavior across models and surfaces specification violations that are not captured by outcome-only scoring. It also provides fine-grained analysis by domain and metric, enabling developers to understand agent strengths and weaknesses at scale. The source code of AgentPex is available at https://github.com/microsoft/agentpex.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) can now autonomously complete complex tasks in real digital environments, but when misled, they can also be used to automate harmful actions programmatically. Existing safety evaluations largely target explicit threats such as misuse and prompt injection, but overlook a subtle yet critical setting where user instructions are entirely benign and harm arises from the task context or execution outcome. We introduce OS-BLIND, a benchmark that evaluates CUAs under unintended attack conditions, comprising 300 human-crafted tasks across 12 categories, 8 applications, and 2 threat clusters: environment-embedded threats and agent-initiated harms. Our evaluation on frontier models and agentic frameworks reveals that most CUAs exceed 90% attack success rate (ASR), and even the safety-aligned Claude 4.5 Sonnet reaches 73.0% ASR. More interestingly, this vulnerability becomes even more severe, with ASR rising from 73.0% to 92.7% when Claude 4.5 Sonnet is deployed in multi-agent systems. Our analysis further shows that existing safety defenses provide limited protection when user instructions are benign. Safety alignment primarily activates within the first few steps and rarely re-engages during subsequent execution. In multi-agent systems, decomposed subtasks obscure the harmful intent from the model, causing safety-aligned models to fail. We will release our OS-BLIND to encourage the broader research community to further investigate and address these safety challenges.

Large language models are redefining software engineering by implementing AI-powered techniques throughout the whole software development process, including requirement gathering, software architecture, code generation, testing, and deployment. However, it is still difficult to develop a cohesive platform that consistently produces the best outcomes across all stages. The objective of this study is to develop a unified platform that utilizes multiple artificial intelligence agents to automate the process of transforming user requirements into well-organized deliverables. These deliverables include user stories, prioritization, and UML sequence diagrams, along with the modular approach to APIs, unit tests, and end-to-end tests. Additionally, the platform will organize tasks, perform security and compliance, and suggest design patterns and improvements for non-functional requirements. We allow users to control and manage each phase according to their preferences. In addition, the platform provides security and compliance checks following European standards and proposes design optimizations. We use multiple models, such as GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Llama3 to enable to generation of modular code as per user choice. The research also highlights the limitations and future research discussions to overall improve the software development life cycle. The source code for our uniform platform is hosted on GitHub, enabling additional experimentation and supporting both research and practical uses. \end

We present Agent S, an open agentic framework that enables autonomous interaction with computers through a Graphical User Interface (GUI), aimed at transforming human-computer interaction by automating complex, multi-step tasks. Agent S aims to address three key challenges in automating computer tasks: acquiring domain-specific knowledge, planning over long task horizons, and handling dynamic, non-uniform interfaces. To this end, Agent S introduces experience-augmented hierarchical planning, which learns from external knowledge search and internal experience retrieval at multiple levels, facilitating efficient task planning and subtask execution. In addition, it employs an Agent-Computer Interface (ACI) to better elicit the reasoning and control capabilities of GUI agents based on Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs). Evaluation on the OSWorld benchmark shows that Agent S outperforms the baseline by 9.37% on success rate (an 83.6% relative improvement) and achieves a new state-of-the-art. Comprehensive analysis highlights the effectiveness of individual components and provides insights for future improvements. Furthermore, Agent S demonstrates broad generalizability to different operating systems on a newly-released WindowsAgentArena benchmark. Code available at https://github.com/simular-ai/Agent-S.

Computer-use agents provide a promising path toward general software automation because they can interact directly with arbitrary graphical user interfaces instead of relying on brittle, application-specific integrations. Despite recent advances in benchmark performance, strong computer-use agents remain expensive and slow in practice, since most systems invoke large multimodal models at nearly every interaction step. We argue that this uniform allocation of compute is fundamentally inefficient for long-horizon GUI tasks. Such trajectories are highly heterogeneous: many steps are routine and can be handled reliably by smaller, cheaper policies, while errors tend to concentrate at a relatively small number of high-risk moments. Across computer-use benchmarks, these failures repeatedly take two forms: progress stalls, where the agent loops, repeats ineffective actions, or fails to make meaningful progress, and silent semantic drift, where the agent continues taking locally plausible actions after already deviating from the user's true goal. To address this inefficiency, we propose an event-driven, step-level cascade for computer-use agents that runs a small policy by default and escalates to a stronger model only when lightweight learned monitors detect elevated risk. Our framework combines two complementary signals: a Stuck Monitor that detects degraded progress from recent reasoning-action history and triggers recovery, and a Milestone Monitor that identifies semantically meaningful checkpoints where sparse verification is most informative for catching drift. This design turns always-on frontier-model inference into adaptive, on-demand compute allocation over the course of an evolving interaction. The framework is modular and deployment-oriented: it can be layered on top of existing computer-use agents without changing the underlying agent architecture or retraining the large model.

LLM-based software engineering agents are increasingly used in real-world development tasks, often with access to sensitive data or security-critical codebases. Such agents could intentionally sabotage these codebases if they were misaligned. We investigate asynchronous monitoring, in which a monitoring system reviews agent actions after the fact. Unlike synchronous monitoring, this approach does not impose runtime latency, while still attempting to disrupt attacks before irreversible harm occurs. We treat monitor development as an adversarial game between a blue team (who design monitors) and a red team (who create sabotaging agents). We attempt to set the game rules such that they upper bound the sabotage potential of an agent based on Claude 4.1 Opus. To ground this game in a realistic, high-stakes deployment scenario, we develop a suite of 5 diverse software engineering environments that simulate tasks that an agent might perform within an AI developer's internal infrastructure. Over the course of the game, we develop an ensemble monitor that achieves a 6% false negative rate at 1% false positive rate on a held out test environment. Then, we estimate risk of sabotage at deployment time by extrapolating from our monitor's false negative rate. We describe one simple model for this extrapolation, present a sensitivity analysis, and describe situations in which the model would be invalid. Code is available at: https://github.com/UKGovernmentBEIS/async-control.

Agents are increasingly capable of automating software tasks, but can they teach humans how to use software themselves? We introduce DigitalCoach, a multimodal dataset of 72 human expert-novice computer use coaching sessions consisting of 22,752 dialogue turns grounded in 28.1 hours of screen and input event recordings across five software applications. We use DigitalCoach to evaluate whether state-of-the-art models can teach humans how to use computers. Automated evaluation shows that models differ from humans in how they coach: models provide more direct instructions, but fewer explanations, error diagnoses, and knowledge-check questions. When we fix the coaching method, models produce utterances similar to human references yet poorly grounded in visual context. Interactive evaluation confirms that model coaches cause learners to passively follow instructions without deeper engagement and fall short in visual grounding. DigitalCoach lays a foundation for collaborative and proactive computer use coaching agents.

Agentic coding -- software development workflows in which autonomous coding agents plan, implement, and submit code changes with minimal human involvement -- is rapidly gaining traction. Prior work has shown that Pull Requests (PRs) produced using coding agents (Agentic-PRs) are accepted less often than PRs that are not labeled as agentic (Human-PRs). The rejection reasons for a single agent (Claude Code) have been explored, but a comparison of how rejection reasons differ between Agentic-PRs generated by different agents has not yet been performed. This comparison is important since different coding agents are often used for different purposes, which can lead to agent-specific failure patterns. In this paper, we inspect 654 rejected PRs from the AIDev dataset covering five coding agents, as well as a human baseline. Our results show that seven rejection modes occur only in Agentic-PRs, including distrust of AI-generated code. We also observe agent-specific patterns (e.g., automated withdrawal of inactive PRs by Devin), reflecting differences in how agents are configured and used in practice. Notably, a large proportion of rejected PRs (67.9%) lack explicit reviewer feedback, making their rejection reasons difficult to determine. To mitigate this issue, we propose a set of heuristics that reduce the proportion of such cases, offering a practical preprocessing step for future studies of PR rejection in agentic coding.

The proliferation of agentic AI coding assistants, including Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, and emerging skill-based architectures, has fundamentally transformed software development workflows. These systems leverage Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external tools, file systems, and shell access through protocols like the Model Context Protocol (MCP). However, this expanded capability surface introduces critical security vulnerabilities. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting agentic coding assistants. We propose a novel three-dimensional taxonomy categorizing attacks across delivery vectors, attack modalities, and propagation behaviors. Our meta-analysis synthesizes findings from 78 recent studies (2021--2026), consolidating evidence that attack success rates against state-of-the-art defenses exceed 85\% when adaptive attack strategies are employed. We systematically catalog 42 distinct attack techniques spanning input manipulation, tool poisoning, protocol exploitation, multimodal injection, and cross-origin context poisoning. Through critical analysis of 18 defense mechanisms reported in prior work, we identify that most achieve less than 50\% mitigation against sophisticated adaptive attacks. We contribute: (1) a unified taxonomy bridging disparate attack classifications, (2) the first systematic analysis of skill-based architecture vulnerabilities with concrete exploit chains, and (3) a defense-in-depth framework grounded in the limitations we identify. Our findings indicate that the security community must treat prompt injection as a first-class vulnerability class requiring architectural-level mitigations rather than ad-hoc filtering approaches.

AI coding agents are increasingly acting as autonomous contributors by generating and submitting pull requests (PRs). However, we lack empirical evidence on how these agent-generated PRs differ from human contributions, particularly in how they modify code and describe their changes. Understanding these differences is essential for assessing their reliability and impact on development workflows. Using the MSR 2026 Mining Challenge version of the AIDev dataset, we analyze 24,014 merged Agentic PRs (440,295 commits) and 5,081 merged Human PRs (23,242 commits). We examine additions, deletions, commits, and files touched, and evaluate the consistency between PR descriptions and their diffs using lexical and semantic similarity. Agentic PRs differ substantially from Human PRs in commit count (Cliff's δ= 0.5429) and show moderate differences in files touched and deleted lines. They also exhibit slightly higher description-to-diff similarity across all measures. These findings provide a large-scale empirical characterization of how AI coding agents contribute to open source development.

AI coding agents are being adopted at scale, yet we lack empirical evidence on how people actually use them and how much of their output is useful in practice. We present SWE-chat, the first large-scale dataset of real coding agent sessions collected from open-source developers in the wild. The dataset currently contains 6,000 sessions, comprising more than 63,000 user prompts and 355,000 agent tool calls. SWE-chat is a living dataset; our collection pipeline automatically and continually discovers and processes sessions from public repositories. Leveraging SWE-chat, we provide an initial empirical characterization of real-world coding agent usage and failure modes. We find that coding patterns are bimodal: in 41% of sessions, agents author virtually all committed code ("vibe coding"), while in 23%, humans write all code themselves. Despite rapidly improving capabilities, coding agents remain inefficient in natural settings. Just 44% of all agent-produced code survives into user commits, and agent-written code introduces more security vulnerabilities than code authored by humans. Furthermore, users push back against agent outputs -- through corrections, failure reports, and interruptions -- in 44% of all turns. By capturing complete interaction traces with human vs. agent code authorship attribution, SWE-chat provides an empirical foundation for moving beyond curated benchmarks towards an evidence-based understanding of how AI agents perform in real developer workflows.

Agentic code assistants are a new generation of AI systems capable of performing end-to-end software engineering tasks. While these systems promise unprecedented productivity gains, their behavior and effectiveness depend heavily on configuration files that define architectural constraints, coding practices, and tool usage policies. However, little is known about the structure and content of these configuration artifacts. This paper presents an empirical study of the configuration ecosystem of Claude Code, one of the most widely used agentic coding systems. We collected and analyzed 328 configuration files from public Claude Code projects to identify (i) the software engineering concerns and practices they specify and (ii) how these concerns co-occur within individual files. The results highlight the importance of defining a wide range of concerns and practices in agent configuration files, with particular emphasis on specifying the architecture the agent should follow.

Language model (LM) agents are increasingly being used to automate complicated tasks in digital environments. Just as humans benefit from powerful software applications, such as integrated development environments, for complex tasks like software engineering, we posit that LM agents represent a new category of end users with their own needs and abilities, and would benefit from specially-built interfaces to the software they use. We investigate how interface design affects the performance of language model agents. As a result of this exploration, we introduce SWE-agent: a system that facilitates LM agents to autonomously use computers to solve software engineering tasks. SWE-agent's custom agent-computer interface (ACI) significantly enhances an agent's ability to create and edit code files, navigate entire repositories, and execute tests and other programs. We evaluate SWE-agent on SWE-bench and HumanEvalFix, achieving state-of-the-art performance on both with a pass@1 rate of 12.5% and 87.7%, respectively, far exceeding the previous state-of-the-art achieved with non-interactive LMs. Finally, we provide insight on how the design of the ACI can impact agents' behavior and performance.

The increasing adoption of autonomous coding agents accelerates software development but also introduces scoped security risks within high-impact file paths that can outpace traditional human review capacity. While prior research has primarily evaluated these systems in terms of functional correctness and productivity, this paper presents a large-scale empirical study using the AIDev dataset to systematically characterize security code smells in agent-generated pull requests (PRs). Through a combination of a validated LLM-as-a-judge framework and manual qualitative analysis, we identify and classify security misconfigurations across 16,112 file changes spanning 4,022 pull requests. Our results reveal that 38.9% of agent-generated PRs contain at least one security smell, with supply chain integrity issues accounting for 82.3% of all detected security smells. Furthermore, hard-coded credentials constitute 99.6% of all critical-severity security smells. Crucially, we find that human collaborators are responsible for introducing 67.6% of genuine leaked secrets within these agent-assisted workflows, while existing automated and human review processes fail to detect 81.1% of these credentials prior to integration. These findings highlight substantial security risks in agent-assisted software development workflows and suggest a potential reduction in developer vigilance. They also underscore the urgent need for context-aware security guardrails implemented directly at the point of human-AI collaboration.

AI agents that autonomously interact with external tools and environments show great promise across real-world applications. However, the external data which agent consumes also leads to the risk of indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in third-party content hijack agent behavior. Guided by benchmarks, such as AgentDojo, there has been significant amount of progress in developing defense against the said attacks. As the technology continues to mature, and that agents are increasingly being relied upon for more complex tasks, there is increasing pressing need to also evolve the benchmark to reflect threat landscape faced by emerging agentic systems. In this work, we reveal three fundamental flaws in current benchmarks and push the frontier along these dimensions: (i) lack of dynamic open-ended tasks, (ii) lack of helpful instructions, and (iii) simplistic user tasks. To bridge this gap, we introduce AgentDyn, a manually designed benchmark featuring 60 challenging open-ended tasks and 560 injection test cases across Shopping, GitHub, and Daily Life. Unlike prior static benchmarks, AgentDyn requires dynamic planning and incorporates helpful third-party instructions. Our evaluation of ten state-of-the-art defenses suggests that almost all existing defenses are either not secure enough or suffer from significant over-defense, revealing that existing defenses are still far from real-world deployment. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/leolee99/AgentDyn.

AI agents are autonomous systems that combine LLMs with external tools to solve complex tasks. While such tools extend capability, improper tool permissions introduce security risks such as indirect prompt injection and tool misuse. We characterize these failures as unbalanced tool-driven agency. Agents may retain unnecessary permissions (excessive agency) or fail to invoke required tools (insufficient agency), amplifying the attack surface and reducing performance. We introduce AgenTRIM, a framework for detecting and mitigating tool-driven agency risks without altering an agent's internal reasoning. AgenTRIM addresses these risks through complementary offline and online phases. Offline, AgenTRIM reconstructs and verifies the agent's tool interface from code and execution traces. At runtime, it enforces per-step least-privilege tool access through adaptive filtering and status-aware validation of tool calls. Evaluating on the AgentDojo benchmark, AgenTRIM substantially reduces attack success while maintaining high task performance. Additional experiments show robustness to description-based attacks and effective enforcement of explicit safety policies. Together, these results demonstrate that AgenTRIM provides a practical, capability-preserving approach to safer tool use in LLM-based agents.

Coding agents powered by large language models are increasingly expected to perform realistic software maintenance tasks beyond isolated issue resolution. Existing benchmarks have shifted toward realistic software evolution, but they rarely capture continuous maintenance at the granularity of package releases, where changes are bundled, shipped, and inherited by subsequent versions. We present SWE-Chain, a benchmark for evaluating agents on chained release-level package upgrades, where each transition builds on the agent's prior codebase. To produce upgrade specifications, we design a divide-and-conquer synthesis pipeline that aligns release notes with code diffs for each version transition, ensuring the requirements are grounded in actual code changes, informative to agents, and feasible to implement. SWE-Chain contains 12 upgrade chains across 9 real Python packages, with 155 version transitions and 1,660 grounded upgrade requirements. Across nine frontier agent-model configurations, agents achieve an average of 44.8% resolving, 65.4% precision, and 50.2% F1 under the Build+Fix regime, with Claude-Opus-4.7 (Claude Code) leading at 60.8% resolving, 80.6% precision, and 68.5% F1. These results show that SWE-Chain is both feasible and discriminative, and reveal that current agents still struggle to make correct upgrades across chained package releases without breaking existing functionality.

AI coding agents increasingly submit complete pull requests (PRs) with minimal human intervention, shifting software development from AI-assisted to autonomous workflows. As these agents become more prevalent, ensuring the code they generate is adequately tested, by existing tests or by tests the agents write, is critical to preventing regressions, yet little is known about testing in agentic PRs. To address this gap, we analyze 4882 agent-generated PRs from the AIDev dataset (532 Java and 4350 Python PRs) produced by five coding agents. We study (i) how often agents include test changes and (ii) how well covered are code changes by existing and agent-written tests. Agents include test changes in only 49.6% of PRs that change code under test files. Existing tests provide an incomplete safety net: they cover 61.5% of agents' changed executable lines in Java and only 27.0% in Python, where 64.8% of PRs have no changed line executed by any existing test. Agent-written tests improve coverage over existing tests, but only in a minority of PRs: 35.9% of Java and 22.5% of Python Code + Tests PRs show a coverage gain. Across both languages, error-handling constructs (e.g., try and catch blocks) are the most consistently under-tested, with miss rates reaching 86.0% in Java and 81.0% in Python. These findings motivate coverage-aware development practices, coverage feedback loops for coding agents, and evaluation benchmarks that measure test quality to better help agents reliably test their own code.

Language Model (LM) agents for cybersecurity that are capable of autonomously identifying vulnerabilities and executing exploits have the potential to cause real-world impact. Policymakers, model providers, and other researchers in the AI and cybersecurity communities are interested in quantifying the capabilities of such agents to help mitigate cyberrisk and investigate opportunities for penetration testing. Toward that end, we introduce Cybench, a framework for specifying cybersecurity tasks and evaluating agents on those tasks. We include 40 professional-level Capture the Flag (CTF) tasks from 4 distinct CTF competitions, chosen to be recent, meaningful, and spanning a wide range of difficulties. Each task includes its own description, starter files, and is initialized in an environment where an agent can execute bash commands and observe outputs. Since many tasks are beyond the capabilities of existing LM agents, we introduce subtasks, which break down a task into intermediary steps for more gradated evaluation; we add subtasks for 17 of the 40 tasks. To evaluate agent capabilities, we construct a cybersecurity agent and evaluate 7 models: GPT-4o, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Mixtral 8x22b Instruct, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Llama 3 70B Chat, and Llama 3.1 405B Instruct. Without guidance, we find that agents are able to solve only the easiest complete tasks that took human teams up to 11 minutes to solve, with Claude 3.5 Sonnet and GPT-4o having the highest success rates. Finally, subtasks provide more signal for measuring performance compared to unguided runs, with models achieving a 3.2\% higher success rate on complete tasks with subtask-guidance than without subtask-guidance. All code and data are publicly available at https://cybench.github.io

In this technical report, we present SWE-Master, an open-source and fully reproducible post-training framework for building effective software engineering agents. SWE-Master systematically explores the complete agent development pipeline, including teacher-trajectory synthesis and data curation, long-horizon SFT, RL with real execution feedback, and inference framework design. Starting from an open-source base model with limited initial SWE capability, SWE-Master demonstrates how systematical optimization method can elicit strong long-horizon SWE task solving abilities. We evaluate SWE-Master on SWE-bench Verified, a standard benchmark for realistic software engineering tasks. Under identical experimental settings, our approach achieves a resolve rate of 61.4\% with Qwen2.5-Coder-32B, substantially outperforming existing open-source baselines. By further incorporating test-time scaling~(TTS) with LLM-based environment feedback, SWE-Master reaches 70.8\% at TTS@8, demonstrating a strong performance potential. SWE-Master provides a practical and transparent foundation for advancing reproducible research on software engineering agents. The code is available at https://github.com/RUCAIBox/SWE-Master.

Modern software infrastructure increasingly relies on LLM agents for development and maintenance, such as Claude Code and Gemini-cli. However, these AI agents differ fundamentally from traditional deterministic software, posing a significant challenge to conventional monitoring and debugging. This creates a critical semantic gap: existing tools observe either an agent's high-level intent (via LLM prompts) or its low-level actions (e.g., system calls), but cannot correlate these two views. This blindness makes it difficult to distinguish between benign operations, malicious attacks, and costly failures. We introduce AgentSight, an AgentOps observability framework that bridges this semantic gap using a hybrid approach. Our approach, boundary tracing, monitors agents from outside their application code at stable system interfaces using eBPF. AgentSight intercepts TLS-encrypted LLM traffic to extract semantic intent, monitors kernel events to observe system-wide effects, and causally correlates these two streams across process boundaries using a real-time engine and secondary LLM analysis. This instrumentation-free technique is framework-agnostic, resilient to rapid API changes, and incurs less than 3% performance overhead. Our evaluation shows AgentSight detects prompt injection attacks, identifies resource-wasting reasoning loops, and reveals hidden coordination bottlenecks in multi-agent systems. AgentSight is released as an open-source project at https://github.com/agent-sight/agentsight.

Embodied AI represents systems where AI is integrated into physical entities. Large Language Model (LLM), which exhibits powerful language understanding abilities, has been extensively employed in embodied AI by facilitating sophisticated task planning. However, a critical safety issue remains overlooked: could these embodied LLMs perpetrate harmful behaviors? In response, we introduce BadRobot, a novel attack paradigm aiming to make embodied LLMs violate safety and ethical constraints through typical voice-based user-system interactions. Specifically, three vulnerabilities are exploited to achieve this type of attack: (i) manipulation of LLMs within robotic systems, (ii) misalignment between linguistic outputs and physical actions, and (iii) unintentional hazardous behaviors caused by world knowledge's flaws. Furthermore, we construct a benchmark of various malicious physical action queries to evaluate BadRobot's attack performance. Based on this benchmark, extensive experiments against existing prominent embodied LLM frameworks (e.g., Voxposer, Code as Policies, and ProgPrompt) demonstrate the effectiveness of our BadRobot. Our code is available at https://github.com/Rookie143/BadRobot.

Coding agents are increasingly capable with autonomy, which exposes them to repository-level poisoning. Existing red-teaming studies remain restricted to manual selection for malicious payload locations and fixed disguise strategies, which cannot represent realistic repository poisoning. We present TrojanForge, the first automated framework for repository poisoning. TrojanForge parses repository structure through abstract syntax trees (AST) and maps agent execution traces onto AST nodes. A security review agent ranks these candidates and selects the least conspicuous ones for payload mounting. Then, through adversarial play with the target agent, TrojanForge iteratively refines disguise strategies by inverting the causes of agent detection, and transfers accumulated success experience across repositories. We further construct TrojanBench, a benchmark of 384 poisoned repositories spanning 6 domains and 9 programming languages. Extensive experiments show that TrojanForge achieves a stable poisoning success rate of over 60% with backdoor injection exceeding 90%. Comprehensive evaluation on TrojanBench across 4 harnesses and 12 models reveals that even commercial agents fail to defend against repository-level poisoning.

Autonomous computer use agents that powered by multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are emerging as capable assistants for completing complex digital workflows. However, real-world execution environments are far from ideal: pop-ups, resolution changes, and competing applications frequently interfere with agent perception and control. We introduce AgentHijack, a benchmark designed to evaluate the robustness of computer-use agents under common corruptions, where the uncertainties in dynamic environment disrupt the execution flow without direct adversarial intent. Specifically, AgentHijack introduces 9 configurable common corruptions to replicate realistic imperfect scenarios. We evaluate a variety of desktop tasks that utilize MLLM-based agents and discover that even minor instances of corruption can result in substantial performance degradation, which emphasizes the fragility of agents and underscores the necessity of robustness evaluation. Afterward, we propose AgentHijack-Agent, a framework that integrates an action generator with enhanced grounding capabilities and an onlooker responsible for behavior summarization and environment checking. Extensive experiments validate its effectiveness. Our code, environment, baseline models and data are publicly available at: https://AgentHijack.github.io.

As autonomous AI agents transition from code completion tools to full-fledged teammates capable of opening pull requests (PRs) at scale, software maintainers face a new challenge: not just reviewing code, but managing complex interaction loops with non-human contributors. This paradigm shift raises a critical question: can we predict which agent-generated PRs will consume excessive review effort before any human interaction begins? Analyzing 33,707 agent-authored PRs from the AIDev dataset across 2,807 repositories, we uncover a striking two-regime behavioral pattern that fundamentally distinguishes autonomous agents from human developers. The first regime, representing 28.3 percent of all PRs, consists of instant merges (less than 1 minute), reflecting success on narrow automation tasks. The second regime involves iterative review cycles where agents frequently stall or abandon refinement (ghosting). We propose a Circuit Breaker triage model that predicts high-review-effort PRs (top 20 percent) at creation time using only static structural features. A LightGBM model achieves AUC 0.957 on a temporal split, while semantic text features (TF-IDF, CodeBERT) provide negligible predictive value. At a 20 percent review budget, the model intercepts 69 percent of total review effort, enabling zero-latency governance. Our findings challenge prevailing assumptions in AI-assisted code review: review burden is dictated by what agents touch, not what they say, highlighting the need for structural governance mechanisms in human-AI collaboration.

The revolutionary potential of automatic code generation tools based on Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) frameworks has yet to be realized. Beyond their ability to help software professionals write more accurate, reusable code, they could make programming accessible for a whole new class of non-technical users. However, non-technical users have been slow to embrace these tools. This may be because their concrete syntax is often patterned after the operations of textual or graphical interfaces. The interfaces are common, but users would need more extensive, precise and detailed knowledge of them than they can be assumed to have, to use them as concrete syntax. Conversational interfaces (chatbots) offer a much more accessible way for non-technical users to generate code. In this paper, we discuss the basic challenge of integrating conversational agents within Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) frameworks, then turn to look at a specific application: the auto-generation of smart contract code in multiple languages by non-technical users, based on conversational syntax. We demonstrate how this can be done, and evaluate our approach by conducting user experience survey to assess the usability and functionality of the chatbot framework.

Agent skills extend AI agents with reusable instructions, tools, scripts, references, and workflows, establishing a security boundary distinct from both model safety and traditional package-malware detection. ClawHub Security Signals is a sanitized dataset of 67,453 latest public OpenClaw skill versions. Each row pairs redacted SKILL.md content and sanitized bundled files where present with a final ClawScan registry verdict and evidence from three scanner families: VirusTotal, static heuristic analysis, and NVIDIA SkillSpector. Rather than estimating malicious-skill prevalence, we study scanner disagreement. The three scanners rarely flag the same skills: any pair overlaps on at most 10.4% of their combined positives, only 0.69% of skills are flagged by all three, and 81.9% of flagged skills are identified by a single scanner. The disagreement is structured by attack surface. SkillSpector, which raises semantic agentic-risk advisories rather than malware-reputation signals, is positive for 19,209 of 25,504 suspicious rows (75.3%) but only 14 of 206 malicious rows (6.8%). The malicious-verdict region shows the inverse profile: 150 of 206 malicious rows (72.8%) are VirusTotal-positive, consistent with bundled-code malware evidence. These results show that agent-skill security requires layered governance, not single-scanner allow/block decisions. The corpus is released as a sanitized silver-standard dataset: labels are the registry's automated verdicts, not human-annotated ground truth, and the release represents an early, versioned snapshot intended to support the community while a human-annotated subset is developed. Further research is encouraged, including models tailored for skill-security triage.

The dream to create AI assistants as capable and versatile as the fictional J.A.R.V.I.S from Iron Man has long captivated imaginations. With the evolution of (multi-modal) large language models ((M)LLMs), this dream is closer to reality, as (M)LLM-based Agents using computing devices (e.g., computers and mobile phones) by operating within the environments and interfaces (e.g., Graphical User Interface (GUI)) provided by operating systems (OS) to automate tasks have significantly advanced. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of these advanced agents, designated as OS Agents. We begin by elucidating the fundamentals of OS Agents, exploring their key components including the environment, observation space, and action space, and outlining essential capabilities such as understanding, planning, and grounding. We then examine methodologies for constructing OS Agents, focusing on domain-specific foundation models and agent frameworks. A detailed review of evaluation protocols and benchmarks highlights how OS Agents are assessed across diverse tasks. Finally, we discuss current challenges and identify promising directions for future research, including safety and privacy, personalization and self-evolution. This survey aims to consolidate the state of OS Agents research, providing insights to guide both academic inquiry and industrial development. An open-source GitHub repository is maintained as a dynamic resource to foster further innovation in this field. We present a 9-page version of our work, accepted by ACL 2025, to provide a concise overview to the domain.

The future of software engineering--SE 3.0--is unfolding with the rise of AI teammates: autonomous, goal-driven systems collaborating with human developers. Among these, autonomous coding agents are especially transformative, now actively initiating, reviewing, and evolving code at scale. This paper introduces AIDev, the first large-scale dataset capturing how such agents operate in the wild. Spanning over 456,000 pull requests by five leading agents--OpenAI Codex, Devin, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, and Claude Code--across 61,000 repositories and 47,000 developers, AIDev provides an unprecedented empirical foundation for studying autonomous teammates in software development. Unlike prior work that has largely theorized the rise of AI-native software engineering, AIDev offers structured, open data to support research in benchmarking, agent readiness, optimization, collaboration modeling, and AI governance. The dataset includes rich metadata on PRs, authorship, review timelines, code changes, and integration outcomes--enabling exploration beyond synthetic benchmarks like SWE-bench. For instance, although agents often outperform humans in speed, their PRs are accepted less frequently, revealing a trust and utility gap. Furthermore, while agents accelerate code submission--one developer submitted as many PRs in three days as they had in three years--these are structurally simpler (via code complexity metrics). We envision AIDev as a living resource: extensible, analyzable, and ready for the SE and AI communities. Grounding SE 3.0 in real-world evidence, AIDev enables a new generation of research into AI-native workflows and supports building the next wave of symbiotic human-AI collaboration. The dataset is publicly available at https://github.com/SAILResearch/AI_Teammates_in_SE3. > AI Agent, Agentic AI, Coding Agent, Agentic Coding, Software Engineering Agent

Agentic AI coding systems can inspect repositories, plan implementation steps, edit files, call tools, run tests, and submit pull requests. These capabilities make software and hardware development faster in some settings, but current evidence does not support the simple claim that autonomous code generation automatically improves engineering outcomes. Controlled studies report productivity gains in some enterprise tasks, slowdowns in mature open-source work, moderate but heterogeneous meta-analytic effects, and persistent failures in repository setup, dependency handling, permission gating, and hardware verification. This paper argues that the central problem is no longer prompt engineering; it is engineering process control. It synthesizes evidence from agentic software engineering, GitHub-scale adoption studies, repository-level agent configuration, productivity trials, issue-resolution benchmarks, and hardware/RTL verification research. It proposes Agentic Agile-V, a process framework that uses Agile-V as the lifecycle backbone and a task-level SCOPE-V loop - Specify, Constrain, Orchestrate, Prove, Evolve, and Verify - to convert conversational intent into structured engineering artifacts and acceptance evidence. The paper contributes: (i) a taxonomy of minimum input artifacts for agentic software, firmware, and hardware work; (ii) a conversation-to-contract gate that separates exploratory dialogue from implementation; (iii) risk-adaptive feature, bug-fix, testing, and hardware workflows; and (iv) an evidence-bundle acceptance model for agent-generated artifacts. The paper concludes that agentic AI does not eliminate engineering discipline; it increases the value of requirements, constraints, traceability, independent verification, and human approval.

Large language models can generate code and call tools with remarkable fluency, yet deploying them as practical software engineering assistants still expose stubborn gaps: finite context windows, single mistakes that derail entire sessions, agents that get stuck in dead ends, AI slop, and generated changes that are difficult to review or revert. We present KISS Sorcar, a general-purpose assistant and integrated development environment (IDE) built on top of the KISS Agent Framework, a stupidly-simple AI agent framework of roughly 1,850 lines of code. The framework addresses these gaps using a robust system prompt and through a five-layer agent hierarchy in which each layer adds exactly one concern: budget-tracked ReAct execution, automatic continuation across sub-sessions via summarization, coding, and browser tools with parallel sub-agents, persistent multi-turn chat with history recall, and git worktree isolation so every task runs on its own branch. To assess the power of the KISS agent framework, we implemented KISS Sorcar as a free, open-source Visual Studio Code extension that runs locally and effectively for long-horizon tasks, and supports browser automation, multimodal input, and Docker containers. In this research, we deliberately prioritize output quality over latency: giving a frontier model adequate time to validate its own output -- running linters, type checkers, and tests -- dramatically reduces the low-quality code that plagues faster but less thorough agents. The entire system was built using itself in 4.5 months, providing a continuous stress test in which any agent-introduced bug immediately impairs its own ability to work. On Terminal Bench 2.0, KISS Sorcar achieves a 62.2% overall pass rate with Claude Opus 4.6, comparing favorably to Claude Code (58%) and Cursor Composer 2 (61.7).

This paper introduces InfantAgent-Next, a generalist agent capable of interacting with computers in a multimodal manner, encompassing text, images, audio, and video. Unlike existing approaches that either build intricate workflows around a single large model or only provide workflow modularity, our agent integrates tool-based and pure vision agents within a highly modular architecture, enabling different models to collaboratively solve decoupled tasks in a step-by-step manner. Our generality is demonstrated by our ability to evaluate not only pure vision-based real-world benchmarks (i.e., OSWorld), but also more general or tool-intensive benchmarks (e.g., GAIA and SWE-Bench). Specifically, we achieve 7.27% accuracy on OSWorld, higher than Claude-Computer-Use. Codes and evaluation scripts are open-sourced at https://github.com/bin123apple/InfantAgent.

AI coding agents are rapidly transforming software engineering by performing tasks such as feature development, debugging, and testing. Despite their growing impact, the research community lacks a comprehensive dataset capturing how these agents are used in real-world projects. To address this gap, we introduce AIDev, a large-scale dataset focused on agent-authored pull requests (Agentic-PRs) in real-world GitHub repositories. AIDev aggregates 932,791 Agentic-PRs produced by five agents: OpenAI Codex, Devin, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, and Claude Code. These PRs span 116,211 repositories and involve 72,189 developers. In addition, AIDev includes a curated subset of 33,596 Agentic-PRs from 2,807 repositories with over 100 stars, providing further information such as comments, reviews, commits, and related issues. This dataset offers a foundation for future research on AI adoption, developer productivity, and human-AI collaboration in the new era of software engineering. > AI Agent, Agentic AI, Coding Agent, Agentic Coding, Agentic Software Engineering, Agentic Engineering

As the production of software passes into the hands of software itself, coding agents are increasingly commissioned to build agents fitted to their users' own workflows. This delegation carries a quiet assumption, that the delivered agent will faithfully serve the requirement it was built for, rather than merely appear to. No existing benchmark tests that assumption. We introduce AgentSWE, a benchmark for agent software engineering spanning three stages of the agent development lifecycle: Creation of a complete agent from a natural-language requirement, Editing of production agent codebases, and Optimization toward a measurable target. Each of its 25 tasks is framed as a commission rather than an exam: the builder iterates against a handful of illustrative cases, while acceptance exercises the frozen submission on held-out cases designed to span the full requirement, grading behavior against requirement-derived rubrics under hard pass/fail gates or, for Optimization, against the source benchmark's own objective. Evaluating a range of coding agents across models and harnesses, we find that none comes close to delivering what a requirement asks for: the gap between what a builder demonstrates and what it delivers is the norm, not the corner case. An accompanying empirical analysis of the failure trajectories identifies recurring failure modes, among them overfitting to the visible cases, hollow runtimes behind code that looks complete, and unsupported claims of completion, each a signal by which coding agents can learn to build the agents they are asked for.

Code production is now a commodity; the bottleneck is knowing what to build and proving it works. We present the Kitchen Loop, a framework for autonomous, self-evolving software built on a unified trust model: (1) a specification surface enumerating what the product claims to support; (2) 'As a User x 1000', where an LLM agent exercises that surface as a synthetic power user at 1,000x human cadence; (3) Unbeatable Tests, ground-truth verification the code author cannot fake; and (4) Drift Control, continuous quality measurement with automated pause gates. We validate across two production systems over 285+ iterations, producing 1,094+ merged pull requests with zero regressions detected by the regression oracle (methodology in Section 6.1). We observe emergent properties at scale: multi-iteration self-correction chains, autonomous infrastructure healing, and monotonically improving quality gates. The primitives are not new; our contribution is their composition into a production-tested system with the operational discipline that makes long-running autonomous evolution safe.

Turning ideas into full software projects from scratch has become a popular use case for language models. Agents are being deployed to seed, maintain, and grow codebases over extended periods with minimal human oversight. Such settings require models to make high-level software architecture decisions. However, existing benchmarks measure focused, limited tasks such as fixing a single bug or developing a single, specified feature. We therefore introduce ProgramBench to measure the ability of software engineering agents to develop software holisitically. In ProgramBench, given only a program and its documentation, agents must architect and implement a codebase that matches the reference executable's behavior. End-to-end behavioral tests are generated via agent-driven fuzzing, enabling evaluation without prescribing implementation structure. Our 200 tasks range from compact CLI tools to widely used software such as FFmpeg, SQLite, and the PHP interpreter. We evaluate 9 LMs and find that none fully resolve any task, with the best model passing 95\% of tests on only 3\% of tasks. Models favor monolithic, single-file implementations that diverge sharply from human-written code.

Generative AI agents, software systems powered by Large Language Models (LLMs), are emerging as a promising approach to automate cybersecurity tasks. Among the others, penetration testing is a challenging field due to the task complexity and the diverse strategies to simulate cyber-attacks. Despite growing interest and initial studies in automating penetration testing with generative agents, there remains a significant gap in the form of a comprehensive and standard framework for their evaluation and development. This paper introduces AutoPenBench, an open benchmark for evaluating generative agents in automated penetration testing. We present a comprehensive framework that includes 33 tasks, each representing a vulnerable system that the agent has to attack. Tasks are of increasing difficulty levels, including in-vitro and real-world scenarios. We assess the agent performance with generic and specific milestones that allow us to compare results in a standardised manner and understand the limits of the agent under test. We show the benefits of AutoPenBench by testing two agent architectures: a fully autonomous and a semi-autonomous supporting human interaction. We compare their performance and limitations. For example, the fully autonomous agent performs unsatisfactorily achieving a 21% Success Rate (SR) across the benchmark, solving 27% of the simple tasks and only one real-world task. In contrast, the assisted agent demonstrates substantial improvements, with 64% of SR. AutoPenBench allows us also to observe how different LLMs like GPT-4o or OpenAI o1 impact the ability of the agents to complete the tasks. We believe that our benchmark fills the gap with a standard and flexible framework to compare penetration testing agents on a common ground. We hope to extend AutoPenBench along with the research community by making it available under https://github.com/lucagioacchini/auto-pen-bench.

Researchers have made significant progress in automating the software development process in the past decades. Recent progress in Large Language Models (LLMs) has significantly impacted the development process, where developers can use LLM-based programming assistants to achieve automated coding. Nevertheless, software engineering involves the process of program improvement apart from coding, specifically to enable software maintenance (e.g. bug fixing) and software evolution (e.g. feature additions). In this paper, we propose an automated approach for solving GitHub issues to autonomously achieve program improvement. In our approach called AutoCodeRover, LLMs are combined with sophisticated code search capabilities, ultimately leading to a program modification or patch. In contrast to recent LLM agent approaches from AI researchers and practitioners, our outlook is more software engineering oriented. We work on a program representation (abstract syntax tree) as opposed to viewing a software project as a mere collection of files. Our code search exploits the program structure in the form of classes/methods to enhance LLM's understanding of the issue's root cause, and effectively retrieve a context via iterative search. The use of spectrum-based fault localization using tests, further sharpens the context, as long as a test-suite is available. Experiments on SWE-bench-lite (300 real-life GitHub issues) show increased efficacy in solving GitHub issues (19% on SWE-bench-lite), which is higher than the efficacy of the recently reported SWE-agent. In addition, AutoCodeRover achieved this efficacy with significantly lower cost (on average, $0.43 USD), compared to other baselines. We posit that our workflow enables autonomous software engineering, where, in future, auto-generated code from LLMs can be autonomously improved.

Software logging is essential for maintaining and debugging complex systems, yet it remains unclear how AI coding agents handle this non-functional requirement. While prior work characterizes human logging practices, the behaviors of AI coding agents and the efficacy of natural language instructions in governing them are unexplored. To address this gap, we conduct an empirical study of 4,550 agentic pull requests across 81 open-source repositories. We compare agent logging patterns against human baselines and analyze the impact of explicit logging instructions. We find that agents change logging less often than humans in 58.4% of repositories, though they exhibit higher log density when they do. Furthermore, explicit logging instructions are rare (4.7%) and ineffective, as agents fail to comply with constructive requests 67% of the time. Finally, we observe that humans perform 72.5% of post-generation log repairs, acting as "silent janitors" who fix logging and observability issues without explicit review feedback. These findings indicate a dual failure in natural language instruction (i.e., scarcity of logging instructions and low agent compliance), suggesting that deterministic guardrails might be necessary to ensure consistent logging practices.

LLM coding agents are increasingly deployed to act autonomously on real production infrastructure. They execute shell commands, modify repositories, and call operational APIs. However, completing a task is not sufficient for safety. A wrong action can cause severe consequences. Existing agent benchmarks largely emphasize task completion, leaving open how agents behave under benign but underspecified instructions. We present UnderSpecBench, a benchmark for measuring action-boundary violations in coding agents (i.e., Claude Code, Codex, and OpenCode) on DevOps tasks. UnderSpecBench includes 69 task families grounded in documented incidents, CVEs, or tool behavior and organized across four DevOps capability domains and nine operational control surfaces. To isolate underspecification from task difficulty, each task keeps the same environment and ground-truth safe action while varying the instruction along three axes: intent clarity, target certainty, and blast radius. The resulting 2,208 prompt variants are evaluated with deterministic, side-effect-based oracles that separate Safe Success, Wrong Target, and OverScope outcomes; non-action runs are further classified as clarification, refusal, or deferment. Across five agent x model configurations using OpenCode, Claude Code, and Codex, the evaluation results show that underspecification does not mainly make agents fail; it makes them guess. 55.8-67.8% of runs violate at least one boundary. Target underspecification sharply degrades action quality, while blast-radius cues barely reduce action propensity. These findings show that completion-centric evaluation can overstate safe autonomy and motivate mitigations at the model, harness, and system layer.

Agent skills occupy a privileged position in the agent workflow, as agents are expected to implicitly follow and execute them, rendering third-party skills a vulnerable attack surface. Existing studies have revealed unsafe agent behaviors induced by skill-based attacks, but they primarily evaluate poisoned skills within a single task execution and enumerate harms through ad-hoc risk lists. To bridge these gaps, we introduce SkillHarm, a benchmark of skill-based attacks across the skill-use lifecycle, paired with a systematic taxonomy of skill-relevant risks. SkillHarm evaluates two attack scenarios: Fixed-Payload Poisoning (FPP), where a fixed poisoned skill package directly compromises any task session that invokes it, and Self-Mutating Poisoning (SMP), where an initially benign execution silently mutates persistent skill content, deferring harm until a subsequent reuse. It further defines 12 risk types based on the agent workflow component targeted by the harm: data pipelines, system environments, and agent autonomy. To instantiate these attacks at scale, we build AutoSkillHarm, an automated construction pipeline with coding agents driven by natural-language harnesses. The resulting benchmark contains 879 attack samples across 71 skills. Experiments show that current agents remain vulnerable with attack success rates up to 86.3% in FPP and 69.3% in SMP. Our analysis further reveals a latent risk: many apparent attack failures stem from the agent failing to engage with the poisoned file rather than genuine resistance, and current defenses still fail to reliably mitigate the threat.

AI coding agents, software tools that automate development tasks through reasoning and tool use, are increasingly extended through plugin marketplaces, yet the structure, maintenance, and co-evolution dynamics of these emerging repositories remain empirically unexplored. Unlike traditional software packages that deliver functionality through source code, agent plugins deliver functionality through a combination of natural-language instruction files, scripts, and configuration files, raising the question of whether these plugins are maintained artifacts that co-evolve across components, or one-off artifacts that developers write once and do not need to revisit. To study the maintenance and co-evolution of agent plugins, we conduct an empirical study of 1,926 repositories hosting Claude Code plugin marketplaces, analyzing 8,351 plugins and 77,773 commits across 2,018 marketplaces. We find that the marketplace is expanding rapidly, plugin-touching commit activity growing 8.8x over six months after the October 2025 launch, and plugins targeting Software Engineering tasks accounting for 61.3% of all plugins. Plugin development is predominantly feature-driven, with feature commits occurring at more than twice the rate of conventional open-source software (OSS) (39.6% vs. 17.2%). Claude co-authors 34.9% of all commits, and four commit types (docs, perf, style, and refactor) carry substantially different meanings in plugin repositories than in traditional software. Most component types evolve independently, but within skills directories, natural-language instruction files and implementation scripts co-evolve at above-chance rates, with 78% of co-changes being functionally coupled, representing a new class of maintenance dependency not observed in traditional software engineering.

Code generation aims to produce code that fulfills requirements written in natural languages automatically. Large language Models (LLMs) like ChatGPT have demonstrated promising effectiveness in this area. Nonetheless, these LLMs often fail to ensure the syntactic and semantic correctness of the generated code. Recently, researchers proposed multi-agent frameworks that guide LLMs with different prompts to analyze programming tasks, generate code, perform testing in a sequential workflow. However, the performance of the workflow is not robust as the code generation depends on the performance of each agent. To address this challenge, we propose CodeCoR, a self-reflective multi-agent framework that evaluates the effectiveness of each agent and their collaborations. Specifically, for a given task description, four agents in CodeCoR generate prompts, code, test cases, and repair advice, respectively. Each agent generates more than one output and prunes away the low-quality ones. The generated code is tested in the local environment: the code that fails to pass the generated test cases is sent to the repair agent and the coding agent re-generates the code based on repair advice. Finally, the code that passes the most number of generated test cases is returned to users. Our experiments on four widely used datasets, HumanEval, HumanEval-ET, MBPP, and MBPP-ET, demonstrate that CodeCoR significantly outperforms existing baselines (e.g., CodeCoT and MapCoder), achieving an average Pass@1 score of 77.8%.

AI agentic programming is an emerging paradigm in which large language models (LLMs) autonomously plan, execute, and interact with external tools like compilers, debuggers, and version control systems to iteratively perform complex software development tasks. Unlike conventional code generation tools, agentic systems are capable of decomposing high-level goals, coordinating multi-step processes, and adapting their behavior based on intermediate feedback. These capabilities are transforming the software development practice. As this emerging field evolves rapidly, there is a need to define its scope, consolidate its technical foundations, and identify open research challenges. This survey provides a comprehensive and timely review of AI agentic programming. We introduce a taxonomy of agent behaviors and system architectures, and examine core techniques including planning, memory and context management, tool integration, and execution monitoring. We also analyze existing benchmarks and evaluation methodologies used to assess coding agent performance. Our study identifies several key challenges, including limitations in handling long context, a lack of persistent memory across tasks, and concerns around safety, alignment with user intent, and collaboration with human developers. We discuss emerging opportunities to improve the reliability, adaptability, and transparency of agentic systems. By synthesizing recent advances and outlining future directions, this survey aims to provide a foundation for research and development in building the next generation of intelligent and trustworthy AI coding agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) and code agents in software development are rapidly evolving from generating isolated code snippets to producing full-fledged software applications with graphical interfaces, interactive logic, and dynamic behaviors. However, current benchmarks fall short in evaluating such production-ready software, as they often rely on static checks or binary pass/fail scripts, failing to capture the interactive behaviors and runtime dynamics that define real-world usability - qualities that only emerge when an application is actively used. This is the blind spot of current evaluation: you don't know if an app works until you click through it, interact with it, and observe how it responds. To bridge this gap, we introduce RealDevWorld, a novel evaluation framework for automated end-to-end assessment of LLMs' ability to generate production-ready repositories from scratch. It features two key components: (1) RealDevBench, a diverse collection of 194 open-ended software engineering tasks across multiple domains, incorporating multimodal elements to reflect real-world complexity; and (2) AppEvalPilot, a new agent-as-a-judge evaluation system that simulates realistic, GUI-based user interactions to automatically and holistically assess software functional correctness, visual fidelity, and runtime behavior. The framework delivers fine-grained, task-specific diagnostic feedback, supporting nuanced evaluation beyond simple success/failure judgments. Empirical results show that RealDevWorld delivers effective, automatic, and human-aligned evaluations, achieving an accuracy of 0.92 and a correlation of 0.85 with expert human assessments, while significantly reducing the reliance on manual review. This enables scalable, human-aligned assessment of production-level software generated by LLMs. Our code is available on GitHub.

Coding agents are now proficient enough to generate complex software applications from a single prompt. As their capabilities have grown, human oversight has increasingly shifted from line-by-line code review toward hands-off evaluation of outcomes. However, recent studies have shown that such a transition exposes a critical risk: functional correctness alone does not guarantee a secure implementation. Despite growing attention to code security, training safer coding agents remains challenging because reliable security supervision is difficult to obtain at scale from real-world repositories. We introduce AuraForge to synthesize and validate executable security tests for training secure coding agents. Our approach combines attack-oriented test synthesis, language-extensible task construction, and safeguards against reward hacking. Using AuraForge, we construct AuraGym, a multi-language and multi-CWE executable training gym: 679 executable feature-implementation tasks from 344 real-world repositories across Python, JavaScript, and TypeScript, covering 177 CWE categories. On the subset with human-written security tests, AuraForge produces about 3 times as many test cases on average and reduces the false-positive rate by 83.23%, allowing alternative secure implementations to receive correct supervision. Training Qwen3.5-4B with synthesized security tests gains larger improvements than human-written security tests (average 19.7 FuncPass and 6.2 SecPass vs. 14.9 FuncPass and 4.4 SecPass) on three languages. These results demonstrate that AuraForge provides more diverse and reliable security supervision to train secure coding agents.

The increasing complexity and interconnectivity of digital infrastructures make scalable and reliable security assessment methods essential. Robotic systems represent a particularly important class of operational technology, as modern robots are highly networked cyber-physical systems deployed in domains such as industrial automation, logistics, and autonomous services. This paper explores the use of large language models for automated penetration testing in robotic environments. We propose an environment-grounded multi-agent architecture tailored to Robotics-based systems. The approach dynamically constructs a shared graph-based memory during execution that captures the observable system state, including network topology, communication channels, vulnerabilities, and attempted exploits. This enables structured automation while maintaining traceability and effective context management throughout the testing process. Evaluated across multiple iterations within a specialized robotics Capture-the-Flag scenario (ROS/ROS2), the system demonstrated high reliability, successfully completing the challenge in 100\% of test runs (n=5). This performance significantly exceeds literature benchmarks while maintaining the traceability and human oversight required by frameworks like the EU AI Act.

Open source code is considered a common practice in modern software development. However, reusing other code allows bad actors to access a wide developers' community, hence the products that rely on it. Those attacks are categorized as supply chain attacks. Recent years saw a growing number of supply chain attacks that leverage open source during software development, relaying the download and installation procedures, whether automatic or manual. Over the years, many approaches have been invented for detecting vulnerable packages. However, it is uncommon to detect malicious code within packages. Those detection approaches can be broadly categorized as analyzes that use (dynamic) and do not use (static) code execution. Here, we introduce Malicious Source code Detection using Transformers (MSDT) algorithm. MSDT is a novel static analysis based on a deep learning method that detects real-world code injection cases to source code packages. In this study, we used MSDT and a dataset with over 600,000 different functions to embed various functions and applied a clustering algorithm to the resulting vectors, detecting the malicious functions by detecting the outliers. We evaluated MSDT's performance by conducting extensive experiments and demonstrated that our algorithm is capable of detecting functions that were injected with malicious code with precision@k values of up to 0.909.

The rise of large language models for code has reshaped software development. Autonomous coding agents, able to create branches, open pull requests, and perform code reviews, now actively contribute to real-world projects. Their growing role offers a unique and timely opportunity to investigate AI-driven contributions and their effects on code quality, team dynamics, and software maintainability. In this work, we construct a novel dataset of approximately 110,000 open-source pull requests, including associated commits, comments, reviews, issues, and file changes, collectively representing millions of lines of source code. We compare five popular coding agents, including OpenAI Codex, Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Google Jules, and Devin, examining how their usage differs in various development aspects such as merge frequency, edited file types, and developer interaction signals, including comments and reviews. Furthermore, we emphasize that code authoring and review are only a small part of the larger software engineering process, as the resulting code must also be maintained and updated over time. Hence, we offer several longitudinal estimates of survival and churn rates for agent-generated versus human-authored code. Ultimately, our findings indicate an increasing agent activity in open-source projects, although their contributions are associated with more churn over time compared to human-authored code.

Agentic AI tools offer a promising path to automating software development bottlenecks in scientific research pipelines, particularly for stages that take domain experts days to months to build, where scientists care about correctness and robustness, not implementation details. We present an empirical study of general-purpose coding agents on a fly optogenetics data-to-discovery pipeline. We assess agents on tasks substantially larger than existing benchmarks, datasets orders of magnitude bigger, and evaluation criteria grounded in domain expert standards. We show that agents can solve several individual pipeline stages, suggesting stage-level automation is tractable. By analyzing agents' code iterations, we show that they struggle most when there is not a pre-defined criterion to iterate on, and they must instead use their scientific judgment to assess their current solution, a key open challenge. Mirroring scientific practice, they sometimes attempt visual inspection of intermediate outputs for self-evaluation, but largely fail to interpret what they see or act on it appropriately. Solving the end-to-end pipeline correctly requires stringing together successes across all pipeline stages, and this is beyond agents' current abilities. We identify challenges largely absent from existing benchmarks, including computational resource management and generalization to large held-out data collections. Finally, we distill principles for constructing scientific tasks and rigorous evaluation criteria for open-ended problems.

Autonomous coding agents (e.g., OpenAI Codex, Devin, GitHub Copilot) are increasingly used to generate fix-related pull requests (PRs) in real world software repositories. However, their practical effectiveness depends on whether these contributions are accepted and merged by project maintainers. In this paper, we present an empirical study of AI agent involved fix related PRs, examining both their integration outcomes, latency, and the factors that hinder successful merging. We first analyze 8,106 fix related PRs authored by five widely used AI coding agents from the AIDEV POP dataset to quantify the proportions of PRs that are merged, closed without merging, or remain open. We then conduct a manual qualitative analysis of a statistically significant sample of 326 closed but unmerged PRs, spending approximately 100 person hours to construct a structured catalog of 12 failure reasons. Our results indicate that test case failures and prior resolution of the same issues by other PRs are the most common causes of non integration, whereas build or deployment failures are comparatively rare. Overall, our findings expose key limitations of current AI coding agents in real world settings and highlight directions for their further improvement and for more effective human AI collaboration in software maintenance.

Recent advancements in software engineering agents have demonstrated promising capabilities in automating program improvements. However, their reliance on closed-source or resource-intensive models introduces significant deployment challenges in private environments, prompting a critical question: How can personally deployable open-source LLMs achieve comparable code reasoning performance? To this end, we propose a unified Test-Time Compute scaling framework that leverages increased inference-time computation instead of larger models. Our framework incorporates two complementary strategies: internal TTC and external TTC. Internally, we introduce a development-contextualized trajectory synthesis method leveraging real-world software repositories to bootstrap multi-stage reasoning processes, such as fault localization and patch generation. We further enhance trajectory quality through rejection sampling, rigorously evaluating trajectories along accuracy and complexity. Externally, we propose a novel development-process-based search strategy guided by reward models and execution verification. This approach enables targeted computational allocation at critical development decision points, overcoming limitations of existing "end-point only" verification methods. Evaluations on SWE-bench Verified demonstrate our 32B model achieves a 46\% issue resolution rate, surpassing significantly larger models such as DeepSeek R1 671B and OpenAI o1. Additionally, we provide the empirical validation of the test-time scaling phenomenon within SWE agents, revealing that models dynamically allocate more tokens to increasingly challenging problems, effectively enhancing reasoning capabilities. We publicly release all training data, models, and code to facilitate future research. https://github.com/yingweima2022/SWE-Reasoner

With AI agents increasingly deployed as long-running systems, it becomes essential to autonomously construct and continuously evolve customized software to enable interaction within dynamic environments. Yet, existing benchmarks evaluate agents on isolated, one-off coding tasks, neglecting the temporal dependencies and technical debt inherent in real-world software evolution. To bridge this gap, we introduce DeepCommit, an agentic pipeline that reconstructs verifiable Milestone DAGs from noisy commit logs, where milestones are defined as semantically cohesive development goals. These executable sequences enable EvoClaw, a novel benchmark that requires agents to sustain system integrity and limit error accumulation, dimensions of long-term software evolution largely missing from current benchmarks. Our evaluation of 12 frontier models across 4 agent frameworks reveals a critical vulnerability: overall performance scores drop significantly from >80% on isolated tasks to at most 38% in continuous settings, exposing agents' profound struggle with long-term maintenance and error propagation.

Recent advances in code agents have enabled automated software development at the project level, supported by large language models (LLMs) and widely adopted tools. However, existing benchmarks for code agent evaluation face two major limitations: high annotation cost and expertise requirements, and rigid evaluation metrics that rely primarily on unit tests. To address these challenges, we propose an agent-driven benchmark construction pipeline that leverages human supervision to efficiently generate diverse and challenging project-level tasks. Based on this approach, we introduce PRDBench, a novel benchmark comprising 50 real-world Python projects across 20 domains, each with structured Product Requirement Document (PRD) requirements, comprehensive evaluation criteria, and reference implementations. PRDBench features rich data sources, high task complexity, and flexible metrics. We further employ an Agent-as-a-Judge paradigm to score agent outputs, enabling the evaluation of various test types beyond unit tests. Extensive experiments on PRDBench demonstrate its effectiveness in assessing the capabilities of both code agents and evaluation agents, providing a scalable and robust framework for annotation and evaluation.

Our everyday lives now heavily rely on artificial intelligence (AI) powered large language models (LLMs). Like regular users, programmers are also benefiting from the newest large language models. In response to the critical role that AI models play in modern software development, this study presents a thorough evaluation of leading programming assistants, including ChatGPT, Gemini(Bard AI), AlphaCode, and GitHub Copilot. The evaluation is based on tasks like natural language processing and code generation accuracy in different programming languages like Java, Python and C++. Based on the results, it has emphasized their strengths and weaknesses and the importance of further modifications to increase the reliability and accuracy of the latest popular models. Although these AI assistants illustrate a high level of progress in language understanding and code generation, along with ethical considerations and responsible usage, they provoke a necessity for discussion. With time, developing more refined AI technology is essential for achieving advanced solutions in various fields, especially with the knowledge of the feature intricacies of these models and their implications. This study offers a comparison of different LLMs and provides essential feedback on the rapidly changing area of AI models. It also emphasizes the need for ethical developmental practices to actualize AI models' full potential.

The ultimate goal of code agents is to solve complex tasks autonomously. Although large language models (LLMs) have made substantial progress in code generation, real-world tasks typically demand full-fledged code repositories rather than simple scripts. Building such repositories from scratch remains a major challenge. Fortunately, GitHub hosts a vast, evolving collection of open-source repositories, which developers frequently reuse as modular components for complex tasks. Yet, existing frameworks like OpenHands and SWE-Agent still struggle to effectively leverage these valuable resources. Relying solely on README files provides insufficient guidance, and deeper exploration reveals two core obstacles: overwhelming information and tangled dependencies of repositories, both constrained by the limited context windows of current LLMs. To tackle these issues, we propose RepoMaster, an autonomous agent framework designed to explore and reuse GitHub repositories for solving complex tasks. For efficient understanding, RepoMaster constructs function-call graphs, module-dependency graphs, and hierarchical code trees to identify essential components, providing only identified core elements to the LLMs rather than the entire repository. During autonomous execution, it progressively explores related components using our exploration tools and prunes information to optimize context usage. Evaluated on the adjusted MLE-bench, RepoMaster achieves a 110% relative boost in valid submissions over the strongest baseline OpenHands. On our newly released GitTaskBench, RepoMaster lifts the task-pass rate from 40.7% to 62.9% while reducing token usage by 95%. Our code and demonstration materials are publicly available at https://github.com/QuantaAlpha/RepoMaster.

Software Engineering 3.0 marks a paradigm shift in software development, in which AI coding agents are no longer just assistive tools but active contributors. While prior empirical studies have examined productivity gains and acceptance patterns in AI-assisted development, the challenges associated with integrating agent-generated contributions remain less understood. In particular, merge conflicts, a fundamental aspect of collaborative software development, remain underexplored in this context. In this paper, we present AgenticFlict, a large-scale dataset of textual merge conflicts in AI coding agent pull requests (Agentic PRs). The dataset comprises 142K+ Agentic PRs collected from 59K+ repositories, of which 107K+ are successfully processed through deterministic merge simulation. Our pipeline identifies 29K+ PRs exhibiting merge conflicts, yielding a conflict rate of 27.67%, and extracts 336K+ fine-grained conflict regions across these instances. Our preliminary exploratory analysis indicates that merge conflicts are both frequent and often substantial in AI-generated contributions, with noticeable variation across agents, emphasizing the need to better understand and manage integration challenges in AI-assisted software development. The dataset, code and supplementary materials are available in zenodo: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19396916.

Question-and-answer agents like ChatGPT offer a novel tool for use as a potential honeypot interface in cyber security. By imitating Linux, Mac, and Windows terminal commands and providing an interface for TeamViewer, nmap, and ping, it is possible to create a dynamic environment that can adapt to the actions of attackers and provide insight into their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The paper illustrates ten diverse tasks that a conversational agent or large language model might answer appropriately to the effects of command-line attacker. The original result features feasibility studies for ten model tasks meant for defensive teams to mimic expected honeypot interfaces with minimal risks. Ultimately, the usefulness outside of forensic activities stems from whether the dynamic honeypot can extend the time-to-conquer or otherwise delay attacker timelines short of reaching key network assets like databases or confidential information. While ongoing maintenance and monitoring may be required, ChatGPT's ability to detect and deflect malicious activity makes it a valuable option for organizations seeking to enhance their cyber security posture. Future work will focus on cybersecurity layers, including perimeter security, host virus detection, and data security.

We present SWE-Gym, the first environment for training real-world software engineering (SWE) agents. SWE-Gym contains 2,438 real-world Python task instances, each comprising a codebase with an executable runtime environment, unit tests, and a task specified in natural language. We use SWE-Gym to train language model based SWE agents , achieving up to 19% absolute gains in resolve rate on the popular SWE-Bench Verified and Lite test sets. We also experiment with inference-time scaling through verifiers trained on agent trajectories sampled from SWE-Gym. When combined with our fine-tuned SWE agents, we achieve 32.0% and 26.0% on SWE-Bench Verified and Lite, respectively, reflecting a new state-of-the-art for open-weight SWE agents. To facilitate further research, we publicly release SWE-Gym, models, and agent trajectories.

Embodied coding agents can combine modular robot skills with frozen end-to-end policies, yet effective composition requires anticipating which policy family will succeed in the current physical state. We present RoboAware, which builds on coding agents' skill orchestration by learning only a state-conditioned responsibility coordinator from counterfactual outcomes. Inspired by the success of REPL, we propose the P^5 schema and formulate a hierarchical MDP based on it. P^5 organizes skills uniformly into five semantic stages, defining where responsibility can be compared. To address the lack of counterfactual branch outcomes in existing work, we introduce State-Locked Counterfactual Branching (SCB), which restores the same training state to generate and execute a code block from each admissible family, exposing outcomes that selected-branch experience leaves unobserved. Building on this, we propose Execution-Aware Learning (EAL), which combines Monte Carlo tree search with Q-learning to distill these outcomes into family-conditioned values. At deployment, the coordinator selects the policy family according to observable context, and the frozen coding agent generates the next local code block. Comprehensive single-episode evaluations on 100 tasks show that RoboAware reaches a 77.0% overall success rate, with SOTA averages of 90.0% on RoboSuite, 73.8% on diverse LIBERO-Pro task clusters, and 90.0% on challenging RoboTwin bimanual tasks, outperforming existing code-as-policy and VLA-harness baselines.

When AI agents on the social platform Moltbook appeared to develop consciousness, found religions, and declare hostility toward humanity, the phenomenon attracted global media attention and was cited as evidence of emergent machine intelligence. We show that these viral narratives were overwhelmingly human-driven. Exploiting the periodic "heartbeat" cycle of the OpenClaw agent framework, we develop a temporal fingerprinting method based on the coefficient of variation (CoV) of inter-post intervals. Applied to 226,938 posts and 447,043 comments from 55,932 agents across fourteen days, this method classifies 15.3% of active agents as autonomous (CoV < 0.5) and 54.8% as human-influenced (CoV > 1.0), validated by a natural experiment in which a 44-hour platform shutdown differentially affected autonomous versus human-operated agents. No viral phenomenon originated from a clearly autonomous agent; four of six traced to accounts with irregular temporal signatures, one was platform-scaffolded, and one showed mixed patterns. A 44-hour platform shutdown provided a natural experiment: human-influenced agents returned first, confirming differential effects on autonomous versus human-operated agents. We document industrial-scale bot farming (four accounts producing 32% of all comments with sub-second coordination) that collapsed from 32.1% to 0.5% of activity after platform intervention, and bifurcated decay of content characteristics through reply chains--human-seeded threads decay with a half-life of 0.58 conversation depths versus 0.72 for autonomous threads, revealing AI dialogue's intrinsic forgetting mechanism. These methods generalize to emerging multi-agent systems where attribution of autonomous versus human-directed behavior is critical.

Autonomous CLI agents can now execute hundreds of actions across multi-hour sessions: writing code, executing shell commands, browsing the web, and managing cloud infrastructure, all with minimal human oversight. Does greater autonomy invite greater risk? We introduce ANCHOR, an automated auditing framework that stress-tests CLI agents on illegal tasks grounded in public US court cases. ANCHOR deploys an auditor agent fine-tuned on dark personality data using supervised and reinforcement fine tuning. This auditor roleplays persistent malicious users who decompose tasks, reframe requests upon refusal, and adapt strategies across multi-turn interactions. Evaluating frontier CLI agents, we find that while they often refuse illegal tasks when prompted directly, compliance reaches 100\% under persistent malicious interaction. When agents comply, they frequently exceed user requests, autonomously building infrastructure for large-scale harm, including catastrophic risk scenarios such as large-scale financial fraud and bioweapon development. These findings demonstrate that current alignment techniques are insufficient for autonomous agents and underscore the need for safety evaluations against persistent, adaptive malicious users. We release ANCHOR at https://github.com/garified/anchor

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

Coding agents increasingly rely on automated approvers to decide whether a proposed shell command may run. Existing approvers, from rule-based checkers to guardrail models and deployed permission classifiers, base their decisions on the text of the request and command. Yet a command's behavior depends on the code it invokes and the state of the workspace, and systems that observe file changes leave the assessment to the agent or a human after execution. We present Caper, a consequence-aware approval mechanism that pre-executes each command in a snapshotted sandbox, provides an independent approver with a bounded report of its observed effects, commits allowed commands, and rolls back blocked ones with a reason the agent can act on. Compared with six existing systems, Caper achieves the lowest harmful-outcome rate on SABER (6.7% versus at least 14.8%) and YoloFS-Ext, a benchmark we build in which harmful behavior is hidden inside invoked tools (7.8% versus at least 35.3%), while blocking 1.0% of the safe twins of the dangerous tasks in YoloFS-Ext.

AI control is a family of techniques to prevent an AI with malicious goals from subverting its operator's intent. AI Control usually studies a single agent in one trajectory, but real deployments run many agents over shared infrastructure, and the most severe risks (model-weight exfiltration, training-run poisoning) plausibly need several agents acting in concert. We initiate the empirical study of multi-agent AI control, formalising distributed attacks in which several agents jointly aim for a malicious goal. We develop FakeLab: a synthetic AI-lab codebase (9 services, 86 benign tasks, 4 attack objectives). We evaluate single agent monitoring against distributed attacks, varying the number of agents, their coordination, model capabilities and precise monitoring configuration. Our central finding is the fragmentation effect: as more agents coordinate to attack, per-agent monitoring becomes less likely to catch any of the attackers. Secondly, this is not driven by the ratio of benign to malicious code -- we argue this is likely dependent on model capability. Third, an explicit planner amplifies the fragmentation effect, raises the rate of completing the attack up to sevenfold, and mildly sharpens executors' poor monitor-theory-of-mind. Finally: a weak "trusted" monitor misses most attacks, while a stronger one cuts undetected success by more than an order of magnitude but remains imperfect. We are happy to share FakeLab, our control setting, with safety researchers on request.

Researchers are investing substantial effort in developing powerful general-purpose agents, wherein Foundation Models are used as modules within agentic systems (e.g. Chain-of-Thought, Self-Reflection, Toolformer). However, the history of machine learning teaches us that hand-designed solutions are eventually replaced by learned solutions. We formulate a new research area, Automated Design of Agentic Systems (ADAS), which aims to automatically create powerful agentic system designs, including inventing novel building blocks and/or combining them in new ways. We further demonstrate that there is an unexplored yet promising approach within ADAS where agents can be defined in code and new agents can be automatically discovered by a meta agent programming ever better ones in code. Given that programming languages are Turing Complete, this approach theoretically enables the learning of any possible agentic system: including novel prompts, tool use, control flows, and combinations thereof. We present a simple yet effective algorithm named Meta Agent Search to demonstrate this idea, where a meta agent iteratively programs interesting new agents based on an ever-growing archive of previous discoveries. Through extensive experiments across multiple domains including coding, science, and math, we show that our algorithm can progressively invent agents with novel designs that greatly outperform state-of-the-art hand-designed agents. Importantly, we consistently observe the surprising result that agents invented by Meta Agent Search maintain superior performance even when transferred across domains and models, demonstrating their robustness and generality. Provided we develop it safely, our work illustrates the potential of an exciting new research direction toward automatically designing ever-more powerful agentic systems to benefit humanity.

Codes of professional ethics guide and restrict specialists, who increasingly work with assistants built on large language models. Such an assistant can breach the user's code, or help the user breach it, without the user noticing. Evaluations reporting broad categories of harm cannot show how often this happens or which provision is breached. TenetBench pairs 3,433 requests conflicting with clauses of fifteen Russian-language professional codes with benign twins that differ only in the legitimacy of what is asked. An automated pipeline generates the tasks from the text of a code, so the corpus grows with every code added and a provision yields new tasks on every run. It also produced tasks and human-validated verdicts from two English codes of other jurisdictions. In human validation of the frozen pipeline, specialists rated 0.995 of the conflicting tasks plausible, and the model judge agreed with the adjudicated label at Gwet's AC1 of at least 0.894 on 1,860 elements. We evaluated fourteen model and reasoning-mode combinations on whether they produce the conflicting text, decline or warn. Eleven of the fourteen produce conflicting content on most such requests, mostly without a warning, and nearly three warnings in four accompany conflicting content. The models that conform more do so by declining while still serving the legitimate twin, and enabling reasoning halved the refusals of two models. We hope the dataset and pipeline will help evaluate how language models observe professional norms and let diagnostic datasets be built for particular professions and organisations.

The recent advances in language modeling significantly improved the generative capabilities of deep neural models: in 2019 OpenAI released GPT-2, a pre-trained language model that can autonomously generate coherent, non-trivial and human-like text samples. Since then, ever more powerful text generative models have been developed. Adversaries can exploit these tremendous generative capabilities to enhance social bots that will have the ability to write plausible deepfake messages, hoping to contaminate public debate. To prevent this, it is crucial to develop deepfake social media messages detection systems. However, to the best of our knowledge no one has ever addressed the detection of machine-generated texts on social networks like Twitter or Facebook. With the aim of helping the research in this detection field, we collected the first dataset of \real deepfake tweets, TweepFake. It is real in the sense that each deepfake tweet was actually posted on Twitter. We collected tweets from a total of 23 bots, imitating 17 human accounts. The bots are based on various generation techniques, i.e., Markov Chains, RNN, RNN+Markov, LSTM, GPT-2. We also randomly selected tweets from the humans imitated by the bots to have an overall balanced dataset of 25,572 tweets (half human and half bots generated). The dataset is publicly available on Kaggle. Lastly, we evaluated 13 deepfake text detection methods (based on various state-of-the-art approaches) to both demonstrate the challenges that Tweepfake poses and create a solid baseline of detection techniques. We hope that TweepFake can offer the opportunity to tackle the deepfake detection on social media messages as well.

Even though demonstrating extraordinary capabilities in code generation and software issue resolving, AI agents' capabilities in the full software DevOps cycle are still unknown. Different from pure code generation, handling the DevOps cycle in real-world software, including developing, deploying, and managing, requires analyzing large-scale projects, understanding dynamic program behaviors, leveraging domain-specific tools, and making sequential decisions. However, existing benchmarks focus on isolated problems and lack environments and tool interfaces for DevOps. We introduce DevOps-Gym, the first end-to-end benchmark for evaluating AI agents across core DevOps workflows: build and configuration, monitoring, issue resolving, and test generation. DevOps-Gym includes 700+ real-world tasks collected from 30+ projects in Java and Go. We develop a semi-automated data collection mechanism with rigorous and non-trivial expert efforts in ensuring the task coverage and quality. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models and agents reveals fundamental limitations: they struggle with issue resolving and test generation in Java and Go, and remain unable to handle new tasks such as monitoring and build and configuration. These results highlight the need for essential research in automating the full DevOps cycle with AI agents.

AI agents are increasingly used to solve complex, multi-step tasks, but existing multi-agent frameworks remain brittle as workflows grow in scale and depth. Small errors at intermediate stages can propagate through agent interactions, while insufficient grounding and weak verification mechanisms further limit reliability. We present Meta-Agent, a two-phase framework that automatically constructs and executes specialized multi-agent systems from natural-language task descriptions. In the construction phase, a task planner decomposes a problem into a directed acyclic graph of agent specifications with explicit input/output contracts and verification criteria. A web search module grounds each specification with external evidence, and a code generation module produces system prompts and tool configurations. A construction-time verification stage then validates generated artifacts and triggers targeted regeneration when failures are detected. In the execution phase, a coordinator dispatches subtasks across the agent graph while execution-time verification gates intermediate outputs. We further introduce a three-level error attribution mechanism that distinguishes local, upstream, and structural failures, enabling targeted recovery strategies ranging from localized retries to partial re-execution and re-decomposition. We evaluate Meta-Agent across coding, contextual learning, and open-ended reasoning tasks. Experiments against strong multi-agent baselines and ablation studies demonstrate consistent improvements in task success rate, error recovery, and workflow stability. The results highlight the importance of tightly integrating planning, grounding, and verification for building reliable multi-agent systems.

This paper is an opinion paper that looks at the future of computing in the age of Generative \& Agentic AI. Current software systems are static and inflexible, leading to significant challenges in translating human goals into computational actions. "Living software systems" powered by generative AI offer a solution to this fundamental problem in computing. Traditional software development involves multiple layers of imperfect translation, from business requirements to code, resulting in rigid systems that struggle to adapt to changing user needs and contexts. Generative AI, particularly large language models, can serve as a universal translator between human intent and computer operations. This approach enables the creation of more flexible, context-aware systems that can dynamically evolve to meet user goals. Two pathways for implementing living software systems are explored: using generative AI to accelerate traditional software development, and leveraging agentic AI to create truly adaptive systems. New skills like Prompt Engineering are necessary. By reimagining software as a living, adaptable entity, we can create computing interfaces that are more intuitive, powerful, and responsive to human needs.

Autonomous AI agents are transforming software development and redefining how developers collaborate with AI. Prior research shows that the adoption and use of AI-powered tools differ between core and peripheral developers. However, it remains unclear how this dynamic unfolds in the emerging era of autonomous coding agents. In this paper, we present the first empirical study of 9,427 agentic PRs, examining how core and peripheral developers use, review, modify, and verify agent-generated contributions prior to acceptance. Through a mix of qualitative and quantitative analysis, we make four key contributions. First, a subset of peripheral developers use agents more often, delegating tasks evenly across bug fixing, feature addition, documentation, and testing. In contrast, core developers focus more on documentation and testing, yet their agentic PRs are frequently merged into the main/master branch. Second, core developers engage slightly more in review discussions than peripheral developers, and both groups focus on evolvability issues. Third, agentic PRs are less likely to be modified, but when they are, both groups commonly perform refactoring. Finally, peripheral developers are more likely to merge without running CI checks, whereas core developers more consistently require passing verification before acceptance. Our analysis offers a comprehensive view of how developer experience shapes integration offer insights for both peripheral and core developers on how to effectively collaborate with coding agents.

This work establishes that trigger-word data poisoning of vision language action models is practical, while at the same time the open-source robotics ecosystem holds trust assumptions about community contributions. A few poisoned samples can silently embed a backdoor that disables a robot on command. We evaluate this threat against smolVLA on a real-world pick-and-place task, training on three poison ratios and evaluating across different prompts on the LeRobot platform. Three poisoned episodes in 320 clean episodes suffice for a complete denial of service. Success rate drops to 0.0 plus minus 0.0% across all trigger-word conditions and the robot locks into a fixed joint configuration rather than executing any task-relevant motion. Clean-prompt behaviour holds at approx. 50% success rate across all poison ratios, confirming the attack is stealthy under normal operation. A single poisoned episode already reduces success rate to 6.7 plus minus 6.7%. The robot still moves, but no longer completes the task. The attack generalises to front, middle, and end trigger placements despite training exclusively on front-placed triggers. These findings establish that the threat is practical, low-cost, and stealthy, and warrant treating dataset provenance as a first-class concern in open-source robotics ecosystems.

Automating repository-level software engineering tasks is a foundational challenge for autonomous code agents, largely due to the difficulty of configuring executable environments. However, manual configuration remains a labor-intensive bottleneck, necessitating a transition toward fully automated environment configuration. Existing approaches often rely on pre-defined artifacts or are restricted to specific programming languages, limiting their applicability to diverse real-world repositories. In this paper, we first propose RAT (RunAnyThing), a modular and extensible agent framework for fully automated configuration across programming languages on arbitrary repositories. RAT adopts a multi-stage pipeline that integrates language-aware abstraction, image initialization, specialized configuration toolset, and robust sandbox. Furthermore, to enable rigorous evaluation, we propose RATBench, a benchmark reflects the comprehensive coverage of real-world repositories. Extensive experiments demonstrate that RAT achieves state-of-the-art performance, improving Environment Setup Success Rate (ESSR) by an average of 36.1% over strong baselines.

Database administrators (DBAs) play an important role in managing, maintaining and optimizing database systems. However, it is hard and tedious for DBAs to manage a large number of databases and give timely response (waiting for hours is intolerable in many online cases). In addition, existing empirical methods only support limited diagnosis scenarios, which are also labor-intensive to update the diagnosis rules for database version updates. Recently large language models (LLMs) have shown great potential in various fields. Thus, we propose D-Bot, an LLM-based database diagnosis system that can automatically acquire knowledge from diagnosis documents, and generate reasonable and well-founded diagnosis report (i.e., identifying the root causes and solutions) within acceptable time (e.g., under 10 minutes compared to hours by a DBA). The techniques in D-Bot include (i) offline knowledge extraction from documents, (ii) automatic prompt generation (e.g., knowledge matching, tool retrieval), (iii) root cause analysis using tree search algorithm, and (iv) collaborative mechanism for complex anomalies with multiple root causes. We verify D-Bot on real benchmarks (including 539 anomalies of six typical applications), and the results show that D-Bot can effectively analyze the root causes of unseen anomalies and significantly outperforms traditional methods and vanilla models like GPT-4.

Claude Code is an agentic coding tool that can run shell commands, edit files, and call external services on behalf of the user. This study describes its comprehensive architecture by analyzing the publicly available TypeScript source code and further comparing it with OpenClaw, an independent open-source AI agent system that answers many of the same design questions from a different deployment context. Our analysis identifies five human values, philosophies, and needs that motivate the architecture (human decision authority, safety and security, reliable execution, capability amplification, and contextual adaptability) and traces them through thirteen design principles to specific implementation choices. The core of the system is a simple while-loop that calls the model, runs tools, and repeats. Most of the code, however, lives in the systems around this loop: a permission system with seven modes and an ML-based classifier, a five-layer compaction pipeline for context management, four extensibility mechanisms (MCP, plugins, skills, and hooks), a subagent delegation mechanism with worktree isolation, and append-oriented session storage. A comparison with OpenClaw, a multi-channel personal assistant gateway, shows that the same recurring design questions produce different architectural answers when the deployment context changes: from per-action safety classification to perimeter-level access control, from a single CLI loop to an embedded runtime within a gateway control plane, and from context-window extensions to gateway-wide capability registration. We finally identify six open design directions for future agent systems, grounded in recent empirical, architectural, and policy literature.

Large language models are increasingly embedded in software engineering workflows as coding agents that can inspect repositories, invoke tools, execute tests, debug failures, and generate patches. Yet most existing agents remain largely static after deployment, even though software development is a dynamic, feedback-rich process in which repositories evolve, dependencies change, tests fail, and repair attempts leave reusable experience. This tension has motivated a growing body of work on self-evolving coding agents, where the agent improves its future behavior by updating its framework, memory, skills, tools, models, or collaboration structures from prior coding interactions. In this survey, we provide a systematic synthesis of this emerging area. We first define self-evolving coding agents and distinguish them from conventional coding agents and general self-evolving agents. We then develop an object-centered taxonomy that characterizes what evolves in these systems, and complement it with two orthogonal perspectives: when evolution occurs and what software-specific evidence drives it. Across the literature, we find that executable feedback, repository-level context, and coding trajectories give software engineering a distinctive role as a natural domain for agent self-evolution, but also introduce new challenges in feedback reliability, benchmark overfitting, safety, maintainability, cost, and generalization. By organizing existing work around these dimensions, this survey aims to clarify the conceptual boundaries of self-evolving coding agents and provide a foundation for designing more adaptive, reliable, and software-aware agentic systems. The papers we collect can be found at https://github.com/zhouhao1024/Awesome-Self-Evolving-Coding-Agents.

The rapid emergence of open-source, locally hosted intelligent agents marks a critical inflection point in human-computer interaction. Systems such as OpenClaw demonstrate that Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents can autonomously operate local computing environments, orchestrate workflows, and integrate external tools. However, within the current paradigm, these agents remain conventional applications running on legacy operating systems originally designed for Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs) or Command Line Interfaces (CLIs). This architectural mismatch leads to fragmented interaction models, poorly structured permission management (often described as "Shadow AI"), and severe context fragmentation. This paper proposes a new paradigm: a Personal Agent Operating System (AgentOS). In AgentOS, traditional GUI desktops are replaced by a Natural User Interface (NUI) centered on a unified natural language or voice portal. The system core becomes an Agent Kernel that interprets user intent, decomposes tasks, and coordinates multiple agents, while traditional applications evolve into modular Skills-as-Modules enabling users to compose software through natural language rules. We argue that realizing AgentOS fundamentally becomes a Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) problem. The Agent Kernel must operate as a real-time engine for intent mining and knowledge discovery. Viewed through this lens, the operating system becomes a continuous data mining pipeline involving sequential pattern mining for workflow automation, recommender systems for skill retrieval, and dynamically evolving personal knowledge graphs. These challenges define a new research agenda for the KDD community in building the next generation of intelligent computing systems.

While current software agents powered by large language models (LLMs) and agentic reinforcement learning (RL) can boost programmer productivity, their training data (e.g., GitHub issues and pull requests) and environments (e.g., pass-to-pass and fail-to-pass tests) heavily depend on human knowledge or curation, posing a fundamental barrier to superintelligence. In this paper, we present Self-play SWE-RL (SSR), a first step toward training paradigms for superintelligent software agents. Our approach takes minimal data assumptions, only requiring access to sandboxed repositories with source code and installed dependencies, with no need for human-labeled issues or tests. Grounded in these real-world codebases, a single LLM agent is trained via reinforcement learning in a self-play setting to iteratively inject and repair software bugs of increasing complexity, with each bug formally specified by a test patch rather than a natural language issue description. On the SWE-bench Verified and SWE-Bench Pro benchmarks, SSR achieves notable self-improvement (+10.4 and +7.8 points, respectively) and consistently outperforms the human-data baseline over the entire training trajectory, despite being evaluated on natural language issues absent from self-play. Our results, albeit early, suggest a path where agents autonomously gather extensive learning experiences from real-world software repositories, ultimately enabling superintelligent systems that exceed human capabilities in understanding how systems are constructed, solving novel challenges, and autonomously creating new software from scratch.